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  1. Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics.Galen Strawson - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    What is the self? Does it exist? If it does exist, what is it like? It's not clear that we even know what we're asking about when we ask these large, metaphysical questions. The idea of the self comes very naturally to us, and it seems rather important, but it's also extremely puzzling. As for the word "self"--it's been taken in so many different ways that it seems that you can mean more or less what you like by it and (...)
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  • Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory.Uriah Kriegel - 2009 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Some mental events are conscious, some are unconscious. What is the difference between the two? Uriah Kriegel offers an answer. His aim is a comprehensive theory of the features that all and only conscious mental events have. The key idea is that consciousness arises when self-awareness and world-awareness are integrated in the right way. Conscious mental events differ from unconscious ones in that, whatever else they may represent, they always also represent themselves, and do so in a very specific way. (...)
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  • Do You Have Constant Tactile Experience of Your Feet in Your Shoes? Or is Experience Limited to What's in Attention?Eric Schwitzgebel - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (3):5-35.
    According to rich views of consciousness (e.g., James, Searle), we have a constant, complex flow of experience (or 'phenomenology') in multiple modalities simultaneously. According to thin views (e.g., Dennett, Mack and Rock), conscious experience is limited to one or a few topics, regions, objects, or modalities at a time. Existing introspective and empirical arguments on this issue (including arguments from 'inattentional blindness') generally beg the question. Participants in the present experiment wore beepers during everyday activity. When a beep sounded, they (...)
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  • Attention and Consciousness.Christopher Mole - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (4):86-104.
    According to commonsense psychology, one is conscious of everything that one pays attention to, but one does not pay attention to all the things that one is conscious of. Recent lines of research purport to show that commonsense is mistaken on both of these points: Mack and Rock (1998) tell us that attention is necessary for consciousness, while Kentridge and Heywood (2001) claim that consciousness is not necessary for attention. If these lines of research were successful they would have important (...)
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  • Why Are Dreams Interesting for Philosophers? The Example of Minimal Phenomenal Selfhood, Plus an Agenda for Future Research.Thomas Metzinger - 2013 - Frontiers in Psychology 4:746.
    This metatheoretical paper develops a list of new research targets by exploring particularly promising interdisciplinary contact points between empirical dream research and philosophy of mind. The central example is the MPS-problem. It is constituted by the epistemic goal of conceptually isolating and empirically grounding the phenomenal property of “minimal phenomenal selfhood,” which refers to the simplest form of self-consciousness. In order to precisely describe MPS, one must focus on those conditions that are not only causally enabling, but strictly necessary to (...)
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  • The Structure of Experience, the Nature of the Visual, and Type 2 Blindsight‌.Fiona Macpherson - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 32:104 - 128.
    Unlike those with type 1 blindsight, people who have type 2 blindsight have some sort of consciousness of the stimuli in their blind field. What is the nature of that consciousness? Is it visual experience? I address these questions by considering whether we can establish the existence of any structural—necessary—features of visual experience. I argue that it is very difficult to establish the existence of any such features. In particular, I investigate whether it is possible to visually, or more generally (...)
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  • Full-Body Illusions and Minimal Phenomenal Selfhood.Olaf Blanke & Thomas Metzinger - 2009 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):7-13.
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  • Interoceptive Inference, Emotion, and the Embodied Self.Anil K. Seth - 2013 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (11):565-573.
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  • Cortical Midline Structures and the Self.Georg Northoff & Felix Bermpohl - 2004 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):102-107.
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  • What is Self-Specific? Theoretical Investigation and Critical Review of Neuroimaging Results.Dorothée Legrand & Perrine Ruby - 2009 - Psychological Review 116 (1):252-282.
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  • What is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness?David J. Chalmers - 2000 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 17--39.
    The search for neural correlates of consciousness (or NCCs) is arguably the cornerstone in the recent resurgence of the science of consciousness. The search poses many difficult empirical problems, but it seems to be tractable in principle, and some ingenious studies in recent years have led to considerable progress. A number of proposals have been put forward concerning the nature and location of neural correlates of consciousness. A few of these include.
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  • Influence of Meditation on Anti-Correlated Networks in the Brain.Zoran Josipovic, Ilan Dinstein, Jochen Weber & David J. Heeger - 2011 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 5.
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  • Minimal Self-Models and the Free Energy Principle.Jakub Limanowski & Felix Blankenburg - 2013 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.
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  • A Philosophical Perspective on the Relation Between Cortical Midline Structures and the Self.Kristina Musholt - 2013 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.
    In recent years there has been increasing evidence that an area in the brain called the cortical midline structures is implicated in what has been termed self-related processing. This article will discuss recent evidence for the relation between CMS and self-consciousness in light of several important philosophical distinctions. First, we should distinguish between being a self and being aware of being a self. While the former consists in having a first-person perspective on the world, the latter requires the ability to (...)
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  • Anomalous Self-Experience in Depersonalization and Schizophrenia: A Comparative Investigation.Louis Sass, Elizabeth Pienkos, Barnaby Nelson & Nick Medford - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2):430-441.
    Various forms of anomalous self-experience can be seen as central to schizophrenia and other psychiatric disorders. We examined similarities and differences between anomalous self-experiences common in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, as listed in the EASE , and those described in published accounts of severe depersonalization. Our aims were to consider anomalous self-experience in schizophrenia in a comparative context, to refine and enlarge upon existing descriptions of experiential disturbances in depersonalization, and to explore hypotheses concerning a possible core process in schizophrenia . Numerous (...)
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  • Ego-Dissolution and Psychedelics: Validation of the Ego-Dissolution Inventory.Matthew M. Nour, Lisa Evans, David Nutt & Robin L. Carhart-Harris - 2016 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 10.
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  • The Entropic Brain: A Theory of Conscious States Informed by Neuroimaging Research with Psychedelic Drugs.Robin L. Carhart-Harris, Robert Leech, Peter J. Hellyer, Murray Shanahan, Amanda Feilding, Enzo Tagliazucchi, Dante R. Chialvo & David Nutt - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
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  • Naturalizing Subjective Character.Uriah Kriegel - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):23-57.
    . When I have a conscious experience of the sky, there is a bluish way it is like for me to have that experience. We may distinguish two aspects of this "bluish way it is like for me": the bluish aspect and the for-me aspect. Let us call the bluish aspect of the experience its qualitative character and the for-me aspect its subjective character . What is this elusive for-me-ness, or subjective character , of conscious experience? In this paper, I (...)
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  • Spatial Aspects of Bodily Self-Consciousness.Bigna Lenggenhager, Michael Mouthon & Olaf Blanke - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):110-117.
    Visual, somatosensory, and perspectival cues normally provide congruent information about where the self is experienced. Separating those cues by virtual reality techniques, recent studies found that self-location was systematically biased to where a visual–tactile event was seen. Here we developed a novel, repeatable and implicit measure of self-location to compare and extend previous protocols. We investigated illusory self-location and associated phenomenological aspects in a lying body position that facilitates clinically observed abnormal self-location . The results confirm that the self is (...)
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  • What Can Body Ownership Illusions Tell Us About Minimal Phenomenal Selfhood?Jakub Limanowski - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
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  • Microcognitive Science: Bridging Experiential and Neuronal Microdynamics.Claire Petitmengin & Jean-Philippe Lachaux - 2013 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.
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  • Philosophical Conceptions of the Self: Implications for Cognitive Science.Shaun Gallagher - 2000 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):14-21.
    Although philosophical approaches to the self are diverse, several of them are relevant to cognitive science. First, the notion of a 'minimal self', a self devoid of temporal extension, is clarified by distinguishing between a sense of agency and a sense of ownership for action. To the extent that these senses are subject to failure in pathologies like schizophrenia, a neuropsychological model of schizophrenia may help to clarify the nature of the minimal self and its neurological underpinnings. Second, there is (...)
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  • The Immersive Spatiotemporal Hallucination Model of Dreaming.Jennifer M. Windt - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):295-316.
    The paper proposes a minimal definition of dreaming in terms of immersive spatiotemporal hallucination (ISTH) occurring in sleep or during sleep–wake transitions and under the assumption of reportability. I take these conditions to be both necessary and sufficient for dreaming to arise. While empirical research results may, in the future, allow for an extension of the concept of dreaming beyond sleep and possibly even independently of reportability, ISTH is part of any possible extension of this definition and thus is a (...)
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  • I Me Mine: On a Confusion Concerning the Subjective Character of Experience.Marie Guillot - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-31.
    In recent debates on phenomenal consciousness, a distinction is sometimes made, after Levine (2001) and Kriegel (2009), between the “qualitative character” of an experience, i.e. the specific way it feels to the subject (e.g. blueish or sweetish or pleasant), and its “subjective character”, i.e. the fact that there is anything at all that it feels like to her. I argue that much discussion of subjective character is affected by a conflation between three different notions. I start by disentangling the three (...)
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  • Bodily Awareness and Self-Consciousness.José Luis Bermúdez & I. V. Objections - 2011 - In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press.
    This article argues that bodily awareness is a basic form of self-consciousness through which perceiving agents are directly conscious of the bodily self. It clarifies the nature of bodily awareness, categorises the different types of body-relative information, and rejects the claim that we can have a sense of ownership of our own bodies. It explores how bodily awareness functions as a form of self-consciousness and highlights the importance of certain forms of bodily awareness that share an important epistemological property with (...)
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  • Self Unbound: Ego Dissolution in Psychedelic Experience.Chris Letheby & Philip Gerrans - 2017 - Neuroscience of Consciousness 3:1-11.
    Users of psychedelic drugs often report that their sense of being a self or ‘I’ distinct from the rest of the world has diminished or altogether dissolved. Neuroscientific study of such ‘ego dissolution’ experiences offers a window onto the nature of self-awareness. We argue that ego dissolution is best explained by an account that explains self-awareness as resulting from the integrated functioning of hierarchical predictive models which posit the existence of a stable and unchanging entity to which representations are bound. (...)
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  • Bayesian Inferences About the Self : A Review.Michael Moutoussis, Pasco Fearon, Wael El-Deredy, Raymond J. Dolan & Karl J. Friston - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 25:67-76.
    Viewing the brain as an organ of approximate Bayesian inference can help us understand how it represents the self. We suggest that inferred representations of the self have a normative function: to predict and optimise the likely outcomes of social interactions. Technically, we cast this predict-and-optimise as maximising the chance of favourable outcomes through active inference. Here the utility of outcomes can be conceptualised as prior beliefs about final states. Actions based on interpersonal representations can therefore be understood as minimising (...)
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  • Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness.Christopher S. Hill - 2002 - Mind 111 (444):882-888.
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  • Video Ergo Sum: Manipulating Bodily Self-Consciousness.Bigna Lenggenhager, Tej Tadi, Thomas Metzinger & Olaf Blanke - 2007 - Science 317 (5841):1096-1099.
    Genes adjacent to species-specific loci are 6.2% older than genes adjacent to other dynamic loci (P < 10−2 by randomization; gray bars in Fig. 3); thus, species-specific genes are not randomly distributed but are found preferentially in the older regions, indicating that the incipient Escherichia and Salmonella lineages continued to participate in recombination at loci unlinked to lineage-specific genes.
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  • How Does It Feel to Lack a Sense of Boundaries? A Case Study of a Long-Term Mindfulness Meditator.Yochai Ataria, Yair Dor-Ziderman & Aviva Berkovich-Ohana - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 37:133-147.
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  • The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness.Mark Johnson - 2001 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 15 (4):323-326.
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  • Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity.George Graham - 2004 - Mind 113 (450):369-372.
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  • Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective.Dan Zahavi - 2005 - Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
    The relationship of self, and self-awareness, and experience: exploring classical phenomenological analyses and their relevance to contemporary discussions in ...
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  • The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2012 - MIT Press.
    Consciousness is arguably the most important area within contemporary philosophy of mind and perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the world. Despite an explosion of research from philosophers, psychologists, and scientists, attempts to explain consciousness in neurophysiological, or even cognitive, terms are often met with great resistance. In The Consciousness Paradox, Rocco Gennaro aims to solve an underlying paradox, namely, how it is possible to hold a number of seemingly inconsistent views, including higher-order thought (HOT) theory, conceptualism, infant and animal (...)
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  • What is It Like to Be a Bat.Thomas Nagel - 1974 - E-Journal Philosophie der Psychologie 5.
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  • Phenomenology and the Project of Naturalization.Dan Zahavi - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4):331-47.
    In recent years, more and more people have started talking about the necessity of reconciling phenomenology with the project of naturalization. Is it possible to bridge the gap between phenomenological analyses and naturalistic models of consciousness? Is it possible to naturalize phenomenology? Given the transcendental philosophically motivated anti-naturalism found in many phenomenologists such a naturalization proposal might seem doomed from the very start, but in this paper I will examine and evaluate some possible alternatives.
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  • Describing One’s Subjective Experience in the Second Person: An Interview Method for the Science of Consciousness. [REVIEW]Claire Petitmengin - 2006 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4):229-269.
    This article presents an interview method which enables us to bring a person, who may not even have been trained, to become aware of his or her subjective experience, and describe it with great precision. It is focused on the difficulties of becoming aware of one’s subjective experience and describing it, and on the processes used by this interview technique to overcome each of these difficulties. The article ends with a discussion of the criteria governing the validity of the descriptions (...)
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  • The Bodily Self: The Sensori-Motor Roots of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness. [REVIEW]Dorothée Legrand - 2006 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):89-118.
    A bodily self is characterized by pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness that is.
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  • Dreaming: A Conceptual Framework for Philosophy of Mind and Empirical Research.Jennifer Windt - unknown
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  • What About the “Self” is Processed in the Posterior Cingulate Cortex?Judson A. Brewer, Kathleen A. Garrison & Susan Whitfield-Gabrieli - 2013 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.
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  • Peripersonal Space as the Space of the Bodily Self.Jean-Paul Noel, Christian Pfeiffer, Olaf Blanke & Andrea Serino - 2015 - Cognition 144:49-57.
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  • Specifying the Self for Cognitive Neuroscience.Kalina Christoff, Diego Cosmelli, Dorothée Legrand & Evan Thompson - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):104-112.
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  • Whatever Next? Predictive Brains, Situated Agents, and the Future of Cognitive Science.Andy Clark - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3):181-204.
    Brains, it has recently been argued, are essentially prediction machines. They are bundles of cells that support perception and action by constantly attempting to match incoming sensory inputs with top-down expectations or predictions. This is achieved using a hierarchical generative model that aims to minimize prediction error within a bidirectional cascade of cortical processing. Such accounts offer a unifying model of perception and action, illuminate the functional role of attention, and may neatly capture the special contribution of cortical processing to (...)
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  • Neurophenomenology: A Methodological Remedy for the Hard Problem.F. Varela - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):330-49.
    This paper responds to the issues raised by D. Chalmers by offering a research direction which is quite radical because of the way in which methodological principles are linked to scientific studies of consciousness. Neuro-phenomenology is the name I use here to designate a quest to marry modern cognitive science and a disciplined approach to human experience, thereby placing myself in the lineage of the continental tradition of Phenomenology. My claim is that the so-called hard problem that animates these Special (...)
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  • Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness.Joseph Levine - 2001 - Philosophy 77 (299):130-135.
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  • Crossmodal Space and Crossmodal Attention.Charles Spence & Jon Driver (eds.) - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    Many organisms possess multiple sensory systems, such as vision, hearing, touch, smell, and taste. The possession of multiple ways of sensing the world offers many benefits. However, combining information from different senses also poses many challenges for the nervous system. In recent years there has been dramatic progress in understanding how information from the different senses gets integrated in order to construct useful representations of external space. This volume brings together the leading researchers from a broad range of scientific approaches (...)
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  • Phenomenology and Experimental Design: Toward a Phenomenologically Enlightened Experimental Science.Shaun Gallagher - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):85-99.
    I review three answers to the question: How can phenomenology contribute to the experimental cognitive neurosciences? The first approach, neurophenomenology, employs phenomenological method and training, and uses first-person reports not just as more data for analysis, but to generate descriptive categories that are intersubjectively and scientifically validated, and are then used to interpret results that correlate with objective measurements of behaviour and brain activity. A second approach, indirect phenomenology, is shown to be problematic in a number of ways. Indirect phenomenology (...)
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  • Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame.Dan Zahavi - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Dan Zahavi engages with classical phenomenology, philosophy of mind, and a range of empirical disciplines to explore the nature of selfhood. He argues that the most fundamental level of selfhood is not socially constructed or dependent upon others, but accepts that certain dimensions of the self and types of self-experience are other-mediated.
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  • What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
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  • Is Minimal Self Preserved in Schizophrenia? A Subcomponents View☆.Aaron L. Mishara - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):715-721.
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