Carolyn M Stone; Autonomy, Emotions and Desires: some problems concerning R. F. Dearden's account of autonomy, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 24, Is.

It is suggested that the current hierarchical (Frankfurt-Dworkin) model of personal autonomy in philosophical anthropology gives expression to the fundamental presupposition of self-determination in much educational practice and pedagogical theory. Radical criticisms are made of the notions of self-identification and self-evaluation which are of the utmost importance to this model. Instead of relying on such ‘acts of the will’ as decision and choice for the explanation of self-identification and self- evaluation, the non-intentional as well as the non-individualistic character of these (...) processes is stressed and analysed in terms of volitional necessity and social dependence. The consequence of this criticism is the substitution of the concept of extreme personal autonomy by that of caring about oneself as the first principle of education. (shrink)

The Humean conception of the self prevalent in the contemporary literature in moral and political philosophy, philosophy of mind, and action theory has yielded a persuasive model of human action that has contributed considerably to our understanding of moral motivation, rational action, and many other issues. But it has also generated certain problems. I should like to take issue with this conception, first by describing it in some detail and charting its connection with two such interrelated problems in moral psychology. (...) Then I shall propose an alternative conception, cribbed in its essentials from Kant ’s metaphysics, that purports to do an even better job of explaining the psychological phenomena. Finally I shall argue that on the suggested alternative, these two problems do not arise. (shrink)

It is suggested that the current hierarchical (Frankfurt-Dworkin) model of personal autonomy in philosophical anthropology gives expression to the fundamental presupposition of self-determination in much educational practice and pedagogical theory. Radical criticisms are made of the notions of self-identification and self-evaluation which are of the utmost importance to this model. Instead of relying on such ‘acts of the will’ as decision and choice for the explanation of self-identification and self- evaluation, the non-intentional as well as the non-individualistic character of these (...) processes is stressed and analysed in terms of volitional necessity and social dependence. The consequence of this criticism is the substitution of the concept of extreme personal autonomy by that of caring about oneself as the first principle of education. (shrink)