What is at the basis of moral action? An altruism acquired by the application of rule and principle? Or, as Noddings asserts, caring and the memory of being cared for? With numerous examples to supplement her rich theoretical discussion, Noddings builds a compelling philosophical argument for an ethics based on natural caring, as in the care of a mother for her child. The ethical behavior that grows out of natural caring, and has as its core care-filled receptivity to those involved (...) in any moral situation, leaves behind the rigidity of rule and principle to focus on what is particular and unique in human relations. Noddings's discussion is wide-ranging, as she considers whether organizations, which operate at a remove from the caring relationship, can truly be called ethical. She discusses the extent to which we may truly care for plants, animals, or ideas. Finally, she proposes a realignment of education to encourage and reward not just rationality and trained intelligence, but also enhanced sensitivity in moral matters. (shrink)

First Published in 1993. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The prevalent ethic of patient autonomy ignores family interests in medical treatment decisions. Acknowledging these interests as legitimate forces basic changes in ethical theory and the moral practice of medicine.

Indhold: Madeleine M. Leininger: The Theory of Culture Care Diversity and Universality. Madeleine M. Leininger: Ethnonursing: A Research Method with Enablers to Study the Theory of Culture Care. Zenaida Spangler: Culture Care of Philippine and Anglo-American Nurses in a Hospital Context. Anna Frances Wenger: The Culture care Theory and the Old Order Amish. David B. Stasiak: Culture Care Theorywith Mexican-Americans in an Urban Context. Irene Zwarycz Bohay: Culture Care Meanings and Experiences of Pregnancy and Childbirth of Ukrainians. Madeleine M. Leininger: (...) Culture Care of the Gadsup Akuna of the Eastern Highlands of New Guinea. Marie F. Gates: Culture Care Theory for Study of Dying Patients in Hospital and Hospice Contexts. Janet Rosenbaum: Culture Care Theory and Greek Canadian Widows. Madeleine M. Leininger: Selected Culture Care Findings of Diverse Cultures Using Culture Care Theory and Ethnomethods. Madeleine M. Leininger: Culture Care Theory and Uses in Nursing Administration. Madeleine M. Leininger: Looking to the Future of Nursing and the Relevancy of Culture Care Theory. (shrink)

In a Different Voice is the little book that started a revolution, making women's voices heard, in their own right and with their own integrity, for virtually the first time in social scientific theorizing about women. Its impact was immediate and continues to this day, in the academic world and beyond.

Nel Noddings argues that hers is not an ethics of agape. I want to argue, on the contrary, that it is, and that this is a problem. My central thesis is that the unidirectional nature of the analysis of one-caring reinforces oppressive institutions.

This well-known core text on nursing ethics provides an in-depth exploration of nursing ethics content from the western philosophical tradition along with some ...

An Introduction to the Biology of Marine Life, Ninth Edition, engages students in the excitement and challenge of understanding marine organisms and the environment in which they live. Selected groups of marine organisms are examined within a framework of basic biological principles and processes that are fundamental to all forms of life in the seas including taxonomy, evolution, ecology, behavior, and physiology.

Western philosophy has been powerfully influenced by a paradigm of personal agency that is linked to an individualistic conception of autonomy. This essay contrasts this conception with an alternative understanding that recognizes a social component built into the very meaning of autonomy. After reviewing feminist critiques of the dominant conception of autonomy, I develop the broad outlines of a relational view and apply this reconceptualization to a concrete situation in order to show how this altered view reconfigures understanding of the (...) participants' relationships and each of their personal perspectives. The situation chosen, physician‐assisted suicide, is intended principally to illustrate one respect in which a relational conception of autonomy reframes a controversial moral issue and reveals perspectives toward it that are likely to be obscured when autonomy is viewed through the lens of the dominant individualistic conception. My principal aim is to show that when autonomy is understood relationally, respecting others' autonomy is likely to be a far more complex issue than is apparent within the standard conception, both for those with professional responsibilities and often for personal intimates as well. (shrink)

The concept of care can be explained in various ways, and it can present a different meaning to each person. Nurses are increasingly aware that good nursing care consists of ‘more’ than the competent performance of a number of caring activities. For many nurses it is less clear what this ‘more’ means and what importance it has in nursing. This article will develop a view concerning care considered as a moral attitude. It is argued that care can be considered as (...) a foundational normative concept in the ethics of the nursing profession. The aim is to clarify that nurses do not derive their specific caring identity just from the set of tasks that they perform but also from the way in which they commit themselves to the caring process. (shrink)

Although we theorize that nurses ‘make a difference’ to patient outcomes and speculate that this happens because nurses ‘care’, there is so far little evidence to support this nebulous claim. Efforts to promote care as the defining characteristic of nursing, and an ‘ethic of care’ as the ethical basis of nursing, have sparked debate within the discipline. This debate has resulted in a polarization that has effectively stalled productive discourse on the issues. Moreover, the focus on care has been at (...) the expense of understanding the true nature of the relationship between caring and the broader base of ethical knowledge that underpins nursing and that must underpin nursing if it is a viable practice profession. This paper used the framework of philosophical argument to explore the moral and ethical foundations of nursing from the perspective of personal and public morals, and responsive nurse–patient relationships as the reflection of ethical nursing knowledge. The foundation of ethical nursing knowledge is the personal moral sense that resides within the individual and that nurses hold in common with others. Personal moral knowledge is transformed into disciplinary ethical knowledge specific to nursing through disciplinary consensus. Responsive relationships are conceptualized in the nursing literature as founded on three essential elements: respect, trust, and mutuality. These three elements are grounded in ethical nursing knowledge; therefore responsive nurse–patient relationships reflect both personal moral knowledge and disciplinary ethical knowledge. By facilitating the articulation of ethical nursing knowledge in practice, responsive relationships connect theory, ethical knowledge, and clinical outcomes. (shrink)

In contemporary liberal ethics patient autonomy is often interpreted as the right to self-determination: when it comes to treatment decisions, the patient is given the right to give or withhold informed consent. This paper joins in the philosophical and ethical criticism of the liberal interpretation as it does not regard patient autonomy as a right, rule or principle, but rather as a practice. Patient autonomy, or so I will argue, is realised in the concrete activities of day-to-day health care, in (...) the material and technological context of care, in arrangements of health care institutions, in the physical training of people with disabilities, as well as in the concrete activities of care-giving. This move from conversations in the consultation room to other sites and situations in the practice of care takes seriously the empirical reality of medical care and intends to show that patient autonomy is practically realised in a much richer and more creative way than most ethical theory seems to assume. (shrink)

This article examines how people with type 2 diabetes perceive autonomous decision making and which moral capacities they consider important in diabetes nurses' support of autonomous decision making. Fifteen older adults with type 2 diabetes were interviewed in a nurse-led unit. First, the data were analysed using the grounded theory method. The participants described a variety of decision-making processes in the nurse and family care-giver context. Later, descriptions of the decision-making processes were analysed using hermeneutic text interpretation. We suggest first- (...) and second-order moral capacities that nurses specializing in diabetes need to promote the autonomous decision making of their patients. We recommend nurses to engage in ongoing, interactive reflective practice to further develop these moral capacities. (shrink)

Bioethicists think about families in terms of conflicting interests. This mistake results from an impoverished notion of informed consent. Only by adequately characterizing the process of informed consent can we capture the phenomenon of shared decisionmaking.

In this article I wish to show how care ethics puts forward a fundamental critique on the ideal of independency in human life without thereby discounting autonomy as a moral value altogether. In care ethics, a relational account of autonomy is developed instead. Because care ethics is sometimes criticized in the literature as hopelessly vague and ambiguous, I shall begin by elaborating on how care ethics and its place in ethical theory can be understood. I shall stipulate a definition of (...) care ethics as a moral perspective or orientation from which ethical theorizing can take place. This will mean that care ethics is more a stance from which we can theorize ethically, than ready-made theory in itself. In conceiving care ethics in this way, it becomes possible to make clear that, for instance, a moral concept of autonomy is not abandoned, but instead is given a particular place and interpretation. In the final part of this article I will show how ‘relational autonomy’ can be applied fruitfully in the practice of psychiatric care. (shrink)