- Justified Belief in a Digital Age: On the Epistemic Implications of Secret Internet Technologies.Boaz Miller & Isaac Record - 2013 - Episteme 10 (2):117 - 134.details
|
|
Trustworthiness.Karen Jones - 2012 - Ethics 123 (1):61-85.details
|
|
The advancement of science: science without legend, objectivity without illusions.Philip Kitcher - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Moral disagreement and moral expertise.Sarah McGrath - 2009 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 87-108.details
|
|
Disagreement, Dogmatism, and Belief Polarization.Thomas Kelly - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):611-633.details
|
|
(2 other versions)The epistemic significance of disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-196.details
|
|
(1 other version)Second-hand moral knowledge.Karen Jones - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):55-78.details
|
|
Epistemic dependence.John Hardwig - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (7):335-349.details
|
|
(1 other version)Experts: Which ones should you trust?Alvin I. Goldman - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):85-110.details
|
|
Entitlement: Epistemic rights without epistemic duties?Fred Dretske - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):591-606.details
|
|
Trust and antitrust.Annette Baier - 1986 - Ethics 96 (2):231-260.details
|
|
(2 other versions)When experts disagree.David Coady - 2006 - Episteme 3 (1-2):68-79.details
|
|
(1 other version)Experts: which ones should you trust?Alvin I. Goldman - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Expertise and the fragmentation of intellectual autonomy.C. Thi Nguyen - 2018 - Philosophical Inquiries 6 (2):107-124.details
|
|
An Ethics of Uncertainty.C. Thi Nguyen - 2011 - Dissertation, Ucladetails
|
|
How to Be a Pessimist about Aesthetic Testimony.Robert Hopkins - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (3):138-157.details
|
|
Moral Expertise and the Credentials Problem.Michael Cholbi - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (4):323-334.details
|
|
Autonomy and the Asymmetry Problem for Moral Expertise.Julia Driver - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (3):619-644.details
|
|
The Great Endarkenment: Philosophy for an Age of Hyperspecialization.Elijah Millgram - 2015 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.details
|
|
Socrates and the Recognition of Experts.Scott LaBarge - 1997 - Apeiron 30 (4):51 - 62.details
|
|
The acquaintance principle.Malcolm Budd - 2003 - British Journal of Aesthetics 43 (4):386-392.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise.Sarah McGrath - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:87-108.details
|
|
The uses of aesthetic testimony.C. Thi Nguyen - 2017 - British Journal of Aesthetics 57 (1):19-36.details
|
|
(2 other versions)The Advancement of Science: Science without Legend, Objectivity without Illusions.Philip Kitcher - 1996 - Erkenntnis 44 (3):379-395.details
|
|
Autonomy, understanding, and moral disagreement.C. Thi Nguyen - 2010 - Philosophical Topics 38 (2):111-129.details
|
|
(2 other versions)The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Tom Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press UK.details
|
|
(2 other versions)The epistemic significance of disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2018 - In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. pp. 167-196.details
|
|
(1 other version)Second-Hand Moral Knowledge.Karen Jones - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):55.details
|
|
(2 other versions)When Experts Disagree.David Coady - 2006 - Episteme 3 (1-2):68-79.details
|
|
Moral testimony and its authority.Philip Nickel - 2001 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (3):253-266.details
|
|
Skepticism about Moral Expertise as a Puzzle for Moral Realism.Sarah McGrath - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (3):111-137.details
|
|
Yes, no, maybe so: a veritistic approach to echo chambers using a trichotomous belief model.Bert Baumgaertner - 2014 - Synthese 191 (11):2549-2569.details
|
|
Disagreement and Belief Dependence: Why Numbers Matter.Jennifer Lackey - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 243-268.details
|
|
(2 other versions)When Experts Disagree.David Coady - 2006 - Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 3 (1):68-79.details
|
|