- Epistemic Authorities and Skilled Agents: A Pluralist Account of Moral Expertise.Federico Bina, Sofia Bonicalzi & Michel Croce - 2024 - Topoi 43:1053-1065.details
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What's Wrong with Partisan Deference?Elise Woodard - forthcoming - In Tamar Szabó Gendler, John Hawthorne, Julianne Chung & Alex Worsnip (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Vol. 8. Oxford University Press.details
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Moral disagreement and artificial intelligence.Pamela Robinson - 2024 - AI and Society 39 (5):2425-2438.details
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Moral disagreement and non-moral ignorance.Nicholas Smyth - 2019 - Synthese 198 (2):1089-1108.details
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Companions in Guilt Arguments in the Epistemology of Moral Disagreement.Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2019 - In Christopher Cowie & Rach Cosker-Rowland (eds.), Companions in Guilt: Arguments in Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 187-205.details
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Disagreement in science: introduction to the special issue.Finnur Dellsén & Maria Baghramian - 2020 - Synthese 198 (S25):6011-6021.details
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Ethics and the Question of What to Do.Olle Risberg - 2023 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 25 (2).details
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Moral Disagreement, Self-Trust, and Complacency.Garrett Cullity - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-15.details
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Moral disagreement scepticism leveled.Jonathan Dixon - 2021 - Ratio 34 (3):203-216.details
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A Faithful Response to Disagreement.Lara Buchak - 2021 - The Philosophical Review 130 (2):191-226.details
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Applying Moral Caution in the Face of Disagreement.Jonathan D. Matheson - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-18.details
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Distinguishing value-neutrality from value-independence: toward a new disentangling strategy for moral epistemology.Lubomira V. Radoilska - 2022 - In Mark McBride & Visa A. J. Kurki (eds.), Without Trimmings: The Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy of Matthew Kramer. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2020 - Analysis 80 (4):789-807.details
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The Surprising Truth About Disagreement.Neil Levy - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (2):137-157.details
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Contingency inattention: against causal debunking in ethics.Regina Rini - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (2):369-389.details
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Trusting Moral Intuitions.John Bengson, Terence Cuneo & Russ Shafer-Landau - 2020 - Noûs 54 (4):956-984.details
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Om moralisk oenighet mellan epistemiska likar.Marco Tiozzo - 2016 - Filosofisk Tidskrift 37 (2):24-34.details
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Précis of Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind.Joshua May - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42 (e146):1-60.details
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Why Moral Expertise Needs Moral Theory.Michael Cholbi - 2018 - In Jamie Carlin Watson & Laura K. Guidry-Grimes (eds.), Moral Expertise: New Essays from Theoretical and Clinical Bioethics. Springer International Publishing. pp. 71-86.details
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The Limitations of the Open Mind.Jeremy Fantl - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Cognitive islands and runaway echo chambers: problems for epistemic dependence on experts.C. Thi Nguyen - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):2803-2821.details
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The Methodological Irrelevance of Reflective Equilibrium.Tristram McPherson - 2015 - In Christopher Daly (ed.), Palgrave Handbook on Philosophical Methods. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 652-674.details
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A Moorean Defense of the Omnivore?Tristram McPherson - 2015 - In Ben Bramble & Bob Fischer (eds.), The Moral Complexities of Eating Meat. New York, US: Oxford University Press. pp. 118-134.details
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Disagreements in Moral Intution as Defeaters.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):282-302.details
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The Significance of Significant Fundamental Moral Disagreement.Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):802-831.details
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Moral Deference and Deference to an Epistemic Peer.Cory Davia & Michele Palmira - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261):605-625.details
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Only All Naturalists Should Worry About Only One Evolutionary Debunking Argument.Tomas Bogardus - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):636-661.details
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The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism.Terence Cuneo & Russ Shafer-Landau - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (3):399-443.details
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Moral Testimony: One of These Things Is Just Like the Others.Daniel Groll & Jason Decker - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):54-74.details
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Moral Epistemology: The Mathematics Analogy.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2012 - Noûs 48 (2):238-255.details
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The puzzle of pure moral deference.Sarah McGrath - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):321-344.details
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Parfit über Intuitionismus und die Herausforderung moralischer Uneinigkeit.Kay Hüwelmeyer - 2016 - Zeitschrift für Praktische Philosophie 3 (2):287-324.details
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Hope for the Evolutionary Debunker: How Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Arguments from Moral Disagreement Can Join Forces.Folke Tersman & Olle Risberg - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-17.details
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Aesthetic testimony, understanding and virtue.Alison Hills - 2022 - Noûs 56 (1):21-39.details
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How to Identify Moral Experts.Amber Riaz - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 25 (1):123-136.details
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Moral Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence.Klemens Kappel & Frederik J. Andersen - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (5):1103-1120.details
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Famine, affluence, and philosophers’ biases.Peter Seipel - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):2907-2926.details
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Publishing without belief.Alexandra Plakias - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):638-646.details
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Testimony, Evidence, and Wisdom in Today’s Philosophy of Religion.Charles Taliaferro & Elizabeth Duel - 2011 - Teaching Philosophy 34 (2):105-118.details
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Moral Caution and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson - 2016 - Journal of Social Philosophy 47 (2):120-141.details
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(1 other version)Moral Expertise.Karen Jones & François Schroeter - 2012 - Analyse & Kritik 34 (2):217-230.details
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Ethical Theories and Controversial Intuitions.Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2023 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 31 (3):318-345.details
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(1 other version)Contingency Anxiety and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):n/a-n/a.details
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Self-Evidence and Disagreement in Ethics.Ryan Fanselow - 2011 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (3):1-17.details
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Moral Intuitions, Reliability, and Disagreement.David Killoren - 2009 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 4 (1):1-35.details
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Moral expertise as skilled practice.Sarah Stroud - 2024 - Philosophical Issues 34 (1):271-284.details
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Disagreement and Intellectual Scepticism.Andrew Rotondo - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):251-271.details
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Ethics And.Sarah McGrath - unknowndetails
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Suspiciously Convenient Belief.Neil Levy - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (5):899-913.details
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No “Real” Experts: Unexpected Agreement Over Disagreement in STS and Philosophy of Science.Jakob Lundgren - 2018 - Perspectives on Science 26 (6):722-735.details
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