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  1. Common ground.Robert Stalnaker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5):701-721.
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  • (1 other version)The Possibility of Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 1996 - Ethics 106 (4):694-726.
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  • A spreading-activation theory of semantic processing.Allan M. Collins & Elizabeth F. Loftus - 1975 - Psychological Review 82 (6):407-428.
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  • (2 other versions)Inquiry.Robert Stalnaker - 1984 - Synthese 79 (1):171-189.
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  • Problems of rationality.Donald Davidson (ed.) - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Problems of Rationality is the eagerly awaited fourth volume of Donald Davidson 's philosophical writings. From the 1960s until his death in August 2003 Davidson was perhaps the most influential figure in English-language philosophy, and his work has had a profound effect upon the discipline. His unified theory of the interpretation of thought, meaning, and action holds that rationality is a necessary condition for both mind and interpretation. Davidson here develops this theory to illuminate value judgements and how we understand (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Inquiry.Robert Stalnaker - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (3):425-448.
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  • Logic for equivocators.David K. Lewis - 1982 - Noûs 16 (3):431-441.
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  • Acting contrary to our professed beliefs or the gulf between occurrent judgment and dispositional belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):531-553.
    People often sincerely assert or judge one thing (for example, that all the races are intellectually equal) while at the same time being disposed to act in a way evidently quite contrary to the espoused attitude (for example, in a way that seems to suggest an implicit assumption of the intellectual superiority of their own race). Such cases should be regarded as ‘in-between’ cases of believing, in which it's neither quite right to ascribe the belief in question nor quite right (...)
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  • Alief in Action (and Reaction).Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (5):552--585.
    I introduce and argue for the importance of a cognitive state that I call alief. An alief is, to a reasonable approximation, an innate or habitual propensity to respond to an apparent stimulus in a particular way. Recognizing the role that alief plays in our cognitive repertoire provides a framework for understanding reactions that are governed by nonconscious or automatic mechanisms, which in turn brings into proper relief the role played by reactions that are subject to conscious regulation and deliberate (...)
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  • How Can the Human Mind Occur in the Physical Universe?John Anderson - 2007 - Oup Usa.
    The human cognitive architecture consists of a set of largely independent modules associated with different brain regions. This book discusses in detail how these various modules can combine to produce behaviours as varied as driving a car and solving an algebraic equation.
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  • Paradoxes of Irrationality.Donald Davidson - 2004 - In Problems of rationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 169–187.
    The author believes that large‐scale rationality on the part of the interpretant is essential to his interpretability, and therefore, in his view, to her having a mind. How, then are cases of irrationality, such as akrasia or self‐deception, judged by the interpretant's own standards, possible? He proposes that, in order to resolve the apparent paradoxes, one must distinguish between accepting a contradictory proposition and accepting separately each of two contradictory propositions, which are held apart, which in turn requires to conceive (...)
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  • Seeing and believing: perception, belief formation and the divided mind.Andy Egan - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (1):47 - 63.
    On many of the idealized models of human cognition and behavior in use by philosophers, agents are represented as having a single corpus of beliefs which (a) is consistent and deductively closed, and (b) guides all of their (rational, deliberate, intentional) actions all the time. In graded-belief frameworks, agents are represented as having a single, coherent distribution of credences, which guides all of their (rational, deliberate, intentional) actions all of the time. It's clear that actual human beings don't live up (...)
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  • Alief in Action (and Reaction).Tamarszabó Gendler - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (5):552-585.
    I introduce and argue for the importance of a cognitive state that I call alief. An alief is, to a reasonable approximation, an innate or habitual propensity to respond to an apparent stimulus in a particular way. Recognizing the role that alief plays in our cognitive repertoire provides a framework for understanding reactions that are governed by non‐conscious or automatic mechanisms, which in turn brings into proper relief the role played by reactions that are subject to conscious regulation and deliberate (...)
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  • Who is Fooled.Donald Davidson - 2004 - In Problems of rationality. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Applies and extends the conclusions of the preceding chapters by examining cases of self‐deception of a puzzling sort emerging from cases of fantasizing and imagining, found in Joyce's Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man and Flaubert's Madame Bovary. The author is particularly interested in what can be described as the ‘divided mind of self‐deception’, the mind that produces an imagination due to its realising the state of the world that motivates the fantasy construct and the possessor's eventual acquisition (...)
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  • (1 other version)Iteration and Fragmentation.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):656-673.
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  • The problem of logical omniscience, I.Robert Stalnaker - 1991 - Synthese 89 (3):425 - 440.
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  • (1 other version)Iteration and Fragmentation.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):656-673.
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  • Social psychology: handbook of basic principles.D. Miller, D. A. Prentice, T. Higgins & A. Kruglanski - 1996 - In E. E. Higgins & A. Kruglanski (eds.), Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles. Guilford.
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  • From Conditioning to Conscious Recollection: Memory Systems of the Brain.Howard Eichenbaum & Neal J. Cohen - 2004 - Oxford University Press USA.
    This cutting-edge book offers a theoretical account of the evolution of multiple memory systems of the brain. The authors conceptualize these memory systems from both behavioral and neurobiological perspectives.
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