- Is the wandering mind a planning mind?Frederik T. Junker & Thor Grünbaum - forthcoming - Mind and Language.details
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Belief, Knowledge and Practical Matters.Jie Gao - 2024 - Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press.details
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Divine Forgetting and Perfect Being Theology.Christopher Willard-Kyle - forthcoming - Faith and Philosophy.details
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The Politics of Language.David Beaver & Jason Stanley - 2023 - Princeton University Press.details
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How can we be moved by magic?Pablo R. Grassi, Vincent Plikat & Hong Yu Wong - forthcoming - British Journal of Aesthetics.details
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Lying by Asserting What You Believe is True: A Case of Transparent Delusion.Vladimir Krstić - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-21.details
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Acceptance and the ethics of belief.Laura K. Soter - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (8):2213-2243.details
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Lying to others, lying to yourself, and literal self-deception.Vladimir Krstić - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Spinoza’s Dynamic Theory of Mind in the 21st Century.Justin Steinberg - 2022 - Journal of Spinoza Studies 1 (1):111-120.details
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Understanding, Knowledge and the Valladolid Debate: Why Las Casas and Sepúlveda Differ on the Moral Status of Indigenous Persons.Eric Bayruns García - 2023 - Inter-American Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):15-35.details
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Believing for truth and the model of epistemic guidance.Xintong Wei - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Shared Belief and the Limits of Empathy.Monika Betzler & Simon Keller - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (2):267-291.details
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Feeling is believing: recalcitrant emotion & Spinozan belief formation.Kris Goffin - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1–14.details
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IX—In Defence of Individual Rationality.Emma Borg - 2022 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 122 (3):195-217.details
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Perceptual learning and reasons‐responsiveness.Zoe Jenkin - 2022 - Noûs 57 (2):481-508.details
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Crossmodal Basing.Zoe Jenkin - 2022 - Mind 131 (524):1163-1194.details
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The Propagation of Suspension of Judgment.Aldo Filomeno - 2022 - Erkenntnis 89 (4):1327-1348.details
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Disagreement and suspended judgement.Filippo Ferrari - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (4):526-542.details
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Epistemic Akrasia and Belief‐Credence Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson & Peter Tan - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):717–727.details
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Being neutral: Agnosticism, inquiry and the suspension of judgment.Matthew McGrath - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):463-484.details
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The Fragmentation of Belief.Joseph Bendana & Eric Mandelbaum - 2021 - In Cristina Borgoni, Dirk Kindermann & Andrea Onofri (eds.), The Fragmented Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Fragmentation and Old Evidence.Will Fleisher - 2023 - Episteme 20 (3):542-567.details
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Fragmentation and logical omniscience.Adam Elga & Agustín Rayo - 2021 - Noûs 56 (3):716-741.details
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Reasoning with heuristics.Brett Karlan - 2021 - Ratio 34 (2):100-108.details
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(1 other version)The science of belief: A progress report.Nicolas Porot & Eric Mandelbaum - forthcoming - WIREs Cognitive Science 1.details
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Out of habit.Santiago Amaya - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11161-11185.details
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How to endorse conciliationism.Will Fleisher - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9913-9939.details
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The Real Myth of Coherence.Wooram Lee - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1211-1230.details
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Transparent Delusion.Vladimir Krstić - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):183-201.details
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Minimal Rationality and the Web of Questions.Daniel Hoek - forthcoming - In Peter van Elswyk, Dirk Kindermann, Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini & Andy Egan (eds.), Unstructured Content. Oxford University Press.details
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Implicit bias.Michael Brownstein - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Silencing without Convention.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):573-598.details
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The Architecture of Belief: An Essay on the Unbearable Automaticity of Believing.Eric Mandelbaum - 2010 - Dissertation, Unc-Chapel Hilldetails
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Second best epistemology: fallibility and normativity.Joshua DiPaolo - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2043-2066.details
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A Dispositional Account of Aversive Racism.Carole J. Lee - 2018 - Proceedings of the 40th Annual Cognitive Science Society.details
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Implicit attitudes and awareness.Jacob Berger - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1291-1312.details
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Saying Without Knowing What or How.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2017 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):351-382.details
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Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science.Jake Quilty-Dunn & Eric Mandelbaum - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2353-2372.details
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Rational endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.details
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Belief as Question‐Sensitive.Seth Yalcin - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):23-47.details
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What is (In)coherence?Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13:184-206.details
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How I learned to stop worrying and love probability 1.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):179-201.details
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Attitude, Inference, Association: On the Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias.Eric Mandelbaum - 2015 - Noûs 50 (3):629-658.details
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Epistemically Transformative Experience.Jane Friedman - manuscriptdetails
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Fragmentation and information access.Adam Elga & Agustin Rayo - 2021 - In Cristina Borgoni, Dirk Kindermann & Andrea Onofri (eds.), The Fragmented Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Against Fragmentation.Aaron Norby - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):30-38.details
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Uncertainty Without All the Doubt.Aaron Norby - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (1):70-94.details
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A Preference Semantics for Imperatives.William B. Starr - 2020 - Semantics and Pragmatics 20.details
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A puzzle about epistemic akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.details
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Is Perception a Source of Reasons?Santiago Echeverri - 2012 - Theoria 79 (1):22-56.details
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