- Belief as Question‐Sensitive.Seth Yalcin - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):23-47.details
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Believing for truth and the model of epistemic guidance.Xintong Wei - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Silencing without Convention.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):573-598.details
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Virtually imagining our biases.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (4):860-893.details
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Compartmentalized knowledge.Levi Spectre - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2785-2805.details
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Beliefs and biases.Shannon Spaulding - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7575-7594.details
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Acceptance and the ethics of belief.Laura K. Soter - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (8):2213-2243.details
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Pain, placebo, and cognitive penetration.Henry Shevlin & Phoebe Friesen - 2021 - Mind and Language 36 (5):771-791.details
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Is Every Theory of Knowledge False?Blake Roeber - 2019 - Noûs 54 (4):839-866.details
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Evidence, Judgment, and Belief at Will.Blake Roeber - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):837-859.details
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Believing in Perceiving: Known Illusions and the Classical Dual‐Component Theory.Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):550-575.details
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Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science.Jake Quilty-Dunn & Eric Mandelbaum - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2353-2372.details
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Rationality & Second‐Order Preferences.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2018 - Noûs 52 (1):196-215.details
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Bayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic Possibilities.Matthew Parrott - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (1):271-296.details
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Uncertainty Without All the Doubt.Aaron Norby - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (1):70-94.details
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Against Fragmentation.Aaron Norby - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):30-38.details
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Being neutral: Agnosticism, inquiry and the suspension of judgment.Matthew McGrath - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):463-484.details
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Attitude, Inference, Association: On the Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias.Eric Mandelbaum - 2015 - Noûs 50 (3):629-658.details
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The Real Myth of Coherence.Wooram Lee - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1211-1230.details
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Transparent Delusion.Vladimir Krstić - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):183-201.details
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Lying by Asserting What You Believe is True: A Case of Transparent Delusion.Vladimir Krstić - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-21.details
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Lying to others, lying to yourself, and literal self-deception.Vladimir Krstić - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Epistemic akrasia and higher-order beliefs.Timothy Kearl - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2501-2515.details
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Reasoning with heuristics.Brett Karlan - 2021 - Ratio 34 (2):100-108.details
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Obsessive–compulsive akrasia.Samuel Kampa - 2019 - Mind and Language 35 (4):475-492.details
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Is the wandering mind a planning mind?Frederik T. Junker & Thor Grünbaum - forthcoming - Mind and Language.details
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Perceptual learning and reasons‐responsiveness.Zoe Jenkin - 2022 - Noûs 57 (2):481-508.details
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Crossmodal Basing.Zoe Jenkin - 2022 - Mind 131 (524):1163-1194.details
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Epistemic Akrasia and Belief‐Credence Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson & Peter Tan - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):717–727.details
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Rationality and Synchronic Identity.Brian Hedden - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (3):544-558.details
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Belief revision in psychotherapy.J. P. Grodniewicz - 2024 - Synthese 203 (4):1-22.details
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How I learned to stop worrying and love probability 1.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):179-201.details
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A puzzle about epistemic akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.details
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How can we be moved by magic?Pablo R. Grassi, Vincent Plikat & Hong Yu Wong - forthcoming - British Journal of Aesthetics.details
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Feeling is believing: recalcitrant emotion & Spinozan belief formation.Kris Goffin - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1–14.details
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Rational Action without Knowledge (and vice versa).Jie Gao - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6):1901-1917.details
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Why Suspend Judging?Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):302-326.details
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Narrative testimony.Rachel Fraser - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (12):4025-4052.details
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Rational endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.details
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How to endorse conciliationism.Will Fleisher - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):9913-9939.details
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Fragmentation and Old Evidence.Will Fleisher - 2023 - Episteme 20 (3):542-567.details
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The Propagation of Suspension of Judgment.Aldo Filomeno - 2022 - Erkenntnis 89 (4):1327-1348.details
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Disagreement and suspended judgement.Filippo Ferrari - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (4):526-542.details
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Fragmentation and logical omniscience.Adam Elga & Agustín Rayo - 2022 - Noûs 56 (3):716-741.details
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Comments on Gendler’s, “the epistemic costs of implicit bias”.Andy Egan - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):65-79.details
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Is Perception a Source of Reasons?Santiago Echeverri - 2012 - Theoria 79 (1):22-56.details
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Second best epistemology: fallibility and normativity.Joshua DiPaolo - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2043-2066.details
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Doing without believing: Intellectualism, knowledge-how, and belief-attribution.Michael Brownstein & Eliot Michaelson - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9):2815–2836.details
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IX—In Defence of Individual Rationality.Emma Borg - 2022 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 122 (3):195-217.details
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Spinozan Doxasticism About Delusions.Federico Bongiorno - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (4):720-752.details
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