- Extended Agency and the Problem of Diachronic Autonomy.Julia Nefsky & Sergio Tenenbaum - 2022 - In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Time in Action: The Temporal Structure of Rational Agency and Practical Thought. New York: Routledge. pp. 173 - 195.details
|
|
Autonomous Agents: From Self Control to Autonomy.Alfred R. Mele - 1995 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism.Berislav Marušić & John Schwenkler - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):309-340.details
|
|
(1 other version)The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Why cognitivism?Yair Levy - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):223-244.details
|
|
(1 other version)Practical Reflection, by J. David Velleman. [REVIEW]Michael H. Robins - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):949-952.details
|
|
(2 other versions)A virtue epistemology: Apt belief and reflective knowledge, volume I * by Ernest Sosa. [REVIEW]Ernest Sosa - 2007 - Analysis 69 (2):382-385.details
|
|
Reasons Without Rationalism.Kieran Setiya - 2007 - Princeton University Press.details
|
|
Achievement.Gwen Bradford - 2015 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)The normativity of rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2013 - Dissertation, Humboldt University of Berlindetails
|
|
Diachronic Incontinence is a Problem in Moral Philosophy.Sarah K. Paul - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (3):337-355.details
|
|
(1 other version)Persons, Character, and Morality.Bernard Williams - 1981 - In Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Decisions, Diachronic Autonomy, and the Division of Deliberative Labor.Luca Ferrero - 2010 - Philosophers' Imprint 10:1-23.details
|
|
A virtue epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The will as reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):201-220.details
|
|
(1 other version)Agency, shmagency: Why normativity won't come from what is constitutive of action.David Enoch - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (2):169-198.details
|
|
(1 other version)Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.details
|
|
Practical Reflection.David Velleman - 1989 - Princeton University Press.details
|
|
Reconsidering Intentions.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2016 - Noûs:443-472.details
|
|
Temptation and the Agent’s Standpoint.Michael Bratman - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (3):293-310.details
|
|
Minimalism about Intention: A Modest Defense.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (3):384-411.details
|
|
Time, rationality and self-governance.Michael Bratman - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):73-88.details
|
|
(1 other version)Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won't Come from What Is Constitutive of Action.David Enoch - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (2):169-198.details
|
|
The constitution of agency: essays on practical reason and moral psychology.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Reasons without rationalism * by Kieran Setiya * princeton university press, 2007. IX + 131 pp. 22.50: Summary.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):509-510.details
|
|
One dogma of philosophy of action.Matthew Noah Smith - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2249-2266.details
|
|
Trust and diachronic agency.Edward S. Hinchman - 2003 - Noûs 37 (1):25–51.details
|
|