- The Obligation to Diversify One's Sources: Against Epistemic Partisanship in the Consumption of News Media.Alex Worsnip - 2019 - In Joe Saunders & Carl Fox (eds.), Media Ethics, Free Speech, and the Requirements of Democracy. Routledge. pp. 240-264.details
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The simple constitutivist move.Luca Ferrero - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (2):146-162.details
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From Oughts to Goals: A Logic for Enkrasia.Dominik Klein & Alessandra Marra - 2020 - Studia Logica 108 (1):85-128.details
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(1 other version)VIII-An Argument Against Motivational Internalism.Elinor Mason - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1part2):135-156.details
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(1 other version)IX-Against Requirements of Rationality.Anthony W. Price - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1part2):157-176.details
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Rationality, Virtue and Higher‐Order Coherence.Jens Gillessen - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (3):411-436.details
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A Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief.Selim Berker - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (4):427-470.details
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The Practical Origins of Ideas: Genealogy as Conceptual Reverse-Engineering (Open Access).Matthieu Queloz - 2021 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Responsibilism within Reason.Kurt Sylvan - 2020 - In Christoph Kelp & John Greco (eds.), Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.details
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Logical norms, accuracy and degree of belief.Robert Williams - 2015 - In Colin R. Caret & Ole T. Hjortland (eds.), Foundations of Logical Consequence. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules?Darren Bradley - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.details
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Enkrasia or evidentialism? Learning to love mismatch.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):597-632.details
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How Moral Uncertaintism Can Be Both True and Interesting.Andrew Sepielli - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 7.details
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The explanatory role of consistency requirements.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2020 - Synthese 197 (10):4551-4569.details
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Cognitivism about Practical Rationality.John Brunero - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 9:18-44.details
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The Level-Splitting View and the Non-Akrasia Constraint.Marco Tiozzo - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):917-923.details
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On Divorcing the Rational and the Justified in Epistemology.Kurt Sylvan - manuscriptdetails
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Respect and the reality of apparent reasons.Kurt Sylvan - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3129-3156.details
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Painfulness, Desire, and the Euthyphro Dilemma.Michael S. Brady - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):239-250.details
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Belief and Difficult Action.Berislav Marušić - 2012 - Philosophers' Imprint 12:1-30.details
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Reasons, rationality, reasoning: how much pulling-apart?Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Problema 12:59-93.details
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The Formulation of Disjunctivism About φ-ing for a Reason.J. J. Cunningham - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (275):235-257.details
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Reasons and Rationality: The Case of Group Agents.Lara Buchak & Philip Pettit - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Andrew Evan Reisner (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning: Themes From the Philosophy of John Broome. New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Reconciling Enkrasia and Higher-Order Defeat.Mattias Skipper - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1369-1386.details
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If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It.Grace Helton - 2018 - Noûs 54 (3):501-526.details
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Rationality as the Rule of Reason.Antti Kauppinen - 2019 - Noûs 55 (3):538-559.details
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How Genealogies Can Affect the Space of Reasons.Matthieu Queloz - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):2005-2027.details
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Modus Ponens and the Logic of Decision.Nate Charlow - 2023 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 52 (3):859-888.details
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Can Worsnip's strategy solve the puzzle of misleading higher-order apparent evidence?Paul Silva - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (3):339-351.details
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Introspection, mindreading, and the transparency of belief.Uwe Peters - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):1086-1102.details
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Teleological epistemology.Jane Friedman - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):673-691.details
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Elusive Externalism.Bernhard Salow - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):397-427.details
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(1 other version)Deliberative Indispensability and Epistemic Justification.Tristram McPherson - 2015 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 10. Oxford University Press. pp. 104-133.details
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Rationality as the Capacity for Understanding.Karl Schafer - 2019 - Noûs 53 (3):639-663.details
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Rationality, time and normativity: On Hedden’s time-slice rationality.Sabine Döring & Bahadir Eker - 2017 - Analysis 77 (3):571-585.details
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Moral Rationalism and the Normativity of Constitutive Principles.Zachary Bachman - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (1):1-19.details
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Explaining enkratic asymmetries: knowledge-first style.Paul Silva - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2907-2930.details
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Rationality and Moral Risk: A Moderate Defense of Hedging.Christian Tarsney - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Marylanddetails
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Deontological evidentialism and ought implies can.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2567-2582.details
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(1 other version)The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Appropriate emotions and the metaphysics of time.Olley Pearson - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1945-1961.details
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Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options.Douglas W. Portmore - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Skepticism about Ought Simpliciter.Derek Clayton Baker - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.details
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What is (In)coherence?Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13:184-206.details
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Why cognitivism?Yair Levy - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):223-244.details
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Contextualism and Knowledge Norms.Alex Worsnip - 2017 - In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. New York: Routledge. pp. 177-189.details
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Rational Planning Agency.Michael E. Bratman - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80:25-48.details
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What is Good Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:153-174.details
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From Self‐Respect to Respect for Others.Adam Cureton - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):166-187.details
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The Function of Normative Process-Requirements.Julian Fink - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (1):115-136.details
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