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  1. Mechanisms for information elicitation.Aviv Zohar & Jeffrey S. Rosenschein - 2008 - Artificial Intelligence 172 (16-17):1917-1939.
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  • Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations.Leonard Savage - 1971 - Journal of the American Statistical Association 66 (336):783-801.
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  • Fault tolerant mechanism design.Ryan Porter, Amir Ronen, Yoav Shoham & Moshe Tennenholtz - 2008 - Artificial Intelligence 172 (15):1783-1799.
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  • Combinatorial Information Market Design.Robin Hanson - unknown
    Department of Economics, George Mason University, MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030, USA E-mail: [email protected] (http://hanson.gmu.edu).
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  • Logarithmic Market Scoring Rules for Modular Combinatorial Information Aggregation.Robin Hanson - unknown
    In practice, scoring rules elicit good probability estimates from individuals, while betting markets elicit good consensus estimates from groups. Market scoring rules combine these features, eliciting estimates from individuals or groups, with groups costing no more than individuals. Regarding a bet on one event given another event, only logarithmic versions preserve the probability of the given event. Logarithmic versions also preserve the conditional probabilities of other events, and so preserve conditional independence relations. Given logarithmic rules that elicit relative probabilities of (...)
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