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Policymaking under scientific uncertainty.Joe Roussos - 2020 - Dissertation, London School of Economicsdetails
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The material theory of induction.John D. Norton - 2021 - Calgary, Alberta, Canada: University of Calgary Press.details
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Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):201-217.details
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Generalized Immodesty Principles in Epistemic Utility Theory.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10 (31):874–907.details
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Mechanisms for information elicitation.Aviv Zohar & Jeffrey S. Rosenschein - 2008 - Artificial Intelligence 172 (16-17):1917-1939.details
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The uniqueness of local proper scoring rules: the logarithmic family.Jingni Yang - 2020 - Theory and Decision 88 (2):315-322.details
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Consequences of Calibration.Robert Williams & Richard Pettigrew - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:14.details
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Coping with Ethical Uncertainty.John R. Welch - 2017 - Diametros 53:150-166.details
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Credence for conclusions: a brief for Jeffrey’s rule.John R. Welch - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):2051-2072.details
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You've Come a Long Way, Bayesians.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):817-834.details
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Where do Bayesian priors come from?Patrick Suppes - 2007 - Synthese 156 (3):441-471.details
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The Effect of Exchange Rates on Statistical Decisions.Mark J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld & Joseph B. Kadane - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (4):504-532.details
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What is justified credence?Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):16-30.details
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A New Epistemic Utility Argument for the Principal Principle.Richard G. Pettigrew - 2013 - Episteme 10 (1):19-35.details
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Accuracy-First Epistemology Without Additivity.Richard Pettigrew - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (1):128-151.details
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Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.details
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Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems.Athanasios Papakonstantinou, Alex Rogers, Enrico H. Gerding & Nicholas R. Jennings - 2011 - Artificial Intelligence 175 (2):648-672.details
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What Accuracy Could Not Be.Graham Oddie - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (2):551-580.details
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Scalable transfer learning in heterogeneous, dynamic environments.Trung Thanh Nguyen, Tomi Silander, Zhuoru Li & Tze-Yun Leong - 2017 - Artificial Intelligence 247 (C):70-94.details
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Risk-neutral equilibria of noncooperative games.Robert Nau - 2015 - Theory and Decision 78 (2):171-188.details
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Epistemic values and the value of learning.Wayne C. Myrvold - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):547-568.details
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Scoring Rules and Epistemic Compromise.Sarah Moss - 2011 - Mind 120 (480):1053-1069.details
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Why scientists gather evidence.Patrick Maher - 1990 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (1):103-119.details
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Symmetry and partial belief geometry.Stefan Lukits - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (3):1-24.details
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Justifying Objective Bayesianism on Predicate Languages.Jürgen Landes & Jon Williamson - 2015 - Entropy 17 (4):2459-2543.details
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We ought to agree: A consequence of repairing Goldman's group scoring rule.Matthew Kopec - 2012 - Episteme 9 (2):101-114.details
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Degrees of incoherence, Dutch bookability & guidance value.Jason Konek - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (2):395-428.details
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Minimizing Inaccuracy for Self-Locating Beliefs.Brian Kierland & Bradley Monton - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):384-395.details
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A Characterization for the Spherical Scoring Rule.Victor Richmond Jose - 2009 - Theory and Decision 66 (3):263-281.details
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Economic Darwinism: Who has the Best Probabilities? [REVIEW]David Johnstone - 2007 - Theory and Decision 62 (1):47-96.details
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Justifying conditionalization: Conditionalization maximizes expected epistemic utility.Hilary Greaves & David Wallace - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):607-632.details
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Downwards Propriety in Epistemic Utility Theory.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):30-62.details
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