- Akrasia, collective and individual.Philip Pettit - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 68--97.details
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(1 other version)Group agency and supervenience.Philip Pettit - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):85-105.details
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Learning and Labeling.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (4):540-548.details
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Leadership and Influence: The Manager as Coach, Nanny and Artificial DNA.Andy Clark - unknowndetails
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(1 other version)Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2007 - Social Choice and Welfare 29 (1):19-33.details
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Wide or narrow scope?John Broome - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):359-370.details
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The Humean theory of motivation.Michael Smith - 1987 - Mind 96 (381):36-61.details
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The discursive dilemma and public reason.Christian List - 2006 - Ethics 116 (2):362-402.details
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(1 other version)Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.details
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(1 other version)What the tortoise said to Achilles.Lewis Carroll - 1895 - Mind 4 (14):278-280.details
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The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.details
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Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.details
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Reason and the first person.Tyler Burge - 1998 - In C. Macdonald, Barry C. Smith & C. J. G. Wright (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation.Donald Davidson - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.details
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(5 other versions)Content and Consciousness.Daniel C. Dennett - 1968 - New York: Routledge.details
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Deliberative Democracy, the Discursive Dilemma and Republican Theory.Philip Pettit - 2003 - In James S. Fishkin & Peter Laslett (eds.), Debating Deliberative Democracy. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 138-162.details
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The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.details
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(1 other version)Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma.Philip Pettit - 2001 - Philosophical Issues 11 (1):268-299.details
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A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency.Philip Pettit - 2001 - Polity.details
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Faces of Intention.Michael Bratman - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):119-121.details
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Groups with minds of their own.Philip Pettit - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Joint actions and group agents.Philip Pettit & David Schweikard - 2006 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):18-39.details
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Aggregating sets of judgments: An impossibility result.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2002 - Economics and Philosophy 18 (1):89-110.details
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(1 other version)The common mind: an essay on psychology, society, and politics.Philip Pettit - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Review: The Fixation of Belief and its Undoing: Changing Beliefs through Inquiry. [REVIEW]Alan Hájek - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (1):166.details
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Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency.Michael Bratman - 1999 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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The Fixation of Belief and its Undoing: Changing Beliefs Through Inquiry.Isaac Levi - 1991 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.details
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(1 other version)The Fixation of Belief and Its Undoing. [REVIEW]Henry E. Kyburg - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3):721-725.details
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Logical Constraints on Judgement Aggregation.Marc Pauly & Martin van Hees - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (6):569 - 585.details
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The emulation theory of representation: Motor control, imagery, and perception.Rick Grush - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3):377-396.details
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(1 other version)What The Tortoise Said To Achilles.Lewis Carroll - 1895 - Mind 104 (416):691-693.details
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Rules, Reasons and Norms.Philip Pettit - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 124 (2):185-197.details
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(2 other versions)Self-knowledge and resentment.Akeel Bilgrami - 2000 - Knowing Our Own Minds (October):207-243.details
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(1 other version)Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma.Philip Pettit - 2001 - Noûs 35 (s1):268-299.details
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(1 other version)A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency.Philip Pettit - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):498-501.details
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Rules, reasons, and norms: selected essays.Philip Pettit - 2002 - New York: Clarendon Press.details
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Logical Constraints on Judgement Aggregation.Marc Pauly & Martin Hees - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (6):569-585.details
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On the many as one: A reply to Kornhauser and Sager.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2005 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (4):377–390.details
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(1 other version)Intention.P. L. Heath - 1960 - Philosophical Quarterly 10 (40):281.details
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Reason and the First Person u knjizi Wright, C., Smith, B: C. and Macdonald, C.T. Burge - 2002 - In Michael McKinsey (ed.), On Knowing Our Own Minds. Wiley-Blackwell.details
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A model of path-dependence in decisions over multiple propositions.Christian List - 2004 - American Political Science Review 98 (3):495-513.details
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I Intend that We J.Michael Bratman - 1999 - In Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 142–161.details
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(2 other versions)Self-Knowledge and Resentment.Akeel Bilgrami - 1998 - In C. Macdonald, Barry C. Smith & C. J. G. Wright (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Intentionality.John Searle - 1983 - Philosophy 59 (229):417-418.details
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