- Groups that fly blind.Jared Peterson - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-24.details
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The extended mind argument against phenomenal intentionality.Cody Turner - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (4):747-774.details
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Why Moral Rights of Free Speech for Business Corporations Cannot Be Justified.Ava Thomas Wright - 2021 - Southwest Philosophy Review 37 (1):187-198.details
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Believing is said of groups in many ways (and so it should be said of them in none).Richard Pettigrew - details
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Eliminating Group Agency.Lars J. K. Moen - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (1):43-66.details
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The Metaphysics of Practical Rationality: Intentional and Deontic Cognition.Preston Stovall - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (4):549-568.details
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Group Responsibility.Christian List - 2022 - In Dana Kay Nelkin & Derk Pereboom (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Group Agency and Artificial Intelligence.Christian List - 2021 - Philosophy and Technology (4):1-30.details
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Collective Responsibility and Entitlement to Collective Reasons for Action.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2020 - In Saba Bazargan-Forward & Deborah Tollefsen (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility. Routledge. pp. 243-257.details
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Group Action Without Group Minds.Kenneth Silver - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):321-342.details
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What Is Minimally Cooperative Behavior?Kirk Ludwig - 2020 - In Anika Fiebich (ed.), Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency. Springer. pp. 9-40.details
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Some Building Blocks for a Theory of the Firm as a Real Entity.David Gindis - 2007 - In Yuri Biondi, Arnaldo Canziani & Thierry Kirat (eds.), The Firm as an Entity: Implications for Economics, Accounting and the Law. Taylor & Francis. pp. 266-291.details
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Individual Responsibility for Collective Actions.Michael Skerker - 2020 - In Saba Bazargan-Forward & Deborah Tollefsen (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility. Routledge.details
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Proxy Assertion.Kirk Ludwig - 2018 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press.details
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Group understanding.Kenneth Boyd - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6837-6858.details
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A Defence of Lichtenberg.Giovanni Merlo - 2021 - Episteme 18 (4):624-639.details
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Existence, really? Tacit disagreements about “existence” in disputes about group minds and corporate agents.Johannes Himmelreich - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4939-4953.details
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Groups with Minds of Their Own Making.Leo Townsend - 2019 - Journal of Social Philosophy 51 (1):129-151.details
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(1 other version)Market epistemology.Michael Thicke - 2018 - Synthese 195 (12):5571-5594.details
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Epistemically Pernicious Groups and the Groupstrapping Problem.Kenneth Boyd - 2018 - Social Epistemology 33 (1):61-73.details
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Collective Intentionality in Non-Human Animals.Robert A. Wilson - 2017 - In Marija Jankovic and Kirk Ludwig (ed.), Routledge Handbook on Collective Intentionality. pp. 420-432.details
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Corporate Agency -- The Lesson of the Discursive Dilemma.Philip Pettit - 2016 - In Kirk Ludwig & Marija Jankovic (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality. New York: Routledge. pp. 249-59.details
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The Conversable, Responsible Corporation.Philip Pettit - 2017 - In Eric Orts & Craig Smith (eds.), The Moral Responsibility of Firms. Oxford University Press. pp. 15-35.details
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Collaborative Irrationality, Akrasia, and Groupthink: Social Disruptions of Emotion Regulation.Thomas Szanto - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7:1-17.details
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Can a Corporation be Worthy of Moral Consideration?Kenneth Silver - 2019 - Journal of Business Ethics 159 (1):253-265.details
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A psychologistic theory of metaphysical explanation.Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2019 - Synthese 196 (7):2777-2802.details
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(1 other version)Market epistemology.Michael Thicke - 2017 - Synthese:1-24.details
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What are social groups? Their metaphysics and how to classify them.Brian Epstein - 2017 - Synthese 196 (12):4899-4932.details
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The Logical Space of Social Trinitarianism.Matthew Davidson - 2016 - Faith and Philosophy 33 (3):333-357.details
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What Is Justified Group Belief.Jennifer Lackey - 2016 - Philosophical Review Recent Issues 125 (3):341-396.details
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Why Change the Subject? On Collective Epistemic Agency.András Szigeti - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):843-864.details
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Early Heidegger on Social Reality.Jo-Jo Koo - 2016 - In Alessandro Salice & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), The Phenomenological Approach to Social Reality: History, Concepts, Problems. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 91-119.details
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Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents.Gunnar Björnsson & Kendy Hess - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):273–298.details
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(1 other version)What is it Like to be a Group Agent?Christian List - 2015 - Noûs:295-319.details
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The Fallacy of Corporate Moral Agency.David Rönnegard (ed.) - 2015 - Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.details
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Indispensability, the Discursive Dilemma, and Groups with Minds of Their Own.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2014 - In Gerhard Preyer, Frank Hindriks & Sara Rachel Chant (eds.), From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 137-162.details
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Three Kinds of Collective Attitudes.Christian List - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S9):1601-1622.details
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Why macroeconomics does not supervene on microeconomics.Brian Epstein - 2014 - Journal of Economic Methodology 21 (1):3-18.details
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Beyond the Big Four and the Big Five.Frank Hindriks, Sara Rachel Chant & Gerhard Preyer - 2014 - In Gerhard Preyer, Frank Hindriks & Sara Rachel Chant (eds.), From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-9.details
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(1 other version)The Transfer of Duties: From Individuals to States and Back Again.Stephanie Collins & Holly Lawford-Smith - 2016 - In Michael Brady & Miranda Fricker (eds.), The Epistemic Life of Groups: Essays in the Epistemology of Collectives. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 150-172.details
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Methodological Individualism and Holism in Political Science: A Reconciliation.Christian List & Kai Spiekermann - 2013 - American Political Science Review 107 (4):629-643.details
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Being and Becoming in the Theory of Group Agency.Leo Townsend - 2013 - Abstracta 7 (1).details
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Collective De Se Thoughts and Centered Worlds.Shen-yi Liao - 2014 - Ratio 27 (1):17-31.details
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Thinking things and feeling things: on an alleged discontinuity in folk metaphysics of mind.Mark Phelan, Adam Arico & Shaun Nichols - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):703-725.details
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Group Agents: Persons, Mobs, or Zombies?Cathal O’Madagain - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (2):271-287.details
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Searle's derivation of promissory obligation.Savas L. Tsohatzidis - 2007 - In Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts: Essays on John Searle’s Social Ontology. Springer.details
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Individual Complicity in Collective Wrongdoing.Brian Lawson - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):227-243.details
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The location problem in social ontology.Frank Hindriks - 2013 - Synthese 190 (3):413-437.details
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Distributive and relational equality.Christian Schemmel - 2012 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 11 (2):123-148.details
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Genuinely collective emotions.Bryce Huebner - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (1):89-118.details
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