Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Framing Joint Action.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):173-192.
    Many philosophers have offered accounts of shared actions aimed at capturing what makes joint actions intentionally joint. I first discuss two leading accounts of shared intentions, proposed by Michael Bratman and Margaret Gilbert. I argue that Gilbert’s account imposes more normativity on shared intentions than is strictly needed and that Bratman’s account requires too much cognitive sophistication on the part of agents. I then turn to the team-agency theory developed by economists that I see as offering an alternative route to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  • Groups with minds of their own.Philip Pettit - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   153 citations  
  • (1 other version)Deciding to believe.Bernard Williams - 1973 - In Problems of the Self. Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press. pp. 136--51.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   342 citations  
  • Perspectival Thought: A Plea for Moderate Relativism.François Recanati - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Our thought and talk are situated. They do not take place in a vacuum but always in a context, and they always concern an external situation relative to which they are to be evaluated. Since that is so, François Recanati argues, our linguistic and mental representations alike must be assigned two layers of content: the explicit content, or lekton, is relative and perspectival, while the complete content, which is absolute, involves contextual factors in addition to what is explicitly represented. Far (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   145 citations  
  • Intentions and plans in decision and game theory.Martin van Hees & Olivier Roy - 2007 - In Bruno Verbeek (ed.), Reasons and Intentions. Ashgate.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • It is raining (somewhere).François Recanati - 2005 - Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (1):123-146.
    The received view about meteorological predicates like ‘rain’ is that they carry an argument slot for a location which can be filled explicitly or implicitly. The view assumes that ‘rain’, in the absence of an explicit location, demands that the context provide a specific location. In an earlier article in this journal, I provided a counter-example, viz. a context in which ‘it is raining’ receives a location-indefinite interpretation. On the basis of that example, I argued that when there is tacit (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • (1 other version)Deciding to believe.B. Williams - 1973 - In Bernard Williams (ed.), Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956–1972. Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press. pp. 136–51.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   166 citations  
  • Intentionality, an Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.Andrew Woodfield - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (143):300-303.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   230 citations  
  • Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    John Searle's Speech Acts (1969) and Expression and Meaning (1979) developed a highly original and influential approach to the study of language. But behind both works lay the assumption that the philosophy of language is in the end a branch of the philosophy of the mind: speech acts are forms of human action and represent just one example of the mind's capacity to relate the human organism to the world. The present book is concerned with these biologically fundamental capacities, and, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1453 citations  
  • Collective Intentions And Team Agency.Natalie Gold & Robert Sugden - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (3):109-137.
    In the literature of collective intentions, the ‘we-intentions’ that lie behind cooperative actions are analysed in terms of individual mental states. The core forms of these analyses imply that all Nash equilibrium behaviour is the result of collective intentions, even though not all Nash equilibria are cooperative actions. Unsatisfactorily, the latter cases have to be excluded either by stipulation or by the addition of further, problematic conditions. We contend that the cooperative aspect of collective intentions is not a property of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   99 citations  
  • Bratman, Searle, and Simplicity : Comments on Bratman, Shared Agency, Planning Theory of Acting Together.Björn Petersson - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):27–37.
    Michael Bratman’s work is established as one of the most important philosophical approaches to group agency so far, and Shared Agency, A Planning Theory of Acting Together confirms that impression. In this paper I attempt to challenge the book’s central claim that considerations of theoretical simplicity will favor Bratman’s theory of collective action over its main rivals. I do that, firstly, by questioning whether there must be a fundamental difference in kind between Searle style we-intentions and I-intentions within that type (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • On collective intentions: collective action in economics and philosophy.Nicholas Bardsley - 2007 - Synthese 157 (2):141-159.
    Philosophers and economists write about collective action from distinct but related points of view. This paper aims to bridge these perspectives. Economists have been concerned with rationality in a strategic context. There, problems posed by “coordination games” seem to point to a form of rational action, “team thinking,” which is not individualistic. Philosophers’ analyses of collective intention, however, sometimes reduce collective action to a set of individually instrumental actions. They do not, therefore, capture the first person plural perspective characteristic of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Michael E. Bratman: Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together: New York, Oxford University Press USA, 2014, ISBN: 978-0-190-933999-0, 240 pages, £ 19.99.Andras Szigeti - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (5):1101-1104.
    If you have ever had to move house, you will know this: the worst part is the sofa. You cannot do it alone. Nor will it be enough for me to just lift one end waiting for you to lift the other. We will have to work together to get the job done. If spaces are tight, we will even have to find a practical solution to a tantalizing mathematical puzzle: the moving sofa problem.Joint actions like that are part and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together.Michael Bratman - 2014 - New York, NY: Oup Usa.
    Human beings act together in characteristic ways that matter to us a great deal. This book explores the conceptual, metaphysical and normative foundations of such sociality. It argues that appeal to the planning structures involved in our individual, temporally extended agency provides substantial resources for understanding these foundations of our sociality.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   185 citations  
  • Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents.Raimo Tuomela - 2013 - New York, US: Oup Usa.
    This volume presents a systematic philosophical theory related to the collectivism-versus-individualism debate in the social sciences. A weak version of collectivism (the "we-mode" approach) that depends on group-based collective intentionality is developed in the book. The we-mode approach is used to account for collective intention and action, cooperation, group attitudes, social practices and institutions as well as group solidarity.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   139 citations  
  • Collective Intentionality.David P. Schweikard & Hans Bernhard Schmid - 2012 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   60 citations  
  • Team Reasoning, Framing and Self-Control: An Aristotelian Account.Natalie Gold - 2013 - In Neil Levy (ed.), Addiction and Self-Control: Perspectives From Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience. New York, US: Oup Usa.
    Decision theory explains weakness of will as the result of a conflict of incentives between different transient agents. In this framework, self-control can only be achieved by the I-now altering the incentives or choice-sets of future selves. There is no role for an extended agency over time. However, it is possible to extend game theory to allow multiple levels of agency. At the inter-personal level, theories of team reasoning allow teams to be agents, as well as individuals. I apply team (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Utilitarianism and Co-Operation.Donald Regan - 1980 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    The author identifies and defines the features of traditional utilitarian theories which account for their appeal, demonstrates that no theory which is exclusively act-oriented can have all the properties that ultilitarians have attempted to build into their theories, and develops a new theory co-operative utilitarianism.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   95 citations  
  • We-thinking and vacillation between frames: filling a gap in Bacharach’s theory.Alessandra Smerilli - 2012 - Theory and Decision 73 (4):539-560.
    We-thinking theories allow groups to deliberate as agents. They have been introduced into the economic domain for both theoretical and empirical reasons. Among the few scholars who have proposed formal approaches to illustrate how we-thinking arises, Bacharach offers one of the most developed theories from the game theoretic point of view. He presents a number of intuitions, not always mutually consistent and not fully developed. In this article, I propose a way to complete Bacharach’s theory, generalizing the interdependence hypothesis and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • (1 other version)Re-considering the Foole’s Rejoinder: backward induction in indefinitely iterated prisoner’s dilemmas.Magnus Jiborn & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2003 - Synthese 136 (2):135-157.
    According to the so-called “Folk Theorem” for repeated games, stable cooperative relations can be sustained in a Prisoner’s Dilemma if the game is repeated an indefinite number of times. This result depends on the possibility of applying strategies that are based on reciprocity, i.e., strategies that reward cooperation with subsequent cooperation and punish defectionwith subsequent defection. If future interactions are sufficiently important, i.e., if the discount rate is relatively small, each agent may be motivated to cooperate by fear of retaliation (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Playing for Real: A Text on Game Theory.Ken Binmore - 2007 - Oxford University Press USA.
    Ken Binmore's previous game theory textbook, Fun and Games, carved out a significant niche in the advanced undergraduate market; it was intellectually serious and more up-to-date than its competitors, but also accessibly written. Its central thesis was that game theory allows us to understand many kinds of interactions between people, a point that Binmore amply demonstrated through a rich range of examples and applications. This replacement for the now out-of-date 1991 textbook retains the entertaining examples, but changes the organization to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.Richard E. Aquila - 1985 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (1):159-170.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   200 citations  
  • Joint Attention, Triangulation and Radical Interpretation: A problem and its Solution.Ingar Brinck - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (2):179-206.
    By describing the aim of triangulation as locating the objects of thoughts and utterances, Davidson has given in the double role of accounting for both the individuation of content and the sense in which content necessarily is public. The focus of this article is on how triangulation may contribute to the individuation of content. I maintain that triangulation, interpreted in terms of joint attention, may serve to break into the intentional circle of meaning and belief, yet without forcing us to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • The philosophy of sociality: The shared point of view * by Raimo Tuomela. [REVIEW]Raimo Tuomela - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):587-589.
    This work provides a rigorous analysis of what Tuomela calls ‘the we-perspective’. Tuomela's overarching project is to argue that ‘conceptualizing social life and theorizing about it requires the use of group concepts, indeed the we-perspective and, especially, the we-mode.’ Already some of the complexities of Tuomela's approach will be evident – viz. in the distinction, implied in the above quotation and carried through systematically throughout the work, between the ‘we-perspective’ and the ‘we-mode’. For, indeed, it is possible, on his account, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   112 citations  
  • Hume's Morals Theory.Robert J. Fogelin - 1983 - Mind 92 (365):129-132.
    First Published in 1980. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   50 citations  
  • A Metaphysics for Freedom.Helen Steward - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Helen Steward argues that determinism is incompatible with agency itself--not only the special human variety of agency, but also powers which can be accorded to animal agents. She offers a distinctive, non-dualistic version of libertarianism, rooted in a conception of what biological forms of organisation might make possible in the way of freedom.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   176 citations  
  • Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents. [REVIEW]Leo Townsend - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):183–187.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory.Michael Bacharach - 2006 - Princeton University Press.
    This is a revision of game theory which takes account of agents' own descriptions of their situations, and which allows people to reason as members of groups.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   136 citations  
  • The logic of team reasoning.Robert Sugden - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):165 – 181.
    Abstract Orthodox decision theory presupposes that agency is invested in individuals. An opposing literature allows team agency to be invested in teams whose members use distinctive modes of team reasoning. This paper offers a new conceptual framework, inspired by David Lewis's analysis of common reasons for belief, within which team reasoning can be represented. It shows how individuals can independently endorse a principle of team reasoning which prescribes acting as a team member conditional on assurance that others have endorsed the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   74 citations  
  • Re-considering the Foole’s Rejoinder: backward induction in indefinitely iterated prisoner’s dilemmas.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Magnus Jiborn - 2000 - In Value and Choice Some Common Themes in Decision Theory and Moral Philosophy. Lund Universitetstrycheriet. pp. 121-140.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • (1 other version)Re-considering the Foole’s Rejoinder: backward induction in indefinitely iterated prisoner’s dilemmas.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Magnus Jiborn - 2000 - In Value and Choice Some Common Themes in Decision Theory and Moral Philosophy. Lund Universitetstrycheriet. pp. 121-140.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Review of Donald Regan: Utilitarianism and co-operation[REVIEW]William Nelson - 1982 - Ethics 92 (4):751-753.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Hume’s Moral Theory.John Leslie Mackie - 1980 - Boston: Routledge.
    First Published in 1980. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   72 citations  
  • The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View.Raimo Tuomela - 2007 - New York, US: Oup Usa.
    The Philosophy of Sociality offers new ideas and conceptual tools for philosophers and social scientists in their analysis of the social world.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   144 citations  
  • Joint intention, we-mode and I-mode.Raimo Tuomela - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):35–58.
    The central topic of this paper is to study joint intention to perform a joint action or to bring about a certain state. Here are some examples of such joint action: You and I share the plan to carry a heavy table jointly upstairs and realize this plan, we sing a duet together, we clean up our backyard together, and I cash a check by acting jointly with you, a bank teller, and finally we together elect a new president for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations  
  • Collectivity And Circularity.Björn Petersson - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (3):138-156.
    According to a common claim, a necessary condition for a collective action (as opposed to a mere set of intertwined or parallel actions) to take place is that the notion of collective action figures in the content of each participant’s attitudes. Insofar as this claim is part of a conceptual analysis, it gives rise to a circularity challenge that has been explicitly addressed by Michael Bratman and Christopher Kutz.1 I will briefly show how the problem arises within Bratman’s and Kutz’s (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency vs. Joint-Agency.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2011 - In Axel Seemann (ed.), Joint Attention: New Developments. MIT Press.
    This chapter aims at investigating the phenomenology of joint action and at gaining a better understanding of (1) how the sense of agency one experiences when engaged in a joint action differs from the sense of agency one has for individual actions and (2) how the sense of agency one experiences when engaged in a joint action differs according to the type of joint action and to the role one plays in it.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  • The limits of individualism are not the limits of rationality.Susan Hurley - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):164-165.
    Individualism fixes the unit of rational agency at the individual, creating problems exemplified in Hi-Lo and Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) games. But instrumental evaluation of consequences does not require a fixed individual unit. Units of agency can overlap, and the question of which unit should operate arises. Assuming a fixed individual unit is hard to justify: It is natural, and can be rational, to act as part of a group rather than as an individual. More attention should be paid to how (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • (1 other version)Utilitarianism and Co-operation.Donald H. Regan - 1980 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 172 (4):689-689.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   93 citations  
  • Utilitarianism and Co-operation.G. W. Harrison - 1983 - Philosophical Quarterly 33 (133):412-413.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations