- What’s voluntary in stance voluntarism?Bruno Malavolta E. Silva - 2021 - Manuscrito 44 (2):52-88.details
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From self-deception to self-control.Vasco Correia - 2014 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):309-323.details
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How Twitter gamifies communication.C. Thi Nguyen - 2021 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Applied Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 410-436.details
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I Ought, Therefore I Can Obey.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.details
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Actos de rumoring y rumor-mongering: un análisis del rumor a partir del enfoque responsabilista en epistemología de las virtudes.Felipe Alejandro Álvarez - 2022 - Littera Scripta. Revista Filosofia 4:152-165.details
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Acceptance and the ethics of belief.Laura K. Soter - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (8):2213-2243.details
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Voluntary Belief on a Reasonable Basis.Philip J. Nickel - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):312-334.details
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"But mom, crop-tops are cute!" Social knowledge, social structure and ideology critique.Sally Haslanger - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):70–91.details
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Taking aim at the truth.Masahiro Yamada - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):47-59.details
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Moderate scientism in philosophy.Buckwalter Wesley & John Turri - 2018 - In Jeroen de Ridder, Rik Peels & Rene van Woudenberg (eds.), Scientism: Prospects and Problems. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Choosing and refusing: doxastic voluntarism and folk psychology.John Turri, David Rose & Wesley Buckwalter - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2507-2537.details
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Kant on the Ethics of Belief.Alix Cohen - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3):317-334.details
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Intellectual Agency and Responsibility for Belief in Free Speech Theory.Robert Mark Simpson - 2013 - Legal Theory 19 (3):307-330.details
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Pragmatic Reasons for Belief.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Genealogy and Knowledge-First Epistemology: A Mismatch?Matthieu Queloz - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):100-120.details
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Epistemic Consent and Doxastic Justification.Luis Oliveira - 2022 - In Paul Silva & Luis R. G. Oliveira (eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on their Nature and Significance. New York: Routledge. pp. 286-312.details
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Emotions, Rationality, and Gender.Alison Duncan Kerr - 2020 - In Encyclopedia of the UN Sustainable Development Goals - Gender Equality.details
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The Benefit of Regan's Doubt.Robert Bass - 2016 - In Mylan Engel Jr & Gary Lynn Comstock (eds.), The Moral Rights of Animals. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books. pp. 239-256.details
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The Self-Reinforcing Nature of Joint Action.Facundo M. Alonso - 2024 - Philosophical Studies:1-19.details
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Group belief reconceived.Jeroen de Ridder - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-21.details
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The Epistemic Value of Expert Autonomy.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):344-361.details
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Scientific Progress, Understanding, and Knowledge: Reply to Park.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 49 (3):451-459.details
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Reconstructed Empiricism.Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (1):95-113.details
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Deductive Cogency, understanding, and acceptance.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3121-3141.details
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Realism and the Absence of Value.Shamik Dasgupta - 2018 - Philosophical Review 127 (3):279-322.details
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Promising as Doxastic Entrustment.Jorah Dannenberg - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (4):425-447.details
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Models As Fictions, Fictions As Models.Gregory Currie - 2016 - The Monist 99 (3):296-310.details
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The Paradox of Bad Faith and Elite Competitive Sport.Leon Culbertson - 2005 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 32 (1):65-86.details
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Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.details
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Can There be Thought Without Words?—Donald Davidson on Language and Animal Minds.Diana Couto - 2022 - Topoi 41 (3):587-598.details
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Os Limites da Racionalidade: Auto-Engano e Acrasia.Vasco Correia - 2010 - Disputatio 3 (28):1 - 17.details
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Betraying Animals.Steve Cooke - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (2):183-200.details
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Kant on Doxastic Voluntarism and its Implications for Epistemic Responsibility.Alix Cohen - 2013 - Kant Yearbook 5 (1):33-50.details
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Teaching & Learning Guide for: ‘Border Disputes: Recent Debates along the Perception–Cognition Border’.Sam Clarke & Jacob Beck - 2023 - Philosophy Compass 18 (10):e12949.details
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Doxastic voluntarism and forced belief.Murray Clarke - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (1):39 - 51.details
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Epistemic norms without voluntary control.Philippe Chuard & Nicholas Southwood - 2009 - Noûs 43 (4):599-632.details
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Negotiation, Persuasion and Argument.Chris Provis - 2004 - Argumentation 18 (1):95-112.details
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A New Problem for Internalism.Chad Carmichael - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13187-13199.details
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A Pragmatic Argument for a Pragmatic Theory of Truth.John Capps - 2017 - Contemporary Pragmatism 14 (2):135-156.details
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Disclaiming epistemic Akrasia: arguments and commentaries.Veronica S. Campos - 2020 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 24 (2).details
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String Theory, Non-Empirical Theory Assessment, and the Context of Pursuit.Frank Cabrera - 2021 - Synthese 198:3671–3699.details
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Mind-Brain Dichotomy, Mental Disorder, and Theory of Mind.Wesley Buckwalter - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (2):511-526.details
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Implicit attitudes and the ability argument.Wesley Buckwalter - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):2961-2990.details
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Reliability and social knowledgerelevant responsibility.Leandro De Brasi - 2015 - Trans/Form/Ação 38 (1):187-212.details
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Epistemic Internalism and Knowledge-Relevant Anti-Individualist Responsibility.Leandro de Brasi - 2017 - Manuscrito 40 (4):113-140.details
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Active belief.Matthew Boyle - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary 35 (S1):119-147.details
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Epistemic Judgement and Motivation.Cameron Boult & Sebastian Köhler - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):738-758.details
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Doxastic Voluntarism and Self-Deception.Anthony R. Booth - 2007 - Disputatio 2 (22):115 - 130.details
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The Epistemic Norm of Inference and Non-Epistemic Reasons for Belief.Patrick Bondy - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-21.details
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The epistemology of science—a bird’s-eye view.Alexander Bird - 2010 - Synthese 175 (S1):5-16.details
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