- Monothematic Delusions: Towards a Two-Factor Account.Martin Davies, Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon & Nora Breen - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2):133-158.details
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The myth of mental illness.Thomas S. Szasz - 2004 - In Arthur L. Caplan, James J. McCartney & Dominic A. Sisti (eds.), Health, Disease, and Illness: Concepts in Medicine. Georgetown University Press. pp. 43--50.details
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(1 other version)Mental illness is indeed a myth.Hanna Pickard - 2009 - In Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience.details
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Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs.Lisa Bortolotti - 2009 - Oxford University Press. Edited by K. W. M. Fulford, John Sadler, Stanghellini Z., Morris Giovanni, Bortolotti Katherine, Broome Lisa & Matthew.details
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The social construction of what?Ian Hacking - 1999 - Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.details
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The sense of agency: Awareness and ownership of action.Anthony J. Marcel - 2003 - In Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 48â93.details
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On thought insertion.Christoph Hoerl - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):189-200.details
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Madness Explained: Psychosis and Human Nature.Richard P. Bentall - 2003 - Allen Lane.details
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(3 other versions)Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.details
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Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge.Richard Moran - 2001 - Princeton University Press.details
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Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory.Ian Hacking - 1995 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.details
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Thought insertion and self-knowledge.Jordi Fernández - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (1):66-88.details
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A role for ownership and authorship in the analysis of thought insertion.Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):205-224.details
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In defence of the doxastic conception of delusions.Timothy J. Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):163-88.details
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(1 other version)The Illusion of Conscious Will.Daniel Wegner - 2002 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.details
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Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives.Matthew Broome & Lisa Bortolotti (eds.) - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Schizophrenia, the space of reasons, and thinking as a motor process.John Campbell - 1999 - The Monist 82 (4):609-625.details
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(1 other version)Mental illness is indeed a myth.Hanna Pickard - 2009 - In Matthew Broome & Lisa Bortolotti (eds.), Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(3 other versions)Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry Frankfurt - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Review of Thomas Szasz: The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct. [REVIEW]Thomas S. Szasz - 1963 - Ethics 73 (2):145-147.details
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Thoughts, motor actions, and the self.Gottfried Vosgerau & Albert Newen - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (1):22–43.details
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Mental action and the epistemology of mind.Matthew Soteriou - 2005 - Noûs 39 (1):83-105.details
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(2 other versions)The Illusion of Conscious Will.R. Holton - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):218-221.details
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Neurocognitive models of schizophrenia: a neurophenomenological critique.Shaun Gallagher - 2004 - Psychopathology 37 (1):8â19.details
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