This paper defends the view that homosexuality is abnormal and hence undesirable—not because it is immoral or sinful, or because it weakens society or hampers evolutionary development, but for a purely mechanical reason. It is a misuse of bodily parts. Clear empirical sense attaches to the idea of the use of such bodily parts as genitals, the idea that they are for something, and consequently to the idea of their misuse. I argue on grounds involving natural selection that misuse of (...) bodily parts can with high probability be connected to unhappiness. I regard these matters as prolegomena to such policy issues as the rights of homosexuals, the rights of those desiring not to associate with homosexuals, and legislation concerning homosexuality, issues which I shall not discuss systematically here. However, I do in the last section draw a seemingly evident corollary from my view that homosexuality is abnormal and likely to lead to unhappiness. (shrink)

In this paper I defend an etiological theory of biological functions (according to which the proper function of a trait is the effect for which it was selected by natural selection) against three objections which have been influential. I argue, contrary to Millikan, that it is wrong to base our defense of the theory on a rejection of conceptual analysis, for conceptual analysis does have an important role in philosophy of science. I also argue that biology requires a normative notion (...) of a "proper function", and that a normative notion is not ahistorical. (shrink)

I defend the historical definition of "function" originally given in my Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories (1984a). The definition was not offered in the spirit of conceptual analysis but is more akin to a theoretical definition of "function". A major theme is that nonhistorical analyses of "function" fail to deal adequately with items that are not capable of performing their functions.

Considered as a form of love, sex is clearly involved in the total set of ethical relationships that exists between persons and is therefore ethically significant.

Philosophy of biology has a long and honourable history. Indeed, like most of the great intellectual achievements of the Western World, it goes back to the Greeks. However, until recently in this century, it was sadly neglected. With a few noteworthy exceptions, someone wishing to delve into the subject had to choose between extremes of insipid vitalism on the one hand, and sterile formalizations of the most elementary biological principles on the other. Whilst philosophy of physics pushed confidently ahead, the (...) philosophy of biology languished. In the past decade, however, things have changed dramatically. A number of energetic and thoughtful young philosophers have made real efforts to master the outlines and details of contemporary biology. They have shown that many stimulating problems emerge when analytic skills are turned towards the life-sciences, particularly if one does not feeI con strained to stay only with theoretical parts of biology, but can range over to more medical parts of the spectrum. At the same time, biology itself has had one of the most fruitful yet turbulent periods in its whole history, and more and more biologists have grown to see that many of the problems they face take them beyond the narrow confines of empiric al science: a broader perspective is needed. (shrink)