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The Case for Closure.John Hawthorne - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 26-43.details
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Probability and the logic of rational belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, Conn.,: Wesleyan University Press.details
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Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, CT, USA: Wesleyan University Press.details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Must we know what we say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.details
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``Must we Know What we Say?".Matt Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.details
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Knowledge and certainty.Jason Stanley - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):35-57.details
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Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Précis of Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):168-172.details
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How to Defeat Opposition to Moore.Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):141-153.details
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How to defeat opposition to Moore.Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:137-49.details
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Knowledge in the image of assertion.Jonathan Schaffer - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):1-19.details
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Assertion and safety.Charlie Pelling - 2013 - Synthese 190 (17):3777-3796.details
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Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow.David Lewis - 1979 - Noûs 13 (4):455-476.details
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Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.details
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Norms of assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.details
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Closure principles.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (3):256–267.details
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Quantifiers, Knowledge, and Counterfactuals.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):287 - 313.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.details
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Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Counterfactual scorekeeping.Anthony S. Gillies - 2007 - Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (3):329 - 360.details
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Conclusive reasons.Fred I. Dretske - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-22.details
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Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.details
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Counterfactuals.Dorothy Edgington - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt1):1-21.details
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I-Counterfactuals.Dorothy Edgington - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt1):1-21.details
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Probability and Assertion.V. H. Dudman - 1992 - Analysis 52 (4):204 - 211.details
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Generalizing the lottery paradox.Igor Douven & Timothy Williamson - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (4):755-779.details
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Fallibilism, epistemic possibility, and concessive knowledge attributions.Trent Dougherty & Patrick Rysiew - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):123-132.details
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Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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Solving the skeptical problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.details
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Knowledge, assertion and lotteries.Keith DeRose - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):568–580.details
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Insensitivity is back, baby!Keith DeRose - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):161-187.details
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Assertion, knowledge, and context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.details
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``Assertion, Knowledge, and Context".Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.details
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Comments on Vogel.Troy Cross - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):89 - 98.details
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Does knowledge secure warrant to assert?E. J. Coffman - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):285 - 300.details
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Counterfactuals and context.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2008 - Analysis 68 (1):39–46.details
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Two more for the knowledge account of assertion.Matthew Benton - 2011 - Analysis 71 (4):684-687.details
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Assertion, knowledge and predictions.Matthew Benton - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):102-105.details
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Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology.Kelly Becker & Tim Black (eds.) - 2012 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Contemporary Debates in Epistemology.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Malden, Ma: Blackwell.details
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Real Conditionals.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Oxford, England: Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Philosophical Troubles. Collected Papers Vol I.Saul A. Kripke (ed.) - 2011 - Oxford University Press.details
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The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1.Keith DeRose - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Implicature: Intention, Convention, and Principle in the Failure of Gricean Theory.Wayne A. Davis - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2006 - Critica 38 (114):98-107.details
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Philosophical Explanations. [REVIEW]Robert Nozick - 1981 - Philosophy 58 (223):118-121.details
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