The examination of the notion of science from a sociological perspective has begun to transform the attitudes to science traditionally upheld by historians and philosophers.

Suitable for students and scholars, this title challenges the assumption that skepticism, rather than established belief, lies at the heart of scientific discovery.

The technological sciences have at least six defining characteristics that distinguish them from the other sciences. They have human-made rather than natural objects as their study objects, include the practice of engineering design, define their study objects in functional terms, evaluate these study objects with category-specified value statements, employ less far-reaching idealizations than the natural sciences, and do not need an exact mathematical solution when a sufficiently close approximation is available. In combination, the six characteristics are sufficient to show that (...) the technological sciences are neither branches nor applications of the natural sciences, but form a different group of sciences with specific characteristics of their own.Keywords: Technological sciences; Technology; Functional concepts; Idealization; Design. (shrink)

In surveying the field of history and philosophy of science , it may be more useful just now to pose some key questions than it would be to lay out the sundry competing attempts to unify H and P. The ten problems this essay presents are grounded in a range of work of enormous interest—historical and philosophical work that has made use of productive categories of analysis: context, historicism, purity, and microhistory, to name but a few. What kind of account (...) are we after—historically and philosophically—when we attempt to address science not as a vacuous generality but in its specific, local formation? (shrink)

Independent philosopher Lee (recently of the U. of Manchester) attends to the deeper implications of ecologically insensitive technology beyond its polluting effects. Contrasting modern with premodern worldviews provides the context for exploring how new sciences like biotechnology require an expanded environmental ethos encompassing both the biotic and the abiotic. The author considers misconceived the notions of nature as either a work of art or a mere social construct per some postmodern thinking. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

In this work the distinguished physical chemist and philosopher, Michael Polanyi, demonstrates that the scientist's personal participation in his knowledge, in both its discovery and its validation, is an indispensable part of science itself. Even in the exact sciences, "knowing" is an art, of which the skill of the knower, guided by his personal commitment and his passionate sense of increasing contact with reality, is a logically necessary part. In the biological and social sciences this becomes even more evident. The (...) tendency to make knowledge impersonal in our culture has split fact from value, science from humanity. Polanyi wishes to substitute for the objective, impersonal ideal of scientific detachment an alternative ideal which gives attention to the personal involvement of the knower in all acts of understanding. His book should help to restore science to its rightful place in an integrated culture, as part of the whole person's continuing endeavor to make sense of the totality of his experience. In honor of this work and his The Study of Man Polanyi was presented with the Lecomte de Noüy Award for 1959. (shrink)

This paper presents a way of classifying different forms of naturalness and unnaturalness. Three main forms of (un)naturalness are found as the following: history- based (un)naturalness, property-based (un)naturalness and relation-based (un)naturalness. Numerous subforms (and some subforms of the subforms) of each are presented. The subforms differ with respect to the entities that are found (un)natural, with respect to their all-inclusiveness, and whether (un)naturalness is seen as all-or-nothing affair, or a continuous gradient. This kind of conceptual analysis is needed, first, because (...) discussion concerning (un)naturalness is common in current bioethics and environmental ethics, and second, because the terms natural and unnatural are highly ambiguous. Thus, the lack of an exact definition of the type of (un)naturalness may lead into equivocation, other forms of bad argumentation, or at least vagueness. (shrink)

It is usually believed that science goes with things like theoria, ‘knowing that’, ontology and representing, and that techne, know-how, technology and intervening are only instrumental to science or its beneficial but nonetheless accidental side effect. In this context to be instrumental means also to be eliminable, or at least transparent, something that leaves no trace. Following the historical development of experimentation, from simple observation to modern microscopic experiments. I try to show how that view loses its ground. To produce (...) an artefact, scientific or other, is to be engaged in a complex dynamics, both ontological and epistemological in which at least two component processes, that of bringing forth and that of bringing into, are intertwined. The old dictum: ‘Science discovers, technology invents’, should be replaced by: science discovers because it invents. As a consequence scientific theory becomes an instrument of design. (shrink)

In defending semantic externalism, philosophers of language have often assumed that there is a straightforward connection between scientific kinds and the natural kinds recognized by ordinary language users.1 For example, the claim that water is H2O assumes that the ordinary language kind water corresponds to a chemical kind, which contains all the molecules with molecular formula H2O as its members. This assumption about the coordination between ordinary language kinds and scientific kinds is important for the externalist program, because it is (...) what allows us to discover empirically the extensions of ordinary language kind terms. (shrink)

Unlike basic sciences, scientific research in advanced technologies aims to explain, predict, and (mathematically) describe not phenomena in nature, but phenomena in technological artefacts, thereby producing knowledge that is utilized in technological design. This article first explains why the covering-law view of applying science is inadequate for characterizing this research practice. Instead, the covering-law approach and causal explanation are integrated in this practice. Ludwig Prandtl's approach to concrete fluid flows is used as an example of scientific research in the engineering (...) sciences. A methodology of distinguishing between regions in space and/or phases in time that show distinct physical behaviours is specific to this research practice. Accordingly, two types of models specific to the engineering sciences are introduced. The diagrammatic model represents the causal explanation of physical behaviour in distinct spatial regions or time phases; the nomo-mathematical model represents the phenomenon in terms of a set of mathematically formulated laws. (shrink)

I classify different sorts of natural resources and suggest how these resources may be acquired. I also argue that inventions, whether gadgets or artificial life forms, should not be privately owned. Gadgets and life-forms are not created (although the term 'invention' suggests otherwise); they are discovered, and hence have much in common with more familiar natural resources such as sunlight that ought not to be privately owned. Nonetheless, inventors of gadgets, like discoverers of certain more familiar resources, sometimes should be (...) granted exclusive but temporary control over their inventions as an incentive for making unknown items widely accessible. (shrink)

Observation and conceptual interpretation constitute the two major ways through which human beings engage the world. _The World Observed/The World Conceived _presents an innovative analysis of the nature and role of observation and conceptualization. While these two actions are often treated as separate, Hans Radder shows that they are inherently interconnected-that materially realized observational processes are always conceptually interpreted and that the meaning of concepts depends on the way they structure observational processes and abstract from them. He examines the role (...) of human action and conceptualization in realizing observational processes and develops a detailed theory of the relationship between observation, abstraction, and the meaning of concepts. This book provides a critical analysis of the work of various other philosophers and their accounts of scientific and ordinary-life observation and conceptualization. Radder discusses the formation and nature of concepts and demonstrates how concepts structure the phenomenal world. He then introduces and defines the notions of extensible concepts, abstraction and nonlocal meanings and explores the philosophical implications of his theory. _The World Observed/The World Conceived_ offers fresh insights in practices of observation and conceptualization, that will prove useful to many areas of scholarly study including ontology, epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, science studies, and cognitive science. (shrink)

Although the expression 'intellectual property' is widely used, it could be argued that the very idea of intellectual property is incoherent. After all, ideas are not like land, houses or clothing; surely they are not the sorts of things that can be owned? I shall examine two arguments - one ontological, one jurisprudential - that put pressure on the coherence of the idea of intellectual property, both leading to the conclusion that intellectual property rights are not genuine property rights, but (...) rights to monopolies. In setting up and responding to the first argument, I discuss the applicability of the type/ token distinction to intellectual property law; a distinction I also appeal to as a way of clarifying my response to the second argument. (shrink)

Selling science has become a common practice in contemporary universities. This commodification of academia pervades many aspects of higher education, including research, teaching, and administration. As such, it raises significant philosophical, political, and moral challenges. This volume offers the first book-length analysis of this disturbing trend from a philosophical perspective and presents views by scholars of philosophy of science, social and political philosophy, and research ethics. The epistemic and moral responsibilities of universities, whether for-profit or nonprofit, are examined from several (...) philosophical standpoints. The contributors discuss the pertinent epistemological and methodological questions, the sociopolitical issues of the organization of science, the tensions between commodified practices and the ideal of “science for the public good,” and the role of governmental regulation and personal ethical behavior. In order to counter coercive and corruptive influences of academic commodification, the contributors consider alternatives to commodified research and offer practical recommendations for establishing appropriate research standards, methodologies and institutional arrangements, and a corresponding normative ethos. (shrink)

Offers a new approach to a number of central issues concerning the theoretical interpretation and normative evaluation of contemporary science and technology.

Philosophical reflection on intellectual property (IP) is still very young. Whilst much has been written by lawyers on intellectual property, the vast majority of this writing is philosophically unsophisticated. This paper aims to at least partially remedy this philosophical deficit by examining what reflection on the ontology of intellectual property can add to our understanding of how to regulate IP. I argue that ontological reflection should bring us to an important basic fact, namely that ownership of intellectual property involves the (...) ownership of types rather than tokens. This difference in the ontological status of the objects owned makes a normative difference to how we should regulate ownership of intellectual property as compared to tangible property. The argument falls into three main parts. I begin by arguing that the type-token distinction is the best way to account for the ontology of intellectual property. I next argue that the realisation that we are dealing with ownership of types rather than tokens has important normative implications. In particular some of the standard arguments in favour of private ownership of physical property simply do not apply in the case of ownership of types, whilst some other arguments apply only in an attenuated way. The next section examines the limitations of ontology as a guide to the regulation of IP. I argue that whilst thinking through the normative implications of the type-token distinction is a necessary 1 condition for a sound regulatory approach to IP, it is certainly not sufficient. This is because many of the specific questions about the regulation of intellectual property that matter most in practice—such as how long the patent term should be, or how much someone should be able to quote from a book and it count as fair use—are not answerable by ontological reflection. Such questions concern the fair distribution of the burdens and benefits involved in the construction of public goods, rather than questions of ontology.. (shrink)

This book argues that intellectual property rights are duty-bearing privileges. Drawing on the work of, amongst others, Grotius, Locke and Hegel, as well as the law of several countries, the book argues that the use of these privileges should be guided by an instrumentalism based on a principle of humanism.

Developments in biotechnology and genomics have moved the issue of patenting scientific and technological inventions toward the center of interest. In particular, the patentability of genes of plants, animals, or humans and of genetically modified (parts of) living organisms has been discussed, and questioned, from various normative perspectives. This paper aims to contribute to this debate. For this purpose, it first explains a number of relevant aspects of the theory and practice of patenting. The focus is on a special and (...) increasingly significant type of patents, namely product patents. The paper provides three general arguments against the concept and practice of product patenting. The first argument briefly considers the claim that patents are legitimate because they promote socially useful innovation. Against this claim, it is argued that product patents may hamper rather than promote such innovation. The second and main argument concludes that product patents are not adequately based on actual technological inventions, as they should be according to the usual criteria of patentability. The principal moral issue is that product patents tend to reward patentees for inventions they have not really made available. The final argument proposes a method for patenting the heat of the sun. Assuming that granting this patent will be generally considered absurd, the argument exposes a further, fundamental problem of the concept and practice of product patenting. (shrink)

In this paper we begin with a reference to the work of Hernando de Soto The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else, and his characterization of the Western institution of formal property. We note the linkages that he sees between the institution and successful capitalist enterprise. Therefore, given the appropriateness of his analysis, it would appear to be worthwhile for developing and less developed countries to adjust their systems of ownership to conform more (...) closely to the Western system of formal property. However, we go on to point out that property relationships within the Western system have become subject to redefinition through the expansion of Intellectual Property rights in ways that ultimately work to the disadvantage of the developing and less developed countries. We point out that this restructuring has been given global application through the implementation of the TRIPS agreement by the WTO. In the final section of the paper I suggest ways in which IP rights and relevant institutions can be reformed in order to avoid the disadvantages to the developing and less developed countries. (shrink)

"Cyberspace" is a term used commonly but without adequate definition. All computer-mediated phenomena may be said to comprise cyberspace. So far, no adequate ontology of cyberspace has been formulated. The law of intellectual property has attempted to fit computer-mediated phenomena into the current legal scheme. Currently, the law of intellectual property distinguishes between the subjects of patent law , and the subject of copyright law . The distinction embodied in the law of intellectual property is invalid and all things which (...) are man-made and intentionally produced are expressive objects. All computer-mediated phenomena are such expressive objects. The law of intellectual property comprises a naive ontology. A common-sense ontology of intellectual property, which must abide by the rules of logic, recognizes that all man-made objects which are intentionally produced are expressive objects and should be afforded the same form on intellectual property protection. The current legal ontology has failed in devising mutually exclusive categories for objects which are of the same type, namely--expressive. A unified ontology would accommodate computer-mediated phenomena without the problems which result from the current naive ontology. (shrink)

There has been some concern m recent years that economic interests in the biotechnology area could, particularly through patenting, have a constricting influence on scientific research. Despite this concern, there have been no studies of this phenomenon beyond isolated cases. In this article we examine the evolution of the biomedical field of hybridoma/monoclonal antibody research with detailed examples of the three types of patent claims that have emerged there—basic claims, claims on application techniques, and claims on specific antibodies. We analyze (...) the impact of these claims and their legal histories on the free flow of scientific information and, the activity of scientific researchers. We conclude that such patent claims present severe restrictions for both, not only in the monoclonal area but in general, amounting to a subtle but significant shift in the political economy of science and technology. (shrink)