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Evidentialism and the Numbers Game

Theoria 73 (4):304-316 (2007)

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  1. Belief's Own Ethics.J. Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.
    In this book Jonathan Adler offers a strengthened version of evidentialism, arguing that the ethics of belief should be rooted in the concept of belief--that...
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  • The Ontology of Reasons.John Skorupski - 2002 - Topoi 21 (1-2):113-124.
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  • Truth, Reason, and the Regulation of Belief.Peter Railton - 1994 - Philosophical Issues 5:71-93.
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  • The Fragmentation of Reason: Preface to a Pragmatic Theory of Cognitive Evaluation.E. J. Lowe & Stephen P. Stich - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (166):98.
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  • Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.
    Evidentialism is a view about the conditions under which a person is epistemically justified in having a particular doxastic attitude toward a proposition. Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This is the traditional view of justification. It is now widely opposed. The essays included in this volume develop and defend the tradition.Evidentialism has many assets. In addition to providing an intuitively plausible account of epistemic justification, it helps to resolve the problem of the (...)
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  • A New Argument for Evidentialism.Nishi Shah - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.
    When we deliberate whether to believe some proposition, we feel immediately compelled to look for evidence of its truth. Philosophers have labelled this feature of doxastic deliberation 'transparency'. I argue that resolving the disagreement in the ethics of belief between evidentialists and pragmatists turns on the correct explanation of transparency. My hypothesis is that it reflects a conceptual truth about belief: a belief that p is correct if and only if p. This normative truth entails that only evidence can be (...)
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