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  1. Against Radical Credal Imprecision.Susanna Rinard - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):157-165.
    A number of Bayesians claim that, if one has no evidence relevant to a proposition P, then one's credence in P should be spread over the interval [0, 1]. Against this, I argue: first, that it is inconsistent with plausible claims about comparative levels of confidence; second, that it precludes inductive learning in certain cases. Two motivations for the view are considered and rejected. A discussion of alternatives leads to the conjecture that there is an in-principle limitation on formal representations (...)
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  • Philosophical Theories of Probability.Donald Gillies - 2000 - Routledge.
    The Twentieth Century has seen a dramatic rise in the use of probability and statistics in almost all fields of research. This has stimulated many new philosophical ideas on probability. _Philosophical Theories of Probability_ is the first book to present a clear, comprehensive and systematic account of these various theories and to explain how they relate to one another. Gillies also offers a distinctive version of the propensity theory of probability, and the intersubjective interpretation, which develops the subjective theory.
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  • How Degrees of Belief Reflect Evidence.James Joyce - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):153-179.
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  • The Bayesian and the Dogmatist.Brian Weatherson - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt2):169-185.
    Dogmatism is sometimes thought to be incompatible with Bayesian models of rational learning. I show that the best model for updating imprecise credences is compatible with dogmatism.
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  • A Defense of Imprecise Credences in Inference and Decision Making1.James M. Joyce - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):281-323.
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  • Laws and Symmetry. [REVIEW]Michael Tooley - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (2):280.
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  • Philosophical Theories of Probability.Donald Gillies - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):132-134.
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