- Decision Theory.Katie Steele & H. Orri Stefánsson - 2012 - In Peter Adamson (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Normative theories of rational choice: expected utility.Rachael Briggs - 2017 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Relative Expectation Theory.Mark Colyvan - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (1):37-44.details
|
|
Making Ado Without Expectations.Mark Colyvan & Alan Hájek - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):829-857.details
|
|
Decision-theoretic paradoxes as voting paradoxes.Rachael Briggs - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):1-30.details
|
|
A critique of benchmark theory.Robert Bassett - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):241-267.details
|
|
Taking Stock of Infinite Value: Pascal’s Wager and Relative Utilities.Paul Bartha - 2007 - Synthese 154 (1):5-52.details
|
|
Making Do Without Expectations.Paul F. A. Bartha - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):799-827.details
|
|
Truth and probability.Frank Ramsey - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 52-94.details
|
|
Must rational intentions maximize utility?Ralph Wedgwood - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup2):73-92.details
|
|
Gandalf’s solution to the Newcomb problem.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2643–2675.details
|
|
Is Evaluative Compositionality a Requirement of Rationality?Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2014 - Mind 123 (490):457-502.details
|
|
Infinite Decisions and Rationally Negligible Probabilities.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2016 - Mind (500):1-14.details
|
|
Scalar consequentialism the right way.Neil Sinhababu - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3131-3144.details
|
|
The Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays.Frank Plumpton Ramsey, R. B. Braithwaite & G. E. Moore - 1931 - Mind 40 (160):476-482.details
|
|
Subjective Rightness and Minimizing Expected Objective Wrongness.Kristian Olsen - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (3):417-441.details
|
|
The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.details
|
|
More Seriously Wrong, More Importantly Right.Thomas Hurka - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (1):41-58.details
|
|
Risk and Rationality.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning.Larry S. Temkin - 2012 - , US: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.details
|
|
An introduction to decision theory.Martin Peterson - 2009 - Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Instrumental Rationality.John Brunero & Niko Kolodny - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.details
|
|
How to Avoid Maximizing Expected Utility.Bradley Monton - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.details
|
|
More seriously wrong.Thomas Hurka - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5:41-58.details
|
|
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (2):166-166.details
|
|
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.John von Neumann & Oskar Morgenstern - 1944 - Science and Society 9 (4):366-369.details
|
|
Functions Resembling Quotients of Measures.Ethan Bolker - 1966 - Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 2:292–312.details
|
|
Internal consistency of choice.Amartya Sen - 1993 - Econometrica 61:495–521.details
|
|
Modeling traveler choice behavior using the concepts of relative utility and relative interest.Junyi Zhang, Harry Timmermans, Aloys Borgers & Donggen Wang - 2004 - Transportation Research Part B 38:215–34..details
|
|
An introduction to decision theory.Martin Peterson - 2010 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 16 (3):413-415.details
|
|