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  1. Indeterminism and the Thin Red Line.Nuel Belnap & Mitchell Green - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8:365 - 388.
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  • (1 other version)An Axiomatization of Prior's Ockhamist Logic of Historical Necessity.Mark Reynolds - 1998 - In Marcus Kracht, Maarten de Rijke, Heinrich Wansing & Michael Zakharyaschev (eds.), Advances in Modal Logic. CSLI Publications. pp. 355-370.
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  • Back to the actual future.Jacek Wawer & Alex Malpass - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):2193-2213.
    The purpose of the paper is to rethink the role of actuality in the branching model of possibilities. We investigate the idea that the model should be enriched with an additional factor—the so-called Thin Red Line—which is supposed to represent the single possible course of events that gets actualized in time. We believe that this idea was often misconceived which prompted some unfortunate reactions. On the one hand, it suggested problematic semantic models of future tense and and on the other, (...)
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  • (1 other version)An Axiomatization of Prior's Ockhamist Logic of Historical Necessity.Mark Reynolds - 1998 - In Marcus Kracht, Maarten de Rijke, Heinrich Wansing & Michael Zakharyaschev (eds.), Advances in Modal Logic. CSLI Publications. pp. 355-370.
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  • Studies in the Way of Words.Paul Grice - 1989 - Philosophy 65 (251):111-113.
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  • Facing the Future: Agents and Choices in Our Indeterminist World.Nuel Belnap, Michael Perloff & Ming Xu - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):660-662.
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  • A Model of the Universe: Space-Time, Probability and Decision.Richard Feist & Storrs McCall - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (4):632.
    The title alone of McCall’s book reveals its ambitious enterprise. The book’s structure is a long inference to the best explanation: chapters present problems that are solved by a single, ontological model. Problems as diverse as time flow, quantum measurement, counterfactual semantics, and free will are discussed. McCall’s style of writing is lucid and pointed—in general, very pleasant to read.
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  • VIII.—Truth.Michael Dummett - 1959 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1):141-162.
    Michael Dummett; VIII.—Truth, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 59, Issue 1, 1 June 1959, Pages 141–162, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/59.1.
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  • Ockhamism without Thin Red Lines.Andrea Iacona - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2633-2652.
    This paper investigates the logic of Ockhamism, a view according to which future contingents are either true or false. Several attempts have been made to give rigorous shape to this view by defining a suitable formal semantics, but arguably none of them is fully satisfactory. The paper draws attention to some problems that beset such attempts, and suggests that these problems are different symptoms of the same initial confusion, in that they stem from the unjustified assumption that the actual course (...)
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  • Future Contingents, Indeterminacy and Context.Paula Sweeney - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):408-422.
    In Facing the Future, Belnap et al. reject bivalence and propose double time reference semantics to give a pragmatic response to the following assertion problem: how can we make sense of assertions about future events made at a time when the outcomes of those events are not yet determined? John MacFarlane employs the same semantics, now bolstered with a relative-truth predicate, to accommodate the following apparently conflicting intuitions regarding the truth-value of an uttered future contingent: at the moment of utterance, (...)
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  • The Truth About the Future.Jacek Wawer - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):365-401.
    There is a long-standing disagreement among Branching-Time theorists. Even though they all believe that the branching representation accurately grasps the idea that the future, contrary to the past, is open, they argue whether this representation is compatible with the claim that one among many possible futures is distinguished—the single future that will come to be. This disagreement is paralleled in an argument about the bivalence of future contingents. The single, privileged future is often called the Thin Red Line. I reconstruct (...)
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  • The open future, bivalence and assertion.Corine Besson & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):251-271.
    It is highly now intuitive that the future is open and the past is closed now—whereas it is unsettled whether there will be a fourth world war, it is settled that there was a first. Recently, it has become increasingly popular to claim that the intuitive openness of the future implies that contingent statements about the future, such as ‘There will be a sea battle tomorrow,’ are non-bivalent (neither true nor false). In this paper, we argue that the non-bivalence of (...)
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  • A future for the thin red line.Alex Malpass & Jacek Wawer - 2012 - Synthese 188 (1):117-142.
    The thin red line ( TRL ) is a theory about the semantics of future-contingents. The central idea is that there is such a thing as the ‘actual future’, even in the presence of indeterminism. It is inspired by a famous solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge associated with William of Ockham, in which the freedom of agents is argued to be compatible with God’s omniscience. In the modern branching time setting, the theory of the TRL is widely regarded (...)
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  • In Defence of Ockhamism.Sven Rosenkranz - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):617-631.
    Ockhamism implies that future contingents may be true, their historical contingency notwithstanding. It is thus opposed to both the Peircean view according to which all future contingents are false, and Supervaluationist Indeterminism according to which all future contingents are neither true nor false. The paper seeks to defend Ockhamism against two charges: the charge that it cannot meet the requirement that truths be grounded in reality, and the charge that it proves incompatible with objective indeterminism about the future. In each (...)
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  • (1 other version)Truth.Michael Dummett - 1959 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1):141-62.
    Michael Dummett; VIII.—Truth, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 59, Issue 1, 1 June 1959, Pages 141–162, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/59.1.
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  • Indeterminist time and truth-value gaps.Richmond H. Thomason - 1970 - Theoria 36 (3):264-281.
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  • The Metaphysics of the Thin Red Line.Andrea Borghini & Giuliano Torrengo - 2012 - In Fabrice Correia & Andrea Iacona (eds.), Around the Tree: Semantic and Metaphysical Issues Concerning Branching and the Open Future. Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer. pp. 105-125.
    There seems to be a minimal core that every theory wishing to accommodate the intuition that the future is open must contain: a denial of physical determinism (i.e. the thesis that what future states the universe will be in is implied by what states it has been in), and a denial of strong fatalism (i.e. the thesis that, at every time, what will subsequently be the case is metaphysically necessary).1 Those two requirements are often associated with the idea of an (...)
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  • (1 other version)Deciding to believe.Bernard Williams - 1973 - In Problems of the Self. Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press. pp. 136--51.
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  • Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications.John MacFarlane - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    John MacFarlane explores how we might make sense of the idea that truth is relative. He provides new, satisfying accounts of parts of our thought and talk that have resisted traditional methods of analysis, including what we mean when we talk about what is tasty, what we know, what will happen, what might be the case, and what we ought to do.
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  • Does tense logic rest on a mistake?Gareth Evans - 1985 - In Collected papers. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 343-363.
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  • Studies in the way of words.Herbert Paul Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
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  • Future contingents and relative truth.John MacFarlane - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):321–336.
    If it is not now determined whether there will be a sea battle tomorrow, can an assertion that there will be one be true? The problem has persisted because there are compelling arguments on both sides. If there are objectively possible futures which would make the prediction true and others which would make it false, symmetry considerations seem to forbid counting it either true or false. Yet if we think about how we would assess the prediction tomorrow, when a sea (...)
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  • Singular terms, truth-value gaps, and free logic.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (17):481-495.
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  • Objective time flow.Storrs McCall - 1976 - Philosophy of Science 43 (3):337-362.
    A theory of temporal passage is put forward which is "objective" in the sense that time flow characterizes the universe independently of the existence of conscious beings. The theory differs from Grunbaum's "mind-dependence" theory, and is designed to avoid Grunbaum's criticisms of an earlier theory of Reichenbach's. The representation of temporal becoming is accomplished by the introduction of indeterministic universe-models; each model representing the universe at a time. The models depict the past as a single four-dimensional manifold, and the future (...)
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  • Past, present, and future.Arthur Prior - 1967 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 157:476-476.
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  • Fatalism.Hugh Rice - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Norms of assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.
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  • Facing the future: agents and choices in our indeterminist world.Nuel D. Belnap - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Michael Perloff & Ming Xu.
    Here is an important new theory of human action, a theory that assumes actions are founded on choices made by agents who face an open future.
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  • In Defence of the Actuality Principle.Francesco Gallina - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (2):295-310.
    The thin red line theory is a form of branching indeterminism. It entails that, among the many possible developments that reality might take, one is privileged: the actual history. The thin red line theory is naturally paired off with a semantic thesis that may be called ‘the actuality principle’: a statement is true as used at a moment if and only if it is true at that moment on the actual history. The actuality principle has been challenged, for it would (...)
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  • (1 other version)Truth.Michael Dummett - 1968 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 33 (1):148-148.
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  • (1 other version)In Defence of the Thin Red Line: A Case for Ockhamism.Peter Øhrstrøm - 2009 - Humana Mente 3 (8).
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  • .Bernard Williams - 1973 - In Deciding to believe. Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press. pp. 136-151.
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