- The Ambiguity Theory of “Knows”.Mark Satta - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):69-83.details
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A linguistic grounding for a polysemy theory of ‘knows’.Mark Satta - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (5):1163-1182.details
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Problems of the Self.Bernard Williams - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 37 (3):551-551.details
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(1 other version)Michael Smith: The Moral Problem. [REVIEW]James Lenman - 1994 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):125-126.details
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What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.details
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Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine.Matthew H. Kramer - 2009 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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In defence of good simpliciter.Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1371-1391.details
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Epistemic scorekeeping.Patrick Rysiew - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms.David Plunkett & Timothy Sundell - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13 (23):1-37.details
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Recovering Understanding.Linda Zagzebski - 2001 - In Matthias Steup (ed.), Knowledge, truth, and duty: essays on epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic Contextualism.Patrick Rysiew - 2007 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Ambiguity.Adam Sennet - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Normativity of Rationality.Jonathan Way - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1057-1068.details
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The epistemology of belief.Hamid Vahid - 2009 - New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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(1 other version)What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.details
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The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.details
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Contextualism, skepticism, and the structure of reasons.Stewart Cohen - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:57-89.details
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“Bamboozled by Our Own Words”: Semantic Blindness and Some Arguments Against Contextualism.Keith Derose - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):316 - 338.details
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(1 other version)Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.details
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A new argument for evidentialism.Nishi Shah - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.details
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Knowing Right From Wrong.Kieran Setiya - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Moral Intuitions, Reliability, and Disagreement.David Killoren - 2009 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 4 (1):1-35.details
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Contextualism: An explanation and defense.Keith DeRose - 1999 - In John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 187--205.details
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(1 other version)Making up your mind: Self-interpretation and self-constitution.Richard Moran - 1988 - Ratio 1 (2):135-51.details
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Disagreement and Epistemic Peers.Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - Oxford Handbooks Online.details
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Knowledge and the State of Nature.Edward Craig - 1990 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 183 (3):620-621.details
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Knowledge claims and context: loose use.Wayne A. Davis - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (3):395-438.details
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Knowledge and belief.Norman Malcolm - 1952 - Mind 61 (242):178-189.details
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Facts and Values.C. L. Stevenson - 1963 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 19 (3):487-487.details
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Fallibilism, epistemic possibility, and epistemic agency.Baron Reed - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):40-69.details
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Contextualism and conceptual disambiguation.Matthias Steup - 2005 - Acta Analytica 20 (1):3-15.details
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Moral Disagreement.Folke Tersman - 2006 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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A Cartesian Introduction to Philosophy.Fred Feldman - 1986 - McGraw-Hill Companies.details
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Facts and Values. [REVIEW]J. M. P. - 1966 - Review of Metaphysics 20 (2):379-380.details
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(1 other version)The Moral Problem.Stephen Darwall - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (185):508-515.details
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(1 other version)Facts and Values.Gerald E. Myers - 1965 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (2):280-281.details
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Modified Occam’s Razor.Ben Phillips - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):371-382.details
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(1 other version)MAKING UP YOUR MIND: Self‐Interpretation and Self‐Constitution.Richard Moran - 2006 - Ratio 1 (2):135-151.details
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