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  1. (1 other version)Psychophysical and theoretical identifications.David Lewis - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Making it Explicit.Isaac Levi & Robert B. Brandom - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):145.
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  • (2 other versions)Perceiving : A Philosophical Study.Rodrick Chisholm - 1957 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 63 (4):500-500.
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  • (2 other versions)Perceiving: a philosophical study.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1957 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 13 (3):365-366.
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  • Vindicating Intentional Realism: A Review of Jerry Fodor's "Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind". [REVIEW]Frances Egan - 1990 - Behavior and Philosophy 18 (1):59-61.
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  • (1 other version)The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (4):328-332.
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  • The Elm and the Expert.Steven Horst - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (183):243-246.
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  • (1 other version)Irrationality: an essay on akrasia, self-deception, and self-control.Alfred R. Mele - 1987 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    The author demonstrates that certain forms of irrationality - incontinent action and self-deception - which many philosophers have rejected as being logically or psychologically impossible, are indeed possible.
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  • (2 other versions)Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1997 - Noûs 31 (4):528-537.
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  • (1 other version)Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.Paul M. Churchland - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):67-90.
    Eliminative materialism is the thesis that our common-sense conception of psychological phenomena constitutes a radically false theory, a theory so fundamentally defective that both the principles and the ontology of that theory will eventually be displaced, rather than smoothly reduced, by completed neuroscience. Our mutual understanding and even our introspection may then be reconstituted within the conceptual framework of completed neuroscience, a theory we may expect to be more powerful by far than the common-sense psychology it displaces, and more substantially (...)
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  • Psychological Explanation. [REVIEW]T. C. Chabdack - 1972 - Philosophy of Science 39 (1):95-97.
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  • 1. The Deceptive Self: Liars, Layers, and Lairs.Amélie Oksenberg Rorty - 1988 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press. pp. 11-28.
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  • Perceiving: A Philosophical Study.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1957 - Ithaca,: Cornell University Press.
    The purpose of this book is to develop a terminological structure in which private perceptions can be discussed publicly without bringing into existence the usual unnecessary philosophical problems of confused usage of language. chisholm displays an appraisive, quasi-ethical use of language, whereby he claims that a thing has some particular sensible property is to have adequate evidence that it actually does have that property. (staff).
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  • Who is Fooled.Donald Davidson - 2004 - In Problems of rationality. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Applies and extends the conclusions of the preceding chapters by examining cases of self‐deception of a puzzling sort emerging from cases of fantasizing and imagining, found in Joyce's Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man and Flaubert's Madame Bovary. The author is particularly interested in what can be described as the ‘divided mind of self‐deception’, the mind that produces an imagination due to its realising the state of the world that motivates the fantasy construct and the possessor's eventual acquisition (...)
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  • (1 other version)Psychophysical and theoretical identifications.David K. Lewis - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):249-258.
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  • The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science.John Dupré - 1993 - Harvard University Press.
    With this manifesto, John Dupré systematically attacks the ideal of scientific unity by showing how its underlying assumptions are at odds with the central conclusions of science itself.
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  • How the laws of physics lie.Nancy Cartwright - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    In this sequence of philosophical essays about natural science, the author argues that fundamental explanatory laws, the deepest and most admired successes of modern physics, do not in fact describe regularities that exist in nature. Cartwright draws from many real-life examples to propound a novel distinction: that theoretical entities, and the complex and localized laws that describe them, can be interpreted realistically, but the simple unifying laws of basic theory cannot.
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  • Whose concepts are they, anyway? The role of philosophical intuition in empirical psychology.Alison Gopnik & Eric Schwitzgebel - 1998 - In Michael Raymond DePaul & William M. Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 75--91.
    This chapter examines several ways in which philosophical attention to intuition can contribute to empirical scientific psychology. The authors then discuss one prevalent misuse of intuition. An unspoken assumption of much argumentation in the philosophy of mind has been that to articulate our folk psychological intuitions, our ordinary concepts of belief, truth, meaning, and so forth, is itself sufficient to give a theoretical account of what belief, truth, meaning, and so forth, actually are. It is believed that this assumption rests (...)
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  • Psychological Explanation: An Introduction To The Philosophy Of Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 1968 - Ny: Random House.
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  • When Other Things Aren’t Equal: Saving Ceteris Paribus Laws from Vacuity.Paul Pietroski & Georges Rey - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (1):81-110.
    A common view is that ceteris paribus clauses render lawlike statements vacuous, unless such clauses can be explicitly reformulated as antecedents of ?real? laws that face no counterinstances. But such reformulations are rare; and they are not, we argue, to be expected in general. So we defend an alternative sufficient condition for the non-vacuity of ceteris paribus laws: roughly, any counterinstance of the law must be independently explicable, in a sense we make explicit. Ceteris paribus laws will carry a plethora (...)
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  • Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
    Change in View offers an entirely original approach to the philosophical study of reasoning by identifying principles of reasoning with principles for revising one's beliefs and intentions and not with principles of logic. This crucial observation leads to a number of important and interesting consequences that impinge on psychology and artificial intelligence as well as on various branches of philosophy, from epistemology to ethics and action theory. Gilbert Harman is Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University. A Bradford Book.
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  • Mad pain and Martian pain.David Lewis - 1978 - In Ned Joel Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. Cambridge: , Vol. pp. 216-222.
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  • Some varieties of functionalism.Sydney Shoemaker - 1981 - Philosophical Topics 12 (1):93-119.
    Fleshing out Ramsey-sentence functionalism; against Lewis's "mad pain" mixed theory; relating functionalism to the causal theory of properties. Empirical functionalism is chauvinistic so probably false. A terrific, in-depth paper.
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  • Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press. Edited by Margaret A. Boden.
    Preface 1 Introduction: The Persistence of the Attitudes 2 Individualism and Supervenience 3 Meaning Holism 4 Meaning and the World Order Epilogue Creation Myth Appendix Why There Still Has to be a Language of Thought Notes References Author Index.
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  • Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes.Fred I. Dretske - 1988 - MIT Press.
    In this lucid portrayal of human behavior, Fred Dretske provides an original account of the way reasons function in the causal explanation of behavior.
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  • Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1984 - MIT Press.
    Preface by Daniel C. Dennett Beginning with a general theory of function applied to body organs, behaviors, customs, and both inner and outer representations, ...
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  • (1 other version)Knowing One’s Own Mind.Donald Davidson - 1987 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.
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  • In-between believing.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):76-82.
    For any proposition P, it may sometimes occur that a person is not quite accurately describable as believing that P, nor quite accurately describable as failing to believe that P. Such a person, I will say, is in an "in-between state of belief." This paper argues for the prevalence of in-between states of believing and asserts the need for an account of belief that allows us intelligibly to talk about in-between believing. It is suggested that Bayesian and representationalist approaches are (...)
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  • The Intentional Stance.Daniel Clement Dennett - 1981 - MIT Press.
    Through the use of such "folk" concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, Daniel Dennett asserts in this first full scale presentation of...
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  • Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - MIT Press.
    In this provocative book, Fred Dretske argues that to achieve an understanding of the mind it is not enough to understand the biological machinery by means of...
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  • (1 other version)Mental Reality.Galen Strawson - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
    Introduction -- A default position -- Experience -- The character of experience -- Understanding-experience -- A note about dispositional mental states -- Purely experiential content -- An account of four seconds of thought -- Questions -- The mental and the nonmental -- The mental and the publicly observable -- The mental and the behavioral -- Neobehaviorism and reductionism -- Naturalism in the philosophy of mind -- Conclusion: The three questions -- Agnostic materialism, part 1 -- Monism -- The linguistic argument (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
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  • (2 other versions)Perceiving: A Philosophical Study.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1957 - Philosophy 34 (131):366-367.
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  • (1 other version)A puzzle about belief.Saul A. Kripke - 1979 - In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel. pp. 239--83.
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  • Belief and self-deception.Amelie Rorty - 1972 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 15 (1-4):387-410.
    In Part I, I consider the normal contexts of assertions of belief and declarations of intentions, arguing that many action-guiding beliefs are accepted uncritically and even pre-consciously. I analyze the function of avowals as expressions of attempts at self-transformation. It is because assertions of beliefs are used to perform a wide range of speech acts besides that of speaking the truth, and because there is a large area of indeterminacy in such assertions, that self-deception is possible. In Part II, I (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and Its Semantics.Jerry A. Fodor - 1994 - MIT Press.
    This book is largely a reconsideration of the arguments that are supposed to ground this consensus.
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  • Consciousness in Action.Susan L. Hurley - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
    In this important book, Susan Hurley sheds new light on consciousness by examining its relationships to action from various angles. She assesses the role of agency in the unity of a conscious perspective, and argues that perception and action are more deeply interdependent than we usually assume. A standard view conceives perception as input from world to mind and action as output from mind to world, with the serious business of thought in between. Hurley criticizes this picture, and considers how (...)
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  • Review of P sychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning In the Philosophy of Mind. [REVIEW]Jay L. Garfield - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1):235-240.
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  • (4 other versions)Motivated Irrationality.David Pears - 1985 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 175 (4):562-563.
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  • (2 other versions)Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):150-154.
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  • From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science.Stephen Stich - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (143):261-278.
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  • (4 other versions)Motivated Irrationality.David Pears - 1988 - Mind 97 (387):471-478.
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  • Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1984 - Behaviorism 14 (1):51-56.
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  • Is "Self-Knowledge" an Empirical Problem? Renegotiating the Space of Philosophical Explanation.Victoria McGeer - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (10):483-515.
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  • Recent work on self-deception.Alfred R. Mele - 1987 - American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1):1-17.
    I start, in Section I, with the case for skepticism about the possibility of self-deception. In Sections II and III, I review attempts to explain how self-deception, conceived on a strict interpersonal model, is possible. Section IV addresses a variety of analyses of self-deception that involve modest departures from these strict models and canvasses associated attacks on the standard paradoxes. The emphasis there is on the static paradoxes, discussion of their dynamic coun terparts being reserved largely for Section V. Section (...)
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  • Deceiving oneself or self-deceived? On the formation of beliefs under the influence.Ariela Lazar - 1999 - Mind 108 (430):265-290.
    How does a subject who is competent to detect the irrationality of a belief that p, form her belief against weighty or even conclusive evidence to the contrary? The phenomenon of self-deception threatens a widely shared view of beliefs according to which they do not regularly correspond to emotions and evaluative attitudes. Accordingly, the most popular answer to this question is that the belief formed in self-deception is caused by an intention to form that belief. On this view, the state (...)
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  • (1 other version)The mental life of some machines.Hilary Putnam - 1966 - In Hector-Neri Castañeda (ed.), Intentionality, Minds and Perception. Detroit,: Wayne State University Press.
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  • (3 other versions)Brains and behavior.Hilary Putnam - 1965 - In Sydney Shoemaker (ed.), Review of _Analytical Philosophy_, Ronald J. Butler (ed.). Blackwell.
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  • Dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe.Robert Audi - 1994 - Noûs 28 (4):419-34.
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  • (1 other version)Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control.Alfred R. Mele - 1987 - Oxford: Oxford University Press USA.
    Although much human action serves as proof that irrational behavior is remarkably common, certain forms of irrationality--most notably, incontinent action and self-deception--pose such difficult theoretical problems that philosophers have rejected them as logically or psychologically impossible. Here, Mele shows that, and how, incontinent action and self-deception are indeed possible. Drawing upon recent experimental work in the psychology of action and inference, he advances naturalized explanations of akratic action and self-deception while resolving the paradoxes around which the philosophical literature revolves. In (...)
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