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The Second Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability.Stephen L. Darwall - 1996 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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Self-constitution: agency, identity, and integrity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The possibility of altruism.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Oxford,: Clarendon P..details
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What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.details
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(2 other versions)Modern Moral Philosophy.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1958 - Philosophy 33 (124):1 - 19.details
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(1 other version)Practical reason and norms.Joseph Raz - 1975 - London: Hutchinson.details
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(3 other versions)Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Two concepts of rules.John Rawls - 1955 - Philosophical Review 64 (1):3-32.details
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The Moral Nexus.R. Jay Wallace - 2019 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.details
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The nature and value of rights.Joel Feinberg & Jan Narveson - 1970 - Journal of Value Inquiry 4 (4):243-260.details
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(5 other versions)The right and the good.W. Ross - 1932 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 39 (2):11-12.details
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Practical Reason and Norms.Joseph Raz - 1975 - Law and Philosophy 12 (3):329-343.details
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(2 other versions)Modern Moral Philosophy.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1997 - In Thomas L. Carson & Paul K. Moser (eds.), Morality and the good life. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(5 other versions)The Right and the Good.W. D. Ross - 1935 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 119 (1):124-124.details
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Euthyphro: Apology ; Crito ; Phaedo.C. J. Plato & Emlyn-Jones - 2017 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Edited by C. J. Emlyn-Jones, William Preddy & Plato.details
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What is it to wrong someone? A puzzle about justice.Michael Thompson - 2004 - In R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler & Michael Smith (eds.), Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. New York: Clarendon Press. pp. 333-384.details
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Authority and reasons: Exclusionary and second‐personal.Stephen Darwall - 2010 - Ethics 120 (2):257-278.details
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Bi-polar obligation.Stephen Darwall - 2012 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 7:333.details
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Relational Primitivism.Ariel Zylberman - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):401-422.details
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Reasons, relations, and commands: Reflections on Darwall.R. Jay Wallace - 2007 - Ethics 118 (1):24-36.details
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Three conceptions of action in moral theory.Tamar Schapiro - 2001 - Noûs 35 (1):93–117.details
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Am I You?Matthias Haase - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):358-371.details
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The Relational Structure of Human Dignity.Ariel Zylberman - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):738-752.details
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The You Turn.Naomi Eilan - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):265-278.details
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The Deontic Structure of Morality.Rjay Wallace - 2013 - In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking about reasons: themes from the philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 137.details
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Reply to Korsgaard, Wallace, and Watson.Stephen Darwall - 2007 - Ethics 118 (1):52-69.details
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Two Second‐Personal Conceptions of the Dignity of Persons.Ariel Zylberman - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):921-943.details
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The Oxford Handbook of Levinas.Michael L. Morgan (ed.) - 2018 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Reply to Leif Wenar.T. M. Scanlon - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (4):400-405.details
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Other wills: the second-person in ethics.Douglas Lavin - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):279-288.details
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The Very Thought of (Wronging) You.Ariel Zylberman - 2014 - Philosophical Topics 42 (1):153-175.details
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For Oneself and Toward Another: The Puzzle about Recognition.Matthias Haase - 1977 - Philosophical Topics 42 (1):113-152.details
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Morality as Equal Accountability: Comments on Stephen Darwall’s The Second‐Person Standpoint.Gary Watson - 2007 - Ethics 118 (1):37-51.details
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On Address.Adrian Haddock - 2014 - Philosophical Topics 42 (1):345-350.details
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Divine Commands and Secular Demands: On Darwall on Anscombe on ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’.Robert Stern - 2014 - Mind 123 (492):1095-1122.details
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Second-Personal Reasons and Moral Obligations.Wenwen Fan - 2014 - Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (1):69-86.details
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Review: Non-Consequentialism, the Person as an End-in-Itself, and the Significance of Status. [REVIEW]Frances Kamm - 1992 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 21 (4):354 - 389.details
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