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  1. (3 other versions)Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
    The doyen of living English philosophers, by these reflections, took hold of and changed the outlook of a good many other philosophers, if not quite enough. He did so, essentially, by assuming that talk of freedom and responsibility is talk not of facts or truths, in a certain sense, but of our attitudes. His more explicit concern was to look again at the question of whether determinism and freedom are consistent with one another -- by shifting attention to certain personal (...)
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  • The Second Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability.Stephen L. Darwall - 1996 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    The result is nothing less than a fundamental reorientation of moral theory that enables it at last to account for morality's supreme authority--an account that ...
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  • Self-constitution: agency, identity, and integrity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Agency and identity -- Necessitation -- Acts and actions -- Aristotle and Kant -- Agency and practical identity -- The metaphysics of normativity -- Constitutive standards -- The constitution of life -- In defense of teleology -- The paradox of self-constitution -- Formal and substantive principles of reason -- Formal versus substantive -- Testing versus weighing -- Maximizing and prudence -- Practical reason and the unity of the will -- The empiricist account of normativity -- The rationalist account of normativity (...)
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  • Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Moral Realism is a systematic defence of the idea that there are objective moral standards. Russ Shafer-Landau argues that there are moral principles that are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, happens to think of them. His central thesis, as well as the many novel supporting arguments used to defend it, will spark much controversy among those concerned with the foundations of ethics.
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  • The possibility of altruism.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Oxford,: Clarendon P..
    Just as there are rational requirements on thought, there are rational requirements on action. This book defends a conception of ethics, and a related conception of human nature, according to which altruism is included among the basic rational requirements on desire and action. Altruism itself depends on the recognition of the reality of other persons, and on the equivalent capacity to regard oneself as merely one individual among many.
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  • What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
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  • (2 other versions)Modern Moral Philosophy.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1958 - Philosophy 33 (124):1 - 19.
    The author presents and defends three theses: (1) "the first is that it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology." (2) "the second is that the concepts of obligation, And duty... And of what is morally right and wrong, And of the moral sense of 'ought', Ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible...." (3) "the third thesis is that (...)
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  • (1 other version)Practical reason and norms.Joseph Raz - 1975 - London: Hutchinson.
    Practical Reason and Norms focuses on three problems: In what way are rules normative, and how do they differ from ordinary reasons? What makes normative systems systematic? What distinguishes legal systems, and in what consists their normativity? All three questions are answered by taking reasons as the basic normative concept, and showing the distinctive role reasons have in every case, thus paving the way to a unified account of normativity. Rules are a structure of reasons to perform the required act (...)
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  • (3 other versions)Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • (1 other version)Two concepts of rules.John Rawls - 1955 - Philosophical Review 64 (1):3-32.
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  • The Moral Nexus.R. Jay Wallace - 2019 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.
    The Moral Nexus develops and defends a new interpretation of morality—namely, as a set of requirements that connect agents normatively to other persons in a nexus of moral relations. According to this relational interpretation, moral demands are directed to other individuals, who have claims that the agent comply with these demands. Interpersonal morality, so conceived, is the domain of what we owe to each other, insofar as we are each persons with equal moral standing. The book offers an interpretative argument (...)
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  • The nature and value of rights.Joel Feinberg & Jan Narveson - 1970 - Journal of Value Inquiry 4 (4):243-260.
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  • (5 other versions)The right and the good.W. Ross - 1932 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 39 (2):11-12.
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  • Practical Reason and Norms.Joseph Raz - 1975 - Law and Philosophy 12 (3):329-343.
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  • (2 other versions)Modern Moral Philosophy.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1997 - In Thomas L. Carson & Paul K. Moser (eds.), Morality and the good life. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • (5 other versions)The Right and the Good.W. D. Ross - 1935 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 119 (1):124-124.
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  • Euthyphro: Apology ; Crito ; Phaedo.C. J. Plato & Emlyn-Jones - 2017 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Edited by C. J. Emlyn-Jones, William Preddy & Plato.
    "This edition, which replaces the original Loeb edition..., offers text, translation, and annotation that are fully current with modern scholarship"--Front flap of dust jacket, volume 1.
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  • What is it to wrong someone? A puzzle about justice.Michael Thompson - 2004 - In R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler & Michael Smith (eds.), Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. New York: Clarendon Press. pp. 333-384.
    This will be the best way of explaining ‘Paris is the lover of Helen’, that is, ‘Paris loves, and by that very fact [et eo ipso] Helen is loved’. Here, therefore, two propositions have been brought together and abbreviated as one. Or, ‘Paris is a lover, and by that very fact Helen is a loved one’.
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  • Authority and reasons: Exclusionary and second‐personal.Stephen Darwall - 2010 - Ethics 120 (2):257-278.
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  • Bi-polar obligation.Stephen Darwall - 2012 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 7:333.
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  • Relational Primitivism.Ariel Zylberman - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):401-422.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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  • Reasons, relations, and commands: Reflections on Darwall.R. Jay Wallace - 2007 - Ethics 118 (1):24-36.
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  • Three conceptions of action in moral theory.Tamar Schapiro - 2001 - Noûs 35 (1):93–117.
    The utilitarian conception, which I call “action as production,” holds that action is a way of making use of the world, conceived as a causal mechanism. According to the rational intuitionist conception, which I call “action as assertion,” action is a way of acknowledging the value in the world, conceived as a realm of status. On the Kantian constructivist conception, which I call “action as participation,” action is a way of making the world, qua causal mechanism, come to count as (...)
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  • Am I You?Matthias Haase - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):358-371.
    It has been suggested that a rational being stands in what is called a “second-personal relation” to herself. According to philosophers like S. Darwall and Ch. Korsgaard, being a rational agent is to interact with oneself, to make demands on oneself. The thesis of the paper is that this view rests on a logical confusion. Transitive verbs like “asking”, “making a demand” or “obligating” can occur with the reflexive pronoun, but it is a mistake to assume that the reflexive and (...)
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  • The Relational Structure of Human Dignity.Ariel Zylberman - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):738-752.
    ABSTRACTThis article argues that received accounts of the concept of human dignity face more difficulties than has been appreciated, when explaining the connection between human dignity and the duty of respect that dignity is supposed to generate. It also argues that a novel, relational, account has the adequate structure to explain such connection.
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  • The You Turn.Naomi Eilan - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):265-278.
    This introductory paper sets out a framework for approaching some of the claims about the second person made by the papers collected in the special edition of Philosophical Explorations on The Second Person . It does so by putting centre stage the notion of a ‘bipolar second person relation’, and examining ways of giving it substance suggested by the authors of these papers. In particular, it focuses on claims made in these papers about the existence and/or nature of second person (...)
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  • The Deontic Structure of Morality.Rjay Wallace - 2013 - In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking about reasons: themes from the philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 137.
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  • Reply to Korsgaard, Wallace, and Watson.Stephen Darwall - 2007 - Ethics 118 (1):52-69.
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  • Two Second‐Personal Conceptions of the Dignity of Persons.Ariel Zylberman - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):921-943.
    In spite of the burgeoning philosophical literature on human dignity, Stephen Darwall's second-personal account of the dignity of persons has not received the attention it deserves. This article investigates Darwall's account and argues that it faces a dilemma, for it succumbs either to a problem of antecedence or to the wrong kind of reasons problem. But this need not mean one should reject a second-personal account. Instead, I argue that an alternative second-personal conception, one I will call relational, promises to (...)
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  • The Oxford Handbook of Levinas.Michael L. Morgan (ed.) - 2018 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Emmanuel Levinas emerged as an influential philosophical voice in the final decades of the twentieth century, and his reputation has continued to flourish and increase in our own day. His central themes--the primacy of the ethical and the core of ethics as our responsibility to and for others--speak to readers from a host of disciplines and perspectives. However, his writings and thought are challenging and difficult. The Oxford Handbook of Levinas contains essays that aim to clarify and engage Levinas and (...)
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  • Reply to Leif Wenar.T. M. Scanlon - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (4):400-405.
    Explains how a contractualist moral theory can explain the moral phenomena commonly called rights, although it does not appeal to the notion of a right as a basic element of moral thinking, or explain the difference between rights violations and wrongs of other kinds. Argues that the latter failure is not an important fault.
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  • Other wills: the second-person in ethics.Douglas Lavin - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):279-288.
    Other wills: the second-person in ethics. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/13869795.2014.941907.
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  • The Very Thought of (Wronging) You.Ariel Zylberman - 2014 - Philosophical Topics 42 (1):153-175.
    Claiming rights against one another is a perfectly familiar phenomenon. We express the elementary thought you cannot do that to me in a variety of ways. And yet, in spite of the perfect familiarity of this phenomenon, the two standard philosophical theories of rights face notorious difficulties in accounting for it. My aim in this paper is to introduce a distinctive, second-personal account of rights. I will call this the independence theory of rights, the view that rights are specifications of (...)
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  • For Oneself and Toward Another: The Puzzle about Recognition.Matthias Haase - 1977 - Philosophical Topics 42 (1):113-152.
    The paper is devoted to a certain way of thinking of the action of another. The posture of mind is characteristically expressed by a specific use of what G. E. M. Anscombe calls stopping modals. On this use, the sentence, “You can’t do that; it is mine,” registers the necessity of justice. My question is: what is the relation between the status of a person, a bearer of rights, the recognition of others as persons, and the practice of addressing the (...)
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  • Morality as Equal Accountability: Comments on Stephen Darwall’s The Second‐Person Standpoint.Gary Watson - 2007 - Ethics 118 (1):37-51.
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  • On Address.Adrian Haddock - 2014 - Philosophical Topics 42 (1):345-350.
    When someone thanks someone for something, or advises him against something, or refuses something from him, his action is directed not merely at but to the other. He addresses the other. But is it only actions that exemplify this mode of directedness? This essay argues that it is not.
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  • Divine Commands and Secular Demands: On Darwall on Anscombe on ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’.Robert Stern - 2014 - Mind 123 (492):1095-1122.
    This paper considers Stephen Darwall’s recent attempt to overturn Elizabeth Anscombe’s claim that moral obligation only really makes sense in terms of a divine command account, where he argues that in fact this account must give way to a more secularized and humanistic position if it is to avoid incoherence. It is suggested that Darwall’s attempt to establish this is flawed, and thus that his internal critique of divine command ethics fails.
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  • Second-Personal Reasons and Moral Obligations.Wenwen Fan - 2014 - Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (1):69-86.
    Stephan Darwall (2006, 2010) claims that a conceptual connection exists between moral obligation and what he calls ‘second-personal reasons.’ In particular, he (2006) claims that, “moral obligation is an irreducibly second-personal concept. That an action would violate a moral obligation is…a second-personal reason not to do it.” A second-personal reason, according to him (2006), is “a distinctive kind of (normative) reason for acting,” a reason made on one’s will and purportedly given by an authority’s demand or address. This paper argues (...)
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  • Review: Non-Consequentialism, the Person as an End-in-Itself, and the Significance of Status. [REVIEW]Frances Kamm - 1992 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 21 (4):354 - 389.
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