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The Contents of Visual Experience.Susanna Siegel - 2010 - , US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Searle against the world : how can experiences find their objects?Kent Bach - 2007 - In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning and Mind. Cambridge University Press.details
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Vision and intentional content.Tyler Burge - 1991 - In Ernest Lepore (ed.), John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 195-214.details
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Minimalism versus Contextualism in Semantics.Emma Borg - 2007 - In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism: New Essays on Semantics and Pragmatics. Oxford University Press UK.details
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The particularity and phenomenology of perceptual experience.Susanna Schellenberg - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (1):19-48.details
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The epistemic force of perceptual experience.Susanna Schellenberg - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):87-100.details
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Perceptual Content Defended.Susanna Schellenberg - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):714 - 750.details
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Experience and Evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):699-747.details
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Action and self-location in perception.Susanna Schellenberg - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):603-632.details
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Epistemological Disjunctivism.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41:221-238.details
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Bats, brain scientists, and the limitations of introspection.Derk Pereboom - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):315-29.details
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Reasons and Experience.Bruce Aune - 1993 - Philosophical Quarterly 43 (171):239-242.details
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Setting things before the mind.Michael G. F. Martin - 1998 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press. pp. 157--179.details
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Veridical hallucination and prosthetic vision.David Lewis - 1980 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (3):239-249.details
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Acquaintance, singular thought and propositional constituency.Jeffrey C. King - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):543-560.details
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The obscure object of hallucination.Mark Johnston - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):113-83.details
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