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  1. Moral Responsibility and the Irrelevance of Physics: Fischer’s Semi-Compatibilism Vs. Anti-Fundamentalism.Helen Steward - 2008 - Journal of Ethics 12 (2):129-145.
    The paper argues that it is possible for an incompatibilist to accept John Martin Fischer's plausible insistence that the question whether we are morally responsible agents ought not to depend on whether the laws of physics turn out to be deterministic or merely probabilistic. The incompatibilist should do so by rejecting the fundamentalism which entails that the question whether determinism is true is a question merely about the nature of the basic physical laws. It is argued that this is a (...)
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  • Alternative Possibilities and the Failure of the Counterexample Strategy.Michael S. McKenna - 1997 - Journal of Social Philosophy 28 (3):71-85.
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  • Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account.Kadri Vihvelin - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):427-450.
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  • Frankfurt on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities.Margery Bedford Naylor - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (September):249-58.
    Harry g frankfurt gave what has been taken to be a counter-Example to the principle that, "a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise." I argue that in his case the agent cannot be morally responsible for what he did, Because it was not within his power not to be compelled to do it. So frankfurt's case is not a counter-Example to this principle.
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  • Actions, Thought-Experiments and the 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities'.Maria Alvarez - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):61 – 81.
    In 1969 Harry Frankfurt published his hugely influential paper 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility' in which he claimed to present a counterexample to the so-called 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities' ('a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise'). The success of Frankfurt-style cases as counterexamples to the Principle has been much debated since. I present an objection to these cases that, in questioning their conceptual cogency, undercuts many of those debates. Such cases (...)
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  • Masked Abilities and Compatibilism.M. Fara - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):843-865.
    An object's disposition to A in circumstances C is masked if circumstances C obtain without the object Aing. This paper explores an analogous sense in which abilities can be masked, and it uses the results of this exploration to motivate an analysis of agents' abilities in terms of dispositions. This analysis is then shown to provide the resources to defend a version of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities against Frankfurt-style counterexamples. Although this principle is often taken to be congenial to (...)
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  • In Defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: Why I Don't Find Frankfurt's Argument Convincing.Carl Ginet - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:403-17.
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  • Free Will and Values.R. Kane - 1989 - Noûs 23 (4):557-559.
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  • Compatibilist Alternatives.Joseph Keim Campbell - 2005 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):387-406.
    _If you were free in doing something and morally responsible for it, you could have done otherwise. That_ _has seemed a pretty firm proposition among the old, new, clear, unclear and other propositions in the_ _philosophical discussion of freedom and determinism. If you were free in what you did, there was an_ _alternative. It is also at least natural to think that if determinism is true, you can never do otherwise than_ _you do. G. E. Moore, that Cambridge reasoner in (...)
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  • Moral Responsibility and Leeway for Action.Keith D. Wyma - 1997 - American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1):57 - 70.
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  • Rational Capacities, Or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion.Michael Smith - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 17-38.
    We ordinarily suppose that there is a difference between having and failing to exercise a rational capacity on the one hand, and lacking a rational capacity altogether on the other. This is crucial for our allocations of responsibility. Someone who has but fails to exercise a capacity is responsible for their failure to exercise their capacity, whereas someone who lacks a capacity altogether is not. However, as Gary Watson pointed out in his seminal essay ’Skepticism about Weakness of Will’, the (...)
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  • Ability and Responsibility.Peter van Inwagen - 1978 - Philosophical Review 87 (2):201 - 224.
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  • Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities.David Widerker - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (2):247-61.
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  • Classical Compatibilism: Not Dead Yet.Bernard Berofsky - 2003 - In Michael McKenna & David Widerker (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. pp. 107.
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  • ``Moral Responsibility and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities&Quot.Harry Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66:829--839.
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  • Fairness, Agency and the Flicker of Freedom.Helen Steward - 2009 - Noûs 43 (1):64 - 93.
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  • A Compatibilist Theory of Alternative Possibilities.Joseph Campbell - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 88 (3):319-330.
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