- A resposta aristotélica para a aporia do regresso ao infinito nas demonstrações.Daniel Lourenço - 2014 - In Conte Jaimir & Mortari Cezar A. (eds.), Temas em Filosofia Contemporânea. NEL – Núcleo de Epistemologia e Lógica. pp. 184-202.details
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Agentive Modals.Matthew Mandelkern, Ginger Schultheis & David Boylan - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (3):301-343.details
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Traditional Compatibilism Reformulated and Defended.Markus E. Schlosser - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42:277-300.details
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Moral Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes and Freedom of Will.Robert Kane - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):229-246.details
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Are abilities dispositions?Barbara Vetter - 2019 - Synthese 196 (196):201-220.details
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(1 other version)Blocking Blockage.Ken Levy - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (2):565-583.details
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Fischer’s Deterministic Frankfurt-Style Argument.Yishai Cohen - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (1):121-140.details
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Leeway Compatibilism and Frankfurt‐Style Cases.Yishai Cohen - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):89-98.details
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Is Objective Consequentialism Compatible with the Principle that “Ought” Implies “Can”?Vuko Andrić - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (1):63-77.details
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Conditionals, Dispositions, and Free Will.Zsófia Zvolenszky - 2014 - Magyar Filozofiai Szemle 58 (4):45–67.details
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Desires without Guises: Why We Need Not Value What We Want.Sabine Döring & Bahadir Eker - 2017 - In Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.), The Nature of Desire. New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Powers opposed and intrinsic finks.Simon Kittle - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):372-380.details
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Everyone thinks that an ability to do otherwise is necessary for free will and moral responsibility.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2091-2107.details
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Dispositions without Conditionals.Barbara Vetter - 2014 - Mind 123 (489):129-156.details
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A new argument against compatibilism.Stephen Mumford & Rani Lill Anjum - 2013 - Analysis (1):ant095.details
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Fischer on the Fragilist Account of Alternative Possibilities.Huiyuhl Yi - 2013 - Dialogue 52 (4):1-14.details
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Action, Deviance, and Guidance.Ezio Di Nucci - 2013 - Abstracta (2):41-59.details
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(2 other versions)Willensfreiheit.Geert Keil - 2017 - Berlin: De Gruyter.details
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Truthmakers and the Direct Argument.Charles Hermes - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (2):401-418.details
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Mindlessness.Ezio Di Nucci - 2013 - Cambridge Scholars Press.details
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Dispositions.Sungho Choi - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Recent Work on Dispositions.Troy Cross - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):115-124.details
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Rational 'ought' implies 'can'.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):70-92.details
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Agency without Avoidability: Defusing a New Threat to Frankfurt’s Counterexample Strategy1.Seth Shabo - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):505-522.details
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Omissions, Responsibility, and Symmetry.Randolph Clarke - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):594-624.details
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The Problem of Enhanced Control.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):687 - 706.details
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Dispositional Abilities.Ann Whittle - 2010 - Philosophers' Imprint 10.details
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Frankfurt versus Frankfurt: a new anti-causalist dawn.Ezio Di Nucci - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):117-131.details
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Aggregating Causal Judgments.Richard Bradley, Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (4):491-515.details
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Rational Capacities, Resolve, and Weakness of Will.Daniel Cohen & Toby Handfield - 2010 - Mind 119 (476):907 - 932.details
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Abilities.John Maier - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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What time travelers may be able to do.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (1):115 - 121.details
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Arguments for incompatibilism.Kadri Vihvelin - 2003/2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Compatibilism.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Moral responsibility.Andrew Eshleman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Dispositions.Michael Fara - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Free will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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What is it for a Machine Learning Model to Have a Capability?Jacqueline Harding & Nathaniel Sharadin - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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Graded Abilities and Action Fragility.David Storrs-Fox - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.details
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Adaptive abilities.Erasmus Mayr & Barbara Vetter - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):140-154.details
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Free will and self expression: A compatibilist garden of forking paths.Robyn Repko Waller - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):299-313.details
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Agentive Modals and Agentive Modality: A Cautionary Tale.Timothy Kearl & Robert H. Wallace - 2024 - American Philosophical Quarterly 61 (2):139–155.details
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Epistemic control without voluntarism.Timothy R. Kearl - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):95-109.details
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Unavoidable actions.Justin A. Capes - 2023 - Philosophical Explorations 27 (1):57-73.details
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Mechanical Choices: A Compatibilist Libertarian Response.Christian List - 2023 - Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-23.details
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Reasons-responsiveness, modality and rational blind spots.Heering David - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):293-316.details
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Actual Control - Demodalising Free Will.David Heering - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Leedsdetails
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Compatibilist Libertarianism: Why It Talks Past the Traditional Free Will Problem and Determinism Is Still a Worry.John Daniel Wright - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (4):604-622.details
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Dependence and the Freedom to Do Otherwise.Taylor Cyr - forthcoming - Faith and Philosophy.details
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Determinism, ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ and Moral Obligation.Nadine Elzein - 2020 - Dialectica 74 (1):35-62..details
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