- Relativity of a Free Will Concept Depending on Both Conscious Indeterminism and Unconscious Determinism.Franz Klaus Jansen - 2011 - Philosophy Study 1 (2):103 - 117.details
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On Shoemaker's Response‐Dependent Theory of Responsibility.Sybren Heyndels & Benjamin De Mesel - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (3):445-451.details
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(1 other version)Patient autonomy as a non-idealised “naturalistic autonomy”.Lara Huber - 2006 - Ethik in der Medizin 18 (2):133-147.details
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On the Possibility (and Acceptability) of Paternalism towards Future People.Andreas Bengtson - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (1):13-25.details
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Free Will and Open Alternatives.Carlos J. Moya - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (45):167-191.details
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Legal Agreements and the Capacities of Agents.Andrei Buckareff - 2014 - In Law and the Philosophy of Action. Brill. pp. 195-219.details
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On Carolina Sartorio’s Causation and Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1535-1543.details
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A Wholehearted Defense of Ambivalence.D. Justin Coates - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (4):419-444.details
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The Threat from Manipulation Arguments.Benjamin Matheson - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (1):37-50.details
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How Should Free Will Skeptics Pursue Legal Change?Marcelo Fischborn - 2017 - Neuroethics 11 (1):47-54.details
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Is Neuroscience Relevant to Our Moral Responsibility Practices?Joseph Vukov - 2014 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 2 (2):61-82.details
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Personal Responsibility and Lifestyle Diseases.Martin Marchman Andersen & Morten Ebbe Juul Nielsen - 2016 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 41 (5):480-499.details
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Traditional Compatibilism Reformulated and Defended.Markus E. Schlosser - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42:277-300.details
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Do intuitions about Frankfurt-style cases rest on an internalist prejudice?Florian Cova & Hichem Naar - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (3):290-305.details
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(2 other versions)Critical Notice.John Martin Fischer - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):427-444.details
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Traps and gaps in action explanation: Theoretical problems of a psychology of human action.Werner Greve - 2001 - Psychological Review 108 (2):435-451.details
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Frankfurtian Reflections: A Critical Discussion of Robert Lockie’s “Three Recent Frankfurt Cases”.Carlos J. Moya - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (2):585-605.details
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The Principle of Alternate Possibilities as Sufficient but not Necessary for Moral Responsibility: A way to Avoid the Frankfurt Counter-Example.Garry Young - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (3):961-969.details
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Leeway Compatibilism and Frankfurt‐Style Cases.Yishai Cohen - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):89-98.details
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Reasons and Impossibility.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):351-384.details
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Determinism and the Paradox of Predictability.Stefan Rummens & Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2010 - Erkenntnis 72 (2):233-249.details
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Ability, Foreknowledge, and Explanatory Dependence.Philip Swenson - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):658-671.details
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If Anyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist, then Everyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1101-1131.details
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Free will and moral responsibility: does either require the other?Alfred Mele - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (3):297-309.details
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Against Counterfactual Miracles.Cian Dorr - 2016 - Philosophical Review 125 (2):241-286.details
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(1 other version)Was 9/11 Morally Justified?1.J. Angelo Corlett - 2007 - Journal of Global Ethics 3 (1):107-123.details
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Is agentive experience compatible with determinism?Oisín Deery - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):2-19.details
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The Real Reason Why the Prisoner’s Dilemma is Not a Newcomb Problem.Mark Thomas Walker - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (3):841-859.details
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Patientenautonomie als nichtidealisierte „natürliche Autonomie“.Dr Phil Lara Huber - 2006 - Ethik in der Medizin 18 (2):133-147.details
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On the adaptive advantage of always being right (even when one is not).Nathalia L. Gjersoe & Bruce M. Hood - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):521-522.details
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False beliefs and naive beliefs: They can be good for you.Roberto Casati & Marco Bertamini - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):512-513.details
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Frankfurt-Style Cases User Manual: Why Frankfurt-Style Enabling Cases Do Not Necessitate Tech Support.Florian Cova - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (3):505-521.details
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The People Problem.Benjamin Vilhauer - 2013 - In Gregg D. Caruso (ed.), Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. pp. 141.details
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How should libertarians conceive of the location and role of indeterminism?Christopher Evan Franklin - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):44 - 58.details
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Freedom and the Fixity of the Past.Wesley H. Holliday - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):179-207.details
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Priming Effects and Free Will.Ezio Di Nucci - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (5):725-734.details
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Agency without Avoidability: Defusing a New Threat to Frankfurt’s Counterexample Strategy1.Seth Shabo - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):505-522.details
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Re-examining Frankfurt Cases.Robert Allen - 1997 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):363-376.details
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Fate, freedom and contingency.Ferenc Huoranszki - 2002 - Acta Analytica 17 (1):79-102.details
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The Explanatory Power of Local Miracle Compatibilism.Garrett Pendergraft - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):249-266.details
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Further thoughts about a Frankfurt-style argument.Derk Pereboom - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):109 – 118.details
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A defense of Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism.David Widerker - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):87 – 108.details
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Free will skepticism and personhood as a desert base.Benjamin Vilhauer - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 489-511.details
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Actions, thought-experiments and the 'principle of alternate possibilities'.Maria Alvarez - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):61 – 81.details
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Why God's beliefs are not hard-type soft facts.David Widerker - 2002 - Religious Studies 38 (1):77-88.details
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Making Do: Troubling Stoic Tendencies in an Otherwise Compelling Theory of Autonomy.David Zimmerman - 2000 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):25-53.details
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Saying good-bye to the direct argument the right way.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (3):349-383.details
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Agents' abilities.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):447–470.details
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Timothy O'Connor, persons and causes (oxford: Oxford university press, 2000).Eric Hiddleston - 2005 - Noûs 39 (3):541–556.details
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Mad, bad, or disagreeing? On moral competence and responsibility.Maureen Sie - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (3):262 – 281.details
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