- (1 other version)The Theory of Epistemic Rationality.Richard Foley - 1987 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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(1 other version)The Nature of Rationality.Robert Nozick - 1994 - Princeton University Press.details
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Promotion as contrastive increase in expected fit.Nathaniel Sharadin & Finnur Dellsén - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1263-1290.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge and Its Place in Nature.Hilary Kornblith - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):403-410.details
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(1 other version)The normative web: an argument for moral realism.Terence Cuneo - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(2 other versions)The Possibility of Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):263-275.details
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(1 other version)Normativity and Judgement.David Papineau & Julia Tanney - 1999 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73:17-61.details
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(1 other version)Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won't Come from What Is Constitutive of Action.David Enoch - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (2):169-198.details
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The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding.Michael Huemer - 2004 - Mind 113 (452):763-766.details
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(1 other version)NORMATIVITY AND JUDGEMENT I–David Papineau.David Papineau - 1999 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):17-43.details
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The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2003 - Cambridge University Press.details
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Can reasons fundamentalism answer the normative question?James Dreier - 2015 - In Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson & Fredrik Björklund (eds.), Motivational Internalism. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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On the Very Idea of Direction of Fit.Kim Frost - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (4):429-484.details
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Problems for pure probabilism about promotion (and a disjunctive alternative).Nathaniel Sharadin - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1371-1386.details
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The Shmagency Question.Matthew Silverstein - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1127-1142.details
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Whither olympism?Mike McNamee - 2014 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 8 (1):1-2.details
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Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons.Sharon Street - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 35 (S1):213-248.details
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(1 other version)Constructivism about reasons.Sharon Street - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:207-45.details
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The values of truth and the truth of values.Michael P. Lynch - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 225--42.details
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Communist Conventions for Deductive Reasoning.Sinan Dogramaci - 2013 - Noûs 49 (4):776-799.details
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Error theory and reasons for belief.Jonas Olson - 2011 - In Andrew Evan Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Why Be an Agent?Evan Tiffany - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):223 - 233.details
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Can We Believe the Error Theory?Bart Streumer - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (4):194-212.details
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Self-constitution: agency, identity, and integrity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Deriving Ethics from Action: A Nietzschean Version of Constitutivism.Paul Katsafanas - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):620-660.details
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Shmagency revisited.David Enoch - 2010 - In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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Epistemic Normativity.Stephen Grimm - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic value. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 243-264.details
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(1 other version)The normative web: an argument for moral realism.Terence Cuneo - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and its place in nature.Hilary Kornblith - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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Constitutivism and the Inescapability of Agency.Luca Ferrero - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:303-333.details
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The trivial argument for epistemic value pluralism. Or how I learned to stop caring about truth.Berit Brogaard - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic value. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic normativity.Hilary Kornblith - 1993 - Synthese 94 (3):357 - 376.details
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Epistemic rationality as instrumental rationality: A critique.Thomas Kelly - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.details
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(1 other version)Agency, shmagency: Why normativity won't come from what is constitutive of action.David Enoch - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (2):169-198.details
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Self-constitution in the ethics of Plato and Kant.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1999 - The Journal of Ethics 3 (1):1-29.details
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(1 other version)The Nature of Rationality.Robert Nozick - 1993 - Princeton University Press.details
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Practical Reflection.David Velleman - 1989 - Princeton University Press.details
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The Possibility of Practical Reason.David Velleman - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by J. David Velleman.details
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On the aim of belief.David Velleman - 1996 - In J. David Velleman (ed.), The Possibility of Practical Reason. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo). pp. 244--81.details
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(1 other version)Constructivism about Reasons.Sharon Street - 2008 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Iii. Oxford University Press.details
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The Nature of Rationality.Robert Nozick - 1993 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 186 (1):187-189.details
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Simple Probabilistic Promotion.Eden Lin - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):360-379.details
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Checking the Neighborhood: A Reply to DiPaolo & Behrends on Promotion.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2016 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (1):1-8.details
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Epistemic Value Monism, or How I Learned to Stop Caring About Truth.Berit Brogaard - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic value. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Contrastive Reasons and Promotion.Justin Snedegar - 2014 - Ethics 125 (1):39-63,.details
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Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations.Sinan Dogramaci - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):513-530.details
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On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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There Are No Norms of Belief.David Papineau - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Truth as the Epistemic Goal.Marian David - 2001 - In Knowledge, Truth, and Duty. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 151-169.details
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