- Norms of Belief.Mona Simion, Christoph Kelp & Harmen Ghijsen - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):374-392.details
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Why Suspend Judging?Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):302-326.details
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Should have known.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2863-2894.details
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Competence to know.Lisa Miracchi - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):29-56.details
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Evidentialist Reliabilism.Juan Comesaña - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):571-600.details
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Good and Evil.Peter Geach - 1956 - Analysis 17 (2):33 - 42.details
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(1 other version)Conclusive reasons.Fred I. Dretske - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-22.details
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Perceptual entitlement.Tyler Burge - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):503-48.details
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On the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326.details
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Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.details
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Ought to Believe.Matthew Chrisman - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (7):346-370.details
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(1 other version)Strong and weak justification.Alvin Goldman - 1987 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:51-69.details
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Modest deontologism in epistemology.Richard Feldman - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):339 - 355.details
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Entitlement: The Basis for Empirical Epistemic Warrant.Tyler Burge - 2020 - In Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 37-142.details
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Epistemic Explanations: A Theory of Telic Normativity, and What It Explains.Ernest Sosa - 2021 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Shifty Speech and Independent Thought: Epistemic Normativity in Context.Mona Simion - 2021 - Oxford University Press.details
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Inquiry, Knowledge, and Understanding.Christoph Kelp - 2021 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Contextual Injustice.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2020 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 30 (1):1–30.details
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Defeaters as Indicators of Ignorance.Clayton Litlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 223–246.details
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The epistemic condition for moral responsibility.Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Knowledge‐first functionalism.Mona Simion - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):254-267.details
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Commodious knowledge.Christoph Kelp & Mona Simion - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5):1487-1502.details
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The tertiary value problem and the superiority of knowledge.Simion Mona & Kelp Christoph - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4):397-410.details
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On the special insult of refusing testimony.Allan Hazlett - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup1):37-51.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1984 - Behaviorism 14 (1):51-56.details
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On the Epistemic Significance of Evidence You Should Have Had.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):449-470.details
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Perception, history and benefit.Mona Simion - 2016 - Episteme 13 (1):61-76.details
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The place of reasons in epistemology.Kurt Sylvan & Ernest Sosa - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Disagreement Without Transparency: Some Bleak Thoughts.John Hawthorne & Amia Srinivasan - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 9--30.details
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Epistemic Entitlement.Peter J. Graham - 2012 - Noûs 46 (3):449-482.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and its Limits. [REVIEW]L. Horsten - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
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(1 other version)Strong and Weak Justification.Alvin Goldman - 1987 - In James E. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives. Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview Publishing. pp. 51-71.details
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Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge. [REVIEW]Jennifer Lackey - 2012 - Philosophy Now 88:44-45.details
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