- The aim of inquiry?Jane Friedman - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (2):506-523.details
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Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism.McCain Kevin (ed.) - 2018 - Cham: Springer Verlag.details
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Inquiry, Questions, and Actions.Benoit Https://Orcidorg Guilielmo - forthcoming - Dialogue.details
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Two Shapes of Pragmatism.Léna Mudry - 2021 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):151-165.details
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Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat.Errol Lord & Kurt Sylvan - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Suspension of Judgment, Rationality's Competition, and the Reach of the Epistemic.Errol Lord - 2020 - In Sebastian Schmidt & Gerhard Ernst (eds.), The Ethics of Belief and Beyond: Understanding Mental Normativity. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. pp. 126-145.details
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Resistance to evidence and the duty to believe.Mona Simion - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):203-216.details
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Systematicity and Skepticism.Aaron Segal - 2024 - American Philosophical Quarterly 641 (1):1-18.details
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Inquiry and Belief.Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 53 (2):296-315.details
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Epistemic norms on evidence-gathering.Carolina Flores & Elise Woodard - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2547-2571.details
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Investigation and Tranquillity in Sextus Empiricus.Svavar Hrafn Svavarsson - 2024 - Phronesis 69 (1):97-121.details
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How do lines of inquiry unfold? Insights from journalism.Susanna Siegel - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Special Issue on Applied Epistemology.details
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Rational Suspension.Alexandra Zinke - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1050-1066.details
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The Quest for Certainty.Luca Zanetti - 2021 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):71-95.details
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Young children's conceptualization of empirical disagreement.Qianru Tiffany Yang, Selesteel Sleight, Samuel Ronfard & Paul L. Harris - 2023 - Cognition 241 (C):105627.details
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Disagreement as Interpersonal Incoherence.Alex Worsnip - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (2):245-268.details
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Why Double-Check?Elise Woodard - forthcoming - Episteme:1-24.details
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The Ignorance Norm and Paradoxical Assertions.Elise Woodard - 2022 - Philosophical Topics 49 (2):321-332.details
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Valuable Ignorance: Delayed Epistemic Gratification.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):363–84.details
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The Knowledge Norm for Inquiry.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy 120 (11):615-640.details
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Agnosticism II: Actions and attitudes.Sylwia Wilczewska - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (5):1-1.details
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One Kind of Asking.Dennis Whitcomb - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266).details
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Inquiring Attitudes and Erotetic Logic: Norms of Restriction and Expansion.Dennis Whitcomb & Jared Millson - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-23.details
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Problems with Rowland’s Practical Conciliationism.Yuzhou Wang - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (4):1639-1648.details
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Agnosticism as settled indecision.Verena Wagner - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):671-697.details
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In the Space of Reasonable Doubt.Marion Vorms & Ulrike Hahn - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 15):3609-3633.details
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Suspension of Judgement: Fittingness, Reasons, and Permissivism.Michael Vollmer - forthcoming - Episteme:1-16.details
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In defence of object-given reasons.Michael Vollmer - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2):485-511.details
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Wondering about the future.Stephan Torre - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (8):2449-2473.details
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There are no epistemic norms of inquiry.David Thorstad - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-24.details
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Discordant knowing: A puzzle about insight in obsessive–compulsive disorder.Evan Taylor - 2020 - Mind and Language 37 (1):73-93.details
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Is higher-order evidence evidence?Eyal Tal - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3157-3175.details
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A Dilemma for Higher-Level Suspension.Eyal Tal - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (4):685-699.details
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Body Checking in Anorexia Nervosa: from Inquiry to Habit.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Somogy Varga - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-18.details
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An Instrumentalist Explanation of Pragmatic Encroachment.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.details
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Credences and suspended judgments as transitional attitudes.Julia Staffel - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):281-294.details
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Acceptance and the ethics of belief.Laura K. Soter - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (8):2213-2243.details
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Suspension as Spandrel.Ernest Sosa - 2019 - Episteme 16 (4):357-368.details
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That’s Not Double Checking, or “There’s only a Problem if You Make One”.Nicholas Smith - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (4):1923-1931.details
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Simply Finding Answers, or the Entirety of Inquiry While Standing on One Foot.Nicholas Smith - 2020 - Disputatio 12 (57):181-198.details
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Sobre a maneira neopirrônica de agir e pensar.Plínio Junqueira Smith - 2020 - Discurso 50 (2):251-279.details
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Checking and the Argument from Inquiry.Wes Siscoe - 2022 - Acta Analytica 38 (1):1-10.details
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Explaining enkratic asymmetries: knowledge-first style.Paul Silva - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2907-2930.details
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Where Reasons and Reasoning Come Apart.Eva Schmidt - 2021 - Noûs 55 (4):762-781.details
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Salience reasoning in coordination games.Julius Schönherr - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6601-6620.details
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Facts about incoherence as non-evidential epistemic reasons.Eva Schmidt - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-22.details
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Hedging and the ignorance norm on inquiry.Yasha Sapir & Peter van Elswyk - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5837-5859.details
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Suspension, entailment, and presupposition.Luis Rosa - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-17.details
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Rational requirements for suspended judgment.Luis Rosa - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):385-406.details
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Profiling, Neutrality, and Social Equality.Lewis Ross - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (4):808-824.details
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