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Thick Concepts.Debbie Roberts - 2017 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 211-225.details
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Special sciences (or: The disunity of science as a working hypothesis).J. A. Fodor - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):97-115.details
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Explanations in psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 1964 - In Max Black (ed.), Philosophy in America. Ithaca: Routledge. pp. 161--179.details
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精神状态的性质.Hilary Putnam - 1967 - In William H. Capitan & Daniel Davy Merrill (eds.), Art, mind, and religion. [Pittsburgh]: University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 1--223.details
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.Peter Railton - 1985 - Rowman & Littlefield.details
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.Jeremy Butterfield & John Earman - 1977details
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An Explanatory Challenge to Moral Reductionism.Lei Zhong - 2012 - Theoria 78 (4):309-325.details
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Why Cornell Moral Realism Cannot Provide an Adequate Account of Moral Knowledge.Elizabeth Tropman - 2014 - Theoria 80 (2):184-190.details
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Can Cornell Moral Realism Adequately Account for Moral Knowledge?Elizabeth Tropman - 2011 - Theoria 78 (1):26-46.details
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Reply to Critics.J. J. Thomson - 2010 - Analysis 70 (4):753-764.details
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Reply to critics.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):465-477.details
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Reply to critics.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):465-477.details
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Moral cognitivism and motivation.Sigrún Svavarsdóttir - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (2):161-219.details
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A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.details
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The multiple realizability argument against reductionism.Elliott Sober - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (4):542-564.details
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Sensations and brain processes.Jjc Smart - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (April):141-56.details
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Slaves of the passions.Mark Andrew Schroeder - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Thick Concepts.Debbie Roberts - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):677-688.details
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Moral realism.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.details
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Naturalism and Prescriptivity.Peter Railton - 1989 - Social Philosophy and Policy 7 (1):151.details
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Two Confusions Concerning Multiple Realization.Thomas W. Polger - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (5):537-547.details
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Subject‐ive and objective.Peter Railton - 1995 - Ratio 8 (3):259-276.details
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The Puzzles of Material Constitution.L. A. Paul - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (7):579-590.details
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Moral realism and program explanation.Mark T. Nelson - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):417 – 428.details
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Return to Moral Twin Earth.David Merli - 2002 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):207-240.details
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Moral explanation and the special sciences.Brad Majors - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (2):121 - 152.details
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In Defence of Cornell Realism: a Reply to Elizabeth Tropman.Joseph Long - 2013 - Theoria 80 (2):174-183.details
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Moral Facts and Best Explanations.Brian Leiter - 2001 - Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):79.details
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Multiple realization and the metaphysics of reduction.Jaegwon Kim - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):1-26.details
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Metaphysics Without Conceptual Analysis.Robert Stalnaker - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):631-636.details
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New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth.Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:447-465.details
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Moral Theory and Explanatory Impotence.Geoffrey Sayre-McCord - 1988 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1):433-457.details
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Moral arguments.Philippa Foot - 1958 - Mind 67 (268):502-513.details
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Morality as a system of hypothetical imperatives.Philippa Foot - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (3):305-316.details
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Special sciences.Jerry A. Fodor - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):97-115.details
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On the method of theoretical physics.Albert Einstein - 1934 - Philosophy of Science 1 (2):163-169.details
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The Metaethical Insignificance of Moral Twin Earth.Janice L. Dowell - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11.details
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Toward Fin de siecle Ethics: Some Trends.Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard & Peter Railton - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (1):115-189.details
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Moral facts as configuring causes.Terence Cuneo - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):141–162.details
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Why the exclusion problem seems intractable and how, just maybe, to tract it.Karen Bennett - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):471-97.details
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Mental Causation.Karen Bennett - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (2):316-337.details
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Moral Cognitivism and Motivation.Sigrun Svavarsdóttir - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (2):161-219.details
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Reply to Critics.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):215-222.details
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Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction.Jaegwon Kim - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):1-26.details
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Disjunctive Properties.Lenny Clapp - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (3):111-136.details
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“How to Be a Moral Realist.Richard Boyd - 1988 - In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press. pp. 181-228.details
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[Handout 12].J. L. Mackie - unknowndetails
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Moral Explanations.Nicholas Sturgeon - 1991 - In Thomas L. Carson & Paul K. Moser (eds.), Morality and the Good Life. Oup Usa.details
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Is consciousness a brain process.Ullin T. Place - 1956 - British Journal of Psychology 47 (1):44-50.details
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