Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Saving People from the Harm of Death.Espen Gamlund & Carl Tollef Solberg (eds.) - 2019 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Death is something we mourn or fear as the worst thing that could happen―whether the deaths of close ones, the deaths of strangers in reported accidents or tragedies, or our own. And yet, being dead is something that no one can experience and live to describe. This simple truth raises a host of difficult philosophical questions about the negativity surrounding our sense of death, and how and for whom exactly it is harmful. The question of whether death is bad has (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Values in Science.Heather E. Douglas - 2014 - In Paul Humphreys (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science. New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 609-630.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   43 citations  
  • Measurement in Science.Eran Tal - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  • Why We Should Reject S.Derek Parfit - 1984 - In Reasons and Persons. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    An argument against the bias towards the near; how a defence of temporal neutrality is not a defence of S; an appeal to inconsistency; why we should reject S and accept CP.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1160 citations  
  • Value Choices in Summary Measures of Population Health.S. Andrew Schroeder - 2017 - Public Health Ethics 10 (2):176-187.
    Summary measures of health, such as the quality-adjusted life year and disability-adjusted life year, have long been known to incorporate a number of value choices. In this paper, though, I show that the value choices in the construction of such measures extend far beyond what is generally recognized. In showing this, I hope both to improve the understanding of those measures by epidemiologists, health economists and policy-makers, and also to contribute to the general debate about the extent to which such (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Is Science Value Free?: Values and Scientific Understanding.Hugh Lacey - 1999 - New York: Routledge.
    Exploring the role of values in scientific inquiry, Hugh Lacey examines the nature and meaning of values, and looks at challenges to the view, posed by postmodernists, feminists, radical ecologists, Third-World advocates and religious fundamentalists, that science is value free. He also focuses on discussions of 'development', especially in Third World countries. This paperback edition includes a new preface.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   138 citations  
  • Age and Death: A Defence of Gradualism.Joseph Millum - 2015 - Utilitas 27 (3):279-297.
    According to standard comparativist views, death is bad insofar as it deprives someone of goods she would otherwise have had. In The Ethics of Killing, Jeff McMahan argues against such views and in favor of a gradualist account according to which how bad it is to die is a function of both the future goods of which the decedent is deprived and her cognitive development when she dies. Comparativists and gradualists therefore disagree about how bad it is to die at (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Moral Aggregation.Iwao Hirose - 2014 - New York, US: Oup Usa.
    This book elucidates the theoretical structure and scope of interpersonal and intra-personal aggregation--a trade-off between benefits to a group of individuals and losses to another group of individuals--and defends a form of aggregation -- formal aggregation -- that resolves a variety of outstanding problems arising from the conventional understanding of aggregation, including the Number Problem concerning the moral relevance of the number of individuals.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal.Heather Douglas - 2009 - University of Pittsburgh Press.
    Douglas proposes a new ideal in which values serve an essential function throughout scientific inquiry, but where the role values play is constrained at key points, protecting the integrity and objectivity of science.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   429 citations  
  • A Defense of the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm.Justin Klocksiem - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (4):285 – 300.
    Although the counterfactual comparative account of harm, according to which someone is harmed when things go worse for her than they otherwise would have, is intuitively plausible, it has recently come under attack. There are five serious objections in the literature: some philosophers argue that the counterfactual account makes it hard to see how we could harm someone in the course of benefitting that person; others argue that Parfit’s non-identity problem is particularly problematic; another objection claims that the account forces (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   60 citations  
  • Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry.Helen E. Longino - 1990 - Princeton University Press.
    This is an important book precisely because there is none other quite like it.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1100 citations  
  • The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life.Jeff McMahan - 2002 - New York, US: OUP Usa.
    A comprehensive study of the ethics of killing in cases in which the metaphysical or moral status of the individual killed is uncertain or controversial. Among those beings whose status is questionable or marginal in this way are human embryos and fetuses, newborn infants, animals, anencephalic infants, human beings with severe congenital and cognitive impairments, and human beings who have become severely demented or irreversibly comatose. In an effort to understand the moral status of these beings, this book develops and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   417 citations  
  • Well-being and death.Ben Bradley - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Well-Being and Death addresses philosophical questions about death and the good life: what makes a life go well? Is death bad for the one who dies? How is this possible if we go out of existence when we die? Is it worse to die as an infant or as a young adult? Is it bad for animals and fetuses to die? Can the dead be harmed? Is there any way to make death less bad for us? Ben Bradley defends the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   168 citations  
  • Weighing lives.John Broome - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    We are often faced with choices that involve the weighing of people's lives against each other, or the weighing of lives against other good things. These are choices both for individuals and for societies. A person who is terminally ill may have to choose between palliative care and more aggressive treatment, which will give her a longer life but at some cost in suffering. We have to choose between the convenience to ourselves of road and air travel, and the lives (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   231 citations  
  • Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Challenging, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity, Parfit claims that we have a false view about our own nature. It is often rational to act against our own best interersts, he argues, and most of us have moral views that are self-defeating. We often act wrongly, although we know there will be no one with serious grounds for complaint, and when we consider future generations it is very hard to avoid conclusions (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2875 citations  
  • What are we?Eric T. Olson - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (5-6):37-55.
    This paper is about the neglected question of what sort of things we are metaphysically speaking. It is different from the mind-body problem and from familiar questions of personal identity. After explaining what the question means and how it differs from others, the paper tries to show how difficult it is to give a satisfying answer.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   222 citations  
  • Which values should be built into economic measures?S. Andrew Schroeder - 2019 - Economics and Philosophy 35 (3):521-536.
    Many economic measures are structured to reflect ethical values. I describe three attitudes towards this: maximalism, according to which we should aim to build all relevant values into measures; minimalism, according to which we should aim to keep values out of measures; and an intermediate view. I argue the intermediate view is likely correct, but existing versions are inadequate. In particular, economists have strong reason to structure measures to reflect fixed, as opposed to user-assessable, values. This implies that, despite disagreement (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • (1 other version)Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy and Public Policy.Daniel Hausman, Michael McPherson & Debra Satz - 2006 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Michael S. McPherson.
    This book shows through argument and numerous policy-related examples how understanding moral philosophy can improve economic analysis, how moral philosophy can benefit from economists' analytical tools, and how economic analysis and moral philosophy together can inform public policy. Part I explores the idea of rationality and its connections to ethics, arguing that when they defend their formal model of rationality, most economists implicitly espouse contestable moral principles. Part II addresses the nature and measurement of welfare, utilitarianism and cost-benefit analysis. Part (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  • Measurement.Nancy Cartwright & Rosa Runhardt - 2014 - In Nancy Cartwright & Eleonora Montuschi (eds.), Philosophy of Social Science: A New Introduction. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    Designing proper measures and carrying them out is one of the key jobs we expect science to accomplish. Properly defined and properly executed scientific measurements provide us with a precise picture of the things we study and give us the kind of information from which we can build scientific laws, models and principles that can help us predict and change the world around us. This chapter is about how this is done in the social sciences.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • (4 other versions)Measurement.Nancy Cartwright - 2005 - In Martin Curd & Stathis Psillos (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. New York: Routledge.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Is consistency overrated?S. Andrew Schroeder - 2018 - Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (3):199-200.
    In their insightful article, ‘The Disvalue of Death in the Global Burden of Disease’, Solberg et al argue that there is a potential incoherence in the way disability-adjusted life years are calculated. Morbidity is measured in years lived with disability in a way quite unlike the way mortality is measured in years of life lost. This potentially renders them incommensurable, like apples and oranges, and makes their aggregate—DALYs—conceptually unsound. The authors say that it is ‘vital’ to address this problem, that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Comparative Harm, Creation and Death.Neil Feit - 2016 - Utilitas 28 (2):136-163.
    Given that a person's death is bad for her,whenis it bad? I defendsubsequentism, the view that things that are bad in the relevant way are bad after they occur. Some have objected to this view on the grounds that it requires us to compare the amount of well-being the victim would have enjoyed, had she not died, with the amount she receives while dead; however, we cannot assign any level of well-being, not even zero, to a dead person. In the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • Incidence, Prevalence, and Hybrid Approaches to Calculating DALYs.S. Andrew Schroeder - 2012 - Population Health Metrics 10 (19).
    When disability-adjusted life years are used to measure the burden of disease on a population in a time interval, they can be calculated in several different ways: from an incidence, pure prevalence, or hybrid perspective. I show that these calculation methods are not equivalent and discuss some of the formal difficulties each method faces. I show that if we don’t discount the value of future health, there is a sense in which the choice of calculation method is a mere question (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Disability-adjusted Life Years: A Critical Review.Sudhir Anand & Kara Hanson - 2004 - In Public Health, Ethics, and Equity. Oxford University Press UK.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • The badness of death and priorities in health.Carl Tollef Solberg & Espen Gamlund - 2016 - BMC Medical Ethics 17 (1):1-9.
    BackgroundThe state of the world is one with scarce medical resources where longevity is not equally distributed. Given such facts, setting priorities in health entails making difficult yet unavoidable decisions about which lives to save. The business of saving lives works on the assumption that longevity is valuable and that an early death is worse than a late death. There is a vast literature on health priorities and badness of death, separately. Surprisingly, there has been little cross-fertilisation between the academic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • (4 other versions)Measurement.Nancy Cartwright - 2005 - In Martin Curd & Stathis Psillos (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. New York: Routledge.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Perspectives on evaluating deaths and their relevance to health policy.Espen Gamlund & Carl Tollef Solberg - 2019 - In Espen Gamlund & Carl Tollef Solberg (eds.), Saving People from the Harm of Death. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The disvalue of death in the global burden of disease.Carl Tollef Solberg, Ole Frithjof Norheim & Mathias Barra - 2018 - Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (3):192-198.
    In the Global Burden of Disease study, disease burden is measured as disability-adjusted life years (DALYs). The paramount assumption of the DALY is that it makes sense to aggregate years lived with disability (YLDs) and years of life lost (YLLs). However, this is not smooth sailing. Whereas morbidity (YLD) is something thathappens toan individual, loss of life itself (YLL) occurs when that individual’s life has ended. YLLs quantify something that involves no experience and does not take place among living individuals. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Weighing Lives.John Broome - 2004 - In Weighing lives. New York: Oxford University Press.
    This chapter presents examples of the practical problem of weighing lives, from medicine, global warming and elsewhere. It also sets out in general terms the theoretical problem that the book will tackle. The problem is to evaluate distributions of wellbeing, in which wellbeing is distributed across people, across time, and across states of nature.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   68 citations