The purpose of this project is to investigate what recollection in the Meno entails. In other words, what does the demonstration with the slave intend to show? Does the slave boy recollect Forms? Does the boy recollect empirical as well as a priori truths? What is the difference between true belief and knowledge as presented in the demonstration? In order to answer these questions, I outline each of the slave boy’s responses to Socrates’ questions with the intent of figuring out (...) when and if recollection occurs in the dialogue. I begin this project by investigating whether or not sense experience is a factor in recollection. In other words, I investigate the role that the diagrams play in the demonstration. I are that the diagrams are a dispensable component in the process of recollection. The reason for this is that the process of recollection can be accomplished without their use. Plato’s ultimate intent in the demonstration is to show that the proof can only be done theoretically, that is, with the answer in front of the boy at the outset of the demonstration, the boy needs to work out the solution using his mind’s own resources. The second component of this project is Dominic Scott’s distinction between the interpretations of recollection ‘K’ and ‘D.’ According to ‘K’, recollection is used to explain how we form conceptual knowledge, understanding is therefore, the product of information provided by the senses and universal notions. According to ‘D’, the purpose of recollection is to scrape away all of the deceptive notions provided by sense experience to reveal the Forms which lie beneath. My main target throughout is Scott’s interpretation ‘D.’ I argue that nowhere in the dialogue does Plato explicitly or implicitly that sense experience is deceptive or that it is necessary to connect with universal notions. Contrary to this interpretation, I argue that recollection in the Meno occurs as merely a rough deduction of an interlocutor’s questioning. In other words, the slave boy deduces from a series of questions provided by Socrates the answer to the geometrical problem. My secondary target is Bedu-Addo, who contends that the purpose of recollection is to stir up true beliefs of what a square is like in order to connect with the Square Itself. I argue that Bedu-Addo’s thesis rests on a faulty interpretation of the text. Nowhere in the dialogue, in the demonstration or elsewhere, does Plato tell us that the purpose of recollection is to reconnect with the Forms. (shrink)

This article examines Gilles Deleuze’s concept of the simulacrum, which Deleuze formulated in the context of his reading of Nietzsche’s project of “overturning Platonism.” The essential Platonic distinction, Deleuze argues, is more profound than the speculative distinction between model and copy, original and image. The deeper, practical distinction moves between two kinds of images or eidolon, for which the Platonic Idea is meant to provide a concrete criterion of selection “Copies” or icons (eikones) are well-grounded claimants to the transcendent Idea, (...) authenticated by their internal resemblance to the Idea, whereas “simulacra” (phantasmata) are like false claimants, built on a dissimilarity and implying an essential perversion or deviation from the Idea. If the goal of Platonism is the triumph of icons over simulacra, the inversion of Platonism would entail an affirmation of the simulacrum as such, which must thus be given its own concept. Deleuze consequently defines the simulacrum in terms of an internal dissimilitude or “disparateness,” which in turn implies a new conception of Ideas, no longer as self-identical qualities (the auto kath’hauto), but rather as constituting a pure concept of difference. An inverted Platonism would necessarily be based on a purely immanent and differential conception of Ideas. Starting from this new conception of the Idea, Deleuze proposes to take up the Platonic project anew, rethinking the fundamental figures of Platonism (selection, repetition, ungrounding, the question-problem complex) on a purely differential basis. In this sense, Deleuze’s inverted Platonism can at the same time be seen as a rejuvenated Platonism and even a completed Platonism. (shrink)

A single question marks our departure, a question that, while apparently straightforward, has assumed so many shapes and disguises that it would not be unjust to claim it has infected all of Western history. In its current manifestation, however, we will take our cue from Plato in phrasing it thus: What is a Sophist? When Plato first formulated the question in these terms, he well understood that its self-evident simplicity could be deceptive and that its effects might proliferate uncontrollably. As (...) Jacques Derrida comments, "The question of what the Sophists really were is an enormous question" (Olson 17). In Plato's case, attempting to "hunt down" the Sophist led from a disturbing journey through the world of images to an unsettling encounter with the existence of nonbeing. (shrink)

The paradox that there can be no such thing as falsity is treated by Plato in a number of places. As exploited in the early dialogue Euthydemus it appears to rest on a simple equivocation. A false statement would be one that stated what is not, but to state what is not is to state nothing; so a false statement would in fact be a non-statement, no statement at all.

J.L. Ackrill's work on Plato and Aristotle has had a considerable influence upon ancient philosophical studies in the late twentieth century. This volume collects the best of Ackrill's essays on the two greatest philosophers of antiquity. With philosophical acuity and philological expertise he examines a wide range of texts and topics--from ethics and logic to epistemology and metaphysics--that continue to be in the focus of debate.