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Ranking Functions, AGM Style

Internet Festschrift for Peter Gärdenfors (1999)

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  1. (1 other version)Ordinal Conditional Functions. A Dynamic Theory of Epistemic States.Wolfgang Spohn - 1988 - In W. L. Harper & B. Skyrms (eds.), Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and Statistics, vol. II. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    It is natural and important to have a formal representation of plain belief, according to which propositions are held true, or held false, or neither. (In the paper this is called a deterministic representation of epistemic states). And it is of great philosophical importance to have a dynamic account of plain belief. AGM belief revision theory seems to provide such an account, but it founders at the problem of iterated belief revision, since it can generally account only for one step (...)
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  • Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems: Networks of Plausible Inference.Judea Pearl - 1988 - Morgan Kaufmann.
    The book can also be used as an excellent text for graduate-level courses in AI, operations research, or applied probability.
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  • A Mathematical Theory of Evidence.Glenn Shafer - 1976 - Princeton University Press.
    Degrees of belief; Dempster's rule of combination; Simple and separable support functions; The weights of evidence; Compatible frames of discernment; Support functions; The discernment of evidence; Quasi support functions; Consonance; Statistical evidence; The dual nature of probable reasoning.
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  • Rational belief systems.Brian David Ellis - 1979 - Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield.
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  • Reversing the Levi identity.Sven Ove Hansson - 1993 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 22 (6):637 - 669.
    The AGM (Alchourrón-Gärdenfors-Makinson) model of belief change is extended to cover changes on sets of beliefs that are not closed under logical consequence (belief bases). Three major types of change operations, namely contraction, internal revision, and external revision are axiomatically characterized, and their interrelations are studied. In external revision, the Levi identity is reversed in the sense that one first adds the new belief to the belief base, and afterwards contracts its negation. It is argued that external revision represents an (...)
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  • (1 other version)On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions.Carlos E. Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors & David Makinson - 1985 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (2):510-530.
    This paper extends earlier work by its authors on formal aspects of the processes of contracting a theory to eliminate a proposition and revising a theory to introduce a proposition. In the course of the earlier work, Gardenfors developed general postulates of a more or less equational nature for such processes, whilst Alchourron and Makinson studied the particular case of contraction functions that are maximal, in the sense of yielding a maximal subset of the theory (or alternatively, of one of (...)
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  • (1 other version)A Textbook of Belief Dynamics: Solutions to Exercises.Sven Ove Hansson - 1999 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    In the middle of the 1980s, logical tools were discovered that make it possible to model changes in belief and knowledge in entirely new ways. These logical tools turned out to be applicable both to human beliefs and to the contents of databases. This is the first textbook in this new area. It contains both discursive chapters with a minimum of formalism and formal chapters in which proofs and proof methods are presented. By using different selections from the formal section (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.
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  • Knowledge in Flux.Henry E. Kyburg & Peter Gardenfors - 1993 - Noûs 27 (4):519-521.
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  • An Epistemic Approach to Conditionals.Peter Gärdenfors - 1981 - American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (3):203 - 211.
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  • On the Properties of Conditional Independence.Wolfgang Spohn - 1994 - In Paul Humphreys (ed.), Patrick Suppes, Scientific Philosopher Vol. 1: Probability and Probabilistic Causality. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    As the paper explains, it is crucial to epistemology in general and to the theory of causation in particular to investigate the properties of conditional independence as completely as possible. The paper summarizes the most important results concerning conditional independence with respect to two important representations of epistemic states, namely (strictly positive) probability measures and natural conditional (or disbelief or ranking) functions. It finally adds some new observations.
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  • On the logic of iterated belief revision.Adnan Darwiche & Judea Pearl - 1997 - Artificial Intelligence 89 (1-2):1-29.
    We show in this paper that the AGM postulates are too weak to ensure the rational preservation of conditional beliefs during belief revision, thus permitting improper responses to sequences of observations. We remedy this weakness by proposing four additional postulates, which are sound relative to a qualitative version of probabilistic conditioning. Contrary to the AGM framework, the proposed postulates characterize belief revision as a process which may depend on elements of an epistemic state that are not necessarily captured by a (...)
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  • On Spohn’s rule for revision of beliefs.Prakash P. Shenoy - 1991 - International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 5 (2):149-181.
    The main ingredients of Spohn's theory of epistemic beliefs are (1) a functional representation of an epistemic state called a disbelief function and (2) a rule for revising this function in light of new information. The main contribution of this paper is as follows. First, we provide a new axiomatic definition of an epistemic state and study some of its properties. Second, we study some properties of an alternative functional representation of an epistemic state called a Spohnian belief function. Third, (...)
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  • (1 other version)The logic of conditionals.Ernest Adams - 1965 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 8 (1-4):166 – 197.
    The standard use of the propositional calculus ('P.C.?) in analyzing the validity of inferences involving conditionals leads to fallacies, and the problem is to determine where P.C. may be ?safely? used. An alternative analysis of criteria of reasonableness of inferences in terms of conditions of justification rather than truth of statements is proposed. It is argued, under certain restrictions, that P. C. may be safely used, except in inferences whose conclusions are conditionals whose antecedents are incompatible with the premises in (...)
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  • The probable and the provable.Laurence Jonathan Cohen - 1977 - Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    The book was planned and written as a single, sustained argument. But earlier versions of a few parts of it have appeared separately. The object of this book is both to establish the existence of the paradoxes, and also to describe a non-Pascalian concept of probability in terms of which one can analyse the structure of forensic proof without giving rise to such typical signs of theoretical misfit. Neither the complementational principle for negation nor the multiplicative principle for conjunction applies (...)
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  • Cohering with.Erik J. Olsson - 1999 - Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):273 - 291.
    I argue that the analysis most capable of systematising our intuitions about coherence as a relation is one according to which a set of beliefs, A, coheres with another set, B, if and only if the set-theoretical union of A and B is a coherent set. The second problem I consider is the role of coherence in epistemic justification. I submit that there are severe problems pertaining to the idea, defended most prominently by Keith Lehrer, that justification amounts to coherence (...)
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  • Iterated belief change based on epistemic entrenchment.Abhaya C. Nayak - 1994 - Erkenntnis 41 (3):353-390.
    In this paper it is argued that, in order to solve the problem of iterated belief change, both the belief state and its input should be represented as epistemic entrenchment (EE) relations. A belief revision operation is constructed that updates a given EE relation to a new one in light of an evidential EE relation. It is shown that the operation in question satisfies generalized versions of the Gärdenfors revision postulates. The account offered is motivated by Spohn's ordinal conditionalization functions, (...)
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  • Belief change as change in epistemic entrenchment.Abhaya C. Nayak, Paul Nelson & Hanan Polansky - 1996 - Synthese 109 (2):143 - 174.
    In this paper, it is argued that both the belief state and its input should be represented as epistemic entrenchment (EE) relations. A belief revision operation is constructed that updates a given EE relation to a new one in light of an evidential EE relation, and an axiomatic characterization of this operation is given. Unlike most belief revision operations, the one developed here can handle both multiple belief revision and iterated belief revision.
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  • A survey of multiple contractions.André Fuhrmann & Sven Ove Hansson - 1994 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 3 (1):39-75.
    The AGM theory of belief contraction is extended tomultiple contraction, i.e. to contraction by a set of sentences rather than by a single sentence. There are two major variants: Inpackage contraction all the sentences must be removed from the belief set, whereas inchoice contraction it is sufficient that at least one of them is removed. Constructions of both types of multiple contraction are offered and axiomatically characterized. Neither package nor choice contraction can in general be reduced to contractions by single (...)
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  • Iterated revision and minimal change of conditional beliefs.Craig Boutilier - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (3):263 - 305.
    We describe a model of iterated belief revision that extends the AGM theory of revision to account for the effect of a revision on the conditional beliefs of an agent. In particular, this model ensures that an agent makes as few changes as possible to the conditional component of its belief set. Adopting the Ramsey test, minimal conditional revision provides acceptance conditions for arbitrary right-nested conditionals. We show that problem of determining acceptance of any such nested conditional can be reduced (...)
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  • Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief. Part II: Iterated Belief Change Without Dispositional Coherence.Hans Rott - 2003 - Journal of Logic and Computation 13 (1):111-145.
    This paper studies the idea of conservatism with respect to belief change strategies in the setting of unary, iterated belief revision functions (based on the conclusions of Rott, ‘Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief, Part I: Finding the Right Framework’, Erkenntnis 50, 1999, 387–412). Special attention is paid to the case of ‘basic belief change’ where neither the (weak) AGM postulates concerning conservatism with respect to beliefs nor the (stong) supplementary AGM postulates concerning dispositional coherence need to be (...)
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  • (1 other version)A Textbook of Belief Dynamics: Theory Change and Database Updating.Sven Ove Hansson - 1999 - Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    SUGGESTED COURSES Introductory level A (Requires very little background in logic .): 4: -9 - - -7 -2 Introductory level B: -9,:+-+ -,2:+,2: -,3:20+-22+ -7 -2 ...
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  • (1 other version)On the logic of theory change: Safe contraction.Carlos E. Alchourrón & David Makinson - 1985 - Studia Logica 44 (4):405 - 422.
    This paper is concerned with formal aspects of the logic of theory change, and in particular with the process of shrinking or contracting a theory to eliminate a proposition. It continues work in the area by the authors and Peter Gärdenfors. The paper defines a notion of safe contraction of a set of propositions, shows that it satisfies the Gärdenfors postulates for contraction and thus can be represented as a partial meet contraction, and studies its properties both in general and (...)
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  • Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief Part I: Finding the right framework.Hans Rott - 1999 - Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):387-412.
    In this paper I discuss the foundations of a formal theory of coherent and conservative belief change that is (a) suitable to be used as a method for constructing iterated changes of belief, (b) sensitive to the history of earlier belief changes, and (c) independent of any form of dispositional coherence. I review various ways to conceive the relationship between the beliefs actually held by an agent and her belief change strategies (that also deal with potential belief sets), show the (...)
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  • How to understand the foundations of empirical belief in a coherentist way.Wolfgang Spohn - 1998 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (1):22–40.
    The central claim of the paper is, roughly, that the fact that it looks to somebody as if p is a defeasibly a priori reason for assuming that p (and vice versa), for any person, even for the perceiver himself. As a preparation, it outlines a doxastic conception suitable to explicate this claim and explains how to analyse dispositions within this conception. Since an observable p has the disposition to look as if p, this analysis generalizes to the central claim (...)
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  • The Logic of Conditionals.[author unknown] - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (1):155-158.
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  • Nomic Probability and the Foundations of Induction. [REVIEW]Henry E. Kyburg & John L. Pollock - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (1):115.
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  • Plausible reasoning: an introduction to the theory and practice of plausibilistic inference.Nicholas Rescher - 1976 - Assen: Van Gorcum.
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  • Rational Belief Systems.James Cargile - 1981 - Philosophical Review 90 (3):454.
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  • Nomic Probability and the Foundations of Induction.John L. Pollock - 1990 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
    In this book Pollock deals with the subject of probabilistic reasoning, making general philosophical sense of objective probabilities and exploring their ...
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  • The Probable and the Provable.Samuel Stoljar - 1981 - Philosophical Review 90 (3):457.
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  • Two Coherence Principles.Wolfgang Spohn - 1999 - Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):155-175.
    The paper proposes two principles of coherence (thus taking up work started in Spohn (1991) "A Reason for Explanation: Explanations Provide Stable Reasons"). The latter indeed serves as a weak, but precise explication of the notion of coherence as it is used in the current epistemological discussion. After discussing their epistemological setting, the paper considers four ways of establishing these principles. They may be inferred neither from enumerative induction, nor from the nature of propositions as objects of belief, nor in (...)
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  • Deterministic and probabilistic reasons and causes.Wolfgang Spohn - 1983 - Erkenntnis 19 (1-3):371 - 396.
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  • (1 other version)Belief revision.Hans Rott - 2008 - In Jonathan Eric Adler & Lance J. Rips (eds.), Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and its Foundations. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 514--534.
    This is a survey paper. Contents: 1 Introduction -- 2 The representation of belief -- 3 Kinds of belief change -- 4 Coherence constraints for belief revision -- 5 Different modes of belief change -- 6 Two strategies for characterizing rational changes of belief - 6.1 The postulates strategy - 6.2 The constructive strategy -- 7 An abstract view of the elements of belief change -- 8 Iterated changes of belief -- 9 Further developments - 9.1 Variants and extensions of (...)
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  • A coherence interpretation of semi-revision.Erik J. Olsson - 1997 - Theoria 63 (1-2):105-134.
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  • Theories of Probability.Terrence Fine - 1973 - Academic Press.
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