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On Legal Interpretation and Second-order Proof Rules.Sebastián Reyes Molina - 2018 - Analisi E Diritto 1 (1):165-184.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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On argument strength.Niki Pfeifer - 2012 - In Frank Zenker (ed.), Bayesian Argumentation – The Practical Side of Probability. Springer. pp. 185-193.details
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Knowledge and Legal Proof.Sarah Moss - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.details
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When statistical evidence is not specific enough.Marcello Di Bello - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12251-12269.details
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Does legal epistemology rest on a mistake? On fetishism, two‐tier system design, and conscientious fact‐finding.David Enoch, Talia Fisher & Levi Spectre - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):85-103.details
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Justice in epistemic gaps: The ‘proof paradox’ revisited.Lewis Ross - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):315-333.details
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Statistical resentment, or: what’s wrong with acting, blaming, and believing on the basis of statistics alone.David Enoch & Levi Spectre - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5687-5718.details
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More on Normic Support and the Criminal Standard of Proof.Martin Smith - 2021 - Mind 130 (519):943-960.details
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Knowledge, Evidence, and Naked Statistics.Sherrilyn Roush - 2023 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira (ed.), Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Legal proof and statistical conjunctions.Lewis D. Ross - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):2021-2041.details
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Statistical Evidence, Normalcy, and the Gatecrasher Paradox.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):563-578.details
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Scepticism and Epistemic Angst, Redux.Duncan Pritchard - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 15):3635-3664.details
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The disvalue of knowledge.David Papineau - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5311-5332.details
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Proof Paradoxes and Normic Support: Socializing or Relativizing?Marcello Di Bello - 2020 - Mind 129 (516):1269-1285.details
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Trial by Statistics: Is a High Probability of Guilt Enough to Convict?Marcello Di Bello - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1045-1084.details
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What should we believe about the future?Miloud Belkoniene - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2375-2386.details
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Overcoming Luck: Two Trends in Legal Philosophy.Jeffrey S. Helmreich - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):335-347.details
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When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction?Martin Smith - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1193-1218.details
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The Impossibility of Coherence.Erik J. Olsson - 2005 - Erkenntnis 63 (3):387-412.details
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Estándares múltiples de prueba en medicina y derecho.Andrés Páez - 2015 - In Andrés Páez (ed.), Hechos, evidencia y estándares de prueba. Ensayos de epistemología jurídica. Bogotá, D.C., Colombia: Ediciones Uniandes. pp. 123-152.details
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Some Artificial Intelligence Tools for Argument Evaluation: An Introduction.Douglas Walton - 2016 - Argumentation 30 (3):317-340.details
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Sensitivity, Causality, and Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):102-112.details
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What types of arguments are there?James B. Freeman - unknowndetails
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Feminist Philosophy of Science.Lynn Hankinson Nelson - 2002 - In Peter K. Machamer & Michael Silberstein (eds.), The Blackwell guide to the philosophy of science. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell. pp. 312–331.details
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Are there any a priori constraints on the study of rationality?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):359-370.details
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Should Bayesians sometimes neglect base rates?Isaac Levi - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):342-343.details
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Propensity, evidence, and diagnosis.J. L. Mackie - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):345-346.details
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The irrational, the unreasonable, and the wrong.Avishai Margalit & Maya Bar-Hillel - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):346-349.details
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Lay arbitration of rules of inference.Richard E. Nisbett - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):349-350.details
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In philosophical defence of Bayesian rationality.Jon Dorling - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):249-250.details
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What's in a link?Jerome A. Feldman - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):474-475.details
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Logic and probability theory versus canons of rationality.Gilbert Harman - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):251-251.details
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Rational belief.Henry E. Kyburg - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):231-245.details
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On the testability of ECHO.D. C. Earle - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):474-474.details
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Can irrationality be intelligently discussed?Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):509.details
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Normative theories of rationality: Occam's razor, Procrustes' bed?Lola L. Lopes - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):255-256.details
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Contrapositivism; or, The only evidence worth paying for is contained in the negatives.David Miller - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):256-257.details
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Decisions with indeterminate probabilities.Teddy Seidenfeld - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):259-261.details
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Expert intuitions and the interpretation of social psychological experiments.André Gallois & Michael Siegal - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):492.details
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A theory of probability should tutor our intuitions.Glenn Shafer - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):508.details
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Probabilistic fallacies.Henry E. Kyburg - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):31-31.details
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Which reference class is evoked?Craig R. M. McKenzie & Jack B. Soll - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):34-35.details
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The need for a theory of evidential weight.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):18-19.details
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How to reconsider the base rate fallacy without forgetting the concept of systematic processing.Pablo Fernandez-Berrocal, Julian Almaraz & Susana Segura - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):21-22.details
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Modeling Corroborative Evidence: Inference to the Best Explanation as Counter–Rebuttal.David Godden - 2014 - Argumentation 28 (2):187-220.details
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Conjecture, acquiescence, and John Millar's history of Ireland.Paul B. Smith - 1996 - The European Legacy 1 (8):2227-2248.details
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Argument Strength, the Toulmin Model, and Ampliative Probability.James B. Freeman - 2006 - Informal Logic 26 (1):25-40.details
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Wigmore's Chart Method.Jean Goodwin & Alec Fisher - 2000 - Informal Logic 20 (3).details
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