Switch to: References

Citations of:

Theories of Probability

Academic Press (1973)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Non-Ideal Decision Theory.Sven Neth - 2023 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
    My dissertation is about Bayesian rationality for non-ideal agents. I show how to derive subjective probabilities from preferences using much weaker rationality assumptions than other standard representation theorems. I argue that non-ideal agents might be uncertain about how they will update on new information and consider two consequences of this uncertainty: such agents should sometimes reject free information and make choices which, taken together, yield sure loss. The upshot is that Bayesian rationality for non-ideal agents makes very different normative demands (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • How to Read a Representor.Edward Elliott - forthcoming - Ergo.
    Imprecise probabilities are often modelled with representors, or sets of probability functions. In the recent literature, two ways of interpreting representors have emerged as especially prominent: vagueness interpretations, according to which each probability function in the set represents how the agent's beliefs would be if any vagueness were precisified away; and comparativist interpretations, according to which the set represents those comparative confidence relations that are common to all probability functions therein. I argue that these interpretations have some important limitations. I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Bertrand’s Paradox and the Principle of Indifference.Nicholas Shackel - 2024 - Abingdon: Routledge.
    Events between which we have no epistemic reason to discriminate have equal epistemic probabilities. Bertrand’s chord paradox, however, appears to show this to be false, and thereby poses a general threat to probabilities for continuum sized state spaces. Articulating the nature of such spaces involves some deep mathematics and that is perhaps why the recent literature on Bertrand’s Paradox has been almost entirely from mathematicians and physicists, who have often deployed elegant mathematics of considerable sophistication. At the same time, the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On Uncertainty.Brian Weatherson - 1998 - Dissertation, Monash University
    This dissertation looks at a set of interconnected questions concerning the foundations of probability, and gives a series of interconnected answers. At its core is a piece of old-fashioned philosophical analysis, working out what probability is. Or equivalently, investigating the semantic question of what is the meaning of ‘probability’? Like Keynes and Carnap, I say that probability is degree of reasonable belief. This immediately raises an epistemological question, which degrees count as reasonable? To solve that in its full generality would (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Primitive Conditional Probabilities, Subset Relations and Comparative Regularity.Joshua Thong - 2024 - Analysis.
    Rational agents seem more confident in any possible event than in an impossible event. But if rational credences are real-valued, then there are some possible events that are assigned 0 credence nonetheless. How do we differentiate these events from impossible events then when we order events? de Finetti (1975), Hájek (2012) and Easwaran (2014) suggest that when ordering events, conditional credences and subset relations are as relevant as unconditional credences. I present a counterexample to all their proposals in this paper. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Better Foundations for Subjective Probability.Sven Neth - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    How do we ascribe subjective probability? In decision theory, this question is often addressed by representation theorems, going back to Ramsey (1926), which tell us how to define or measure subjective probability by observable preferences. However, standard representation theorems make strong rationality assumptions, in particular expected utility maximization. How do we ascribe subjective probability to agents which do not satisfy these strong rationality assumptions? I present a representation theorem with weak rationality assumptions which can be used to define or measure (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Hypothetical Frequencies as Approximations.Jer Steeger - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (4):1295-1325.
    Hájek (Erkenntnis 70(2):211–235, 2009) argues that probabilities cannot be the limits of relative frequencies in counterfactual infinite sequences. I argue for a different understanding of these limits, drawing on Norton’s (Philos Sci 79(2):207–232, 2012) distinction between approximations (inexact descriptions of a target) and idealizations (separate models that bear analogies to the target). Then, I adapt Hájek’s arguments to this new context. These arguments provide excellent reasons not to use hypothetical frequencies as idealizations, but no reason not to use them as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Are non-accidental regularities a cosmic coincidence? Revisiting a central threat to Humean laws.Aldo Filomeno - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5205-5227.
    If the laws of nature are as the Humean believes, it is an unexplained cosmic coincidence that the actual Humean mosaic is as extremely regular as it is. This is a strong and well-known objection to the Humean account of laws. Yet, as reasonable as this objection may seem, it is nowadays sometimes dismissed. The reason: its unjustified implicit assignment of equiprobability to each possible Humean mosaic; that is, its assumption of the principle of indifference, which has been attacked on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Indifference to Anti-Humean Chances.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (5):485-501.
    An indifference principle says that your credences should be distributed uniformly over each of the possibilities you recognise. A chance deference principle says that your credences should be aligned with the chances. My thesis is that, if we are anti-Humeans about chance, then these two principles are incompatible. Anti-Humeans think that it is possible for the actual frequencies to depart from the chances. So long as you recognise possibilities like this, you cannot both spread your credences evenly and defer to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • ‘Ramseyfying’ Probabilistic Comparativism.Edward Elliott - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (4):727-754.
    Comparativism is the view that comparative confidences (e.g., being more confident that P than that Q) are more fundamental than degrees of belief (e.g., believing that P with some strength x). In this paper, I outline the basis for a new, non-probabilistic version of comparativism inspired by a suggestion made by Frank Ramsey in `Probability and Partial Belief'. I show how, and to what extent, `Ramseyan comparativism' might be used to weaken the (unrealistically strong) probabilistic coherence conditions that comparativism traditionally (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Aggregation for potentially infinite populations without continuity or completeness.David McCarthy, Kalle M. Mikkola & J. Teruji Thomas - 2019 - arXiv:1911.00872 [Econ.TH].
    We present an abstract social aggregation theorem. Society, and each individual, has a preorder that may be interpreted as expressing values or beliefs. The preorders are allowed to violate both completeness and continuity, and the population is allowed to be infinite. The preorders are only assumed to be represented by functions with values in partially ordered vector spaces, and whose product has convex range. This includes all preorders that satisfy strong independence. Any Pareto indifferent social preorder is then shown to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Imprecise evidence without imprecise credences.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2735-2758.
    Does rationality require imprecise credences? Many hold that it does: imprecise evidence requires correspondingly imprecise credences. I argue that this is false. The imprecise view faces the same arbitrariness worries that were meant to motivate it in the first place. It faces these worries because it incorporates a certain idealization. But doing away with this idealization effectively collapses the imprecise view into a particular kind of precise view. On this alternative, our attitudes should reflect a kind of normative uncertainty: uncertainty (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Full & Partial Belief.Konstantin Genin - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 437-498.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • (1 other version)Bayesian Decision Theory and Stochastic Independence.Philippe Mongin - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (1):152-178.
    As stochastic independence is essential to the mathematical development of probability theory, it seems that any foundational work on probability should be able to account for this property. Bayesian decision theory appears to be wanting in this respect. Savage’s postulates on preferences under uncertainty entail a subjective expected utility representation, and this asserts only the existence and uniqueness of a subjective probability measure, regardless of its properties. What is missing is a preference condition corresponding to stochastic independence. To fill this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Bayesian Variations: Essays on the Structure, Object, and Dynamics of Credence.Aron Vallinder - 2018 - Dissertation, London School of Economics
    According to the traditional Bayesian view of credence, its structure is that of precise probability, its objects are descriptive propositions about the empirical world, and its dynamics are given by conditionalization. Each of the three essays that make up this thesis deals with a different variation on this traditional picture. The first variation replaces precise probability with sets of probabilities. The resulting imprecise Bayesianism is sometimes motivated on the grounds that our beliefs should not be more precise than the evidence (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • (1 other version)Bayesian Decision Theory and Stochastic Independence.Philippe Mongin - 2017 - TARK 2017.
    Stochastic independence has a complex status in probability theory. It is not part of the definition of a probability measure, but it is nonetheless an essential property for the mathematical development of this theory. Bayesian decision theorists such as Savage can be criticized for being silent about stochastic independence. From their current preference axioms, they can derive no more than the definitional properties of a probability measure. In a new framework of twofold uncertainty, we introduce preference axioms that entail not (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • O Problema da Indução.Eduardo Castro & Diogo Fernandes - 2014 - Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.
    State of the art paper on the problem of induction: how to justify the conclusion that ‘all Fs are Gs’ from the premise that ‘all observed Fs are Gs’. The most prominent theories of contemporary philosophical literature are discussed and analysed, such as: inductivism, reliabilism, perspective of laws of nature, rationalism, falsificationism, the material theory of induction and probabilistic approaches, according to Carnap, Reichenbach and Bayesianism. In the end, we discuss the new problem of induction of Goodman, raised by the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Making sense of randomness: Implicit encoding as a basis for judgment.Ruma Falk & Clifford Konold - 1997 - Psychological Review 104 (2):301-318.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  • Causation, Prediction, and Search.Peter Spirtes, Clark Glymour, Scheines N. & Richard - 1993 - Mit Press: Cambridge.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   64 citations  
  • (1 other version)Qualitative Axioms of Uncertainty as a Foundation for Probability and Decision-Making.Patrick Suppes - 2016 - Minds and Machines 26 (1-2):185-202.
    Although the concept of uncertainty is as old as Epicurus’s writings, and an excellent quantitative theory, with entropy as the measure of uncertainty having been developed in recent times, there has been little exploration of the qualitative theory. The purpose of the present paper is to give a qualitative axiomatization of uncertainty, in the spirit of the many studies of qualitative comparative probability. The qualitative axioms are fundamentally about the uncertainty of a partition of the probability space of events. Of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Representation and Invariance of Scientific Structures.Patrick Suppes - 2002 - CSLI Publications (distributed by Chicago University Press).
    An early, very preliminary edition of this book was circulated in 1962 under the title Set-theoretical Structures in Science. There are many reasons for maintaining that such structures play a role in the philosophy of science. Perhaps the best is that they provide the right setting for investigating problems of representation and invariance in any systematic part of science, past or present. Examples are easy to cite. Sophisticated analysis of the nature of representation in perception is to be found already (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   143 citations  
  • Does chance hide necessity ? A reevaluation of the debate ‘determinism - indeterminism’ in the light of quantum mechanics and probability theory.Louis Vervoort - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Montreal
    In this text the ancient philosophical question of determinism (“Does every event have a cause ?”) will be re-examined. In the philosophy of science and physics communities the orthodox position states that the physical world is indeterministic: quantum events would have no causes but happen by irreducible chance. Arguably the clearest theorem that leads to this conclusion is Bell’s theorem. The commonly accepted ‘solution’ to the theorem is ‘indeterminism’, in agreement with the Copenhagen interpretation. Here it is recalled that indeterminism (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Feminist Philosophy of Science.Lynn Hankinson Nelson - 2002 - In Peter K. Machamer & Michael Silberstein (eds.), The Blackwell guide to the philosophy of science. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell. pp. 312–331.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Highlights of Past Literature Current Work Future Work.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Measure Semantics and Qualitative Semantics for Epistemic Modals.Wesley H. Holliday & Thomas F. Icard - 2013 - Proceedings of SALT 23:514-534.
    In this paper, we explore semantics for comparative epistemic modals that avoid the entailment problems shown to result from Kratzer’s (1991) semantics by Yalcin (2006, 2009, 2010). In contrast to the alternative semantics presented by Yalcin and Lassiter (2010, 2011), based on finitely additive probability measures, we introduce semantics based on qualitatively additive measures, as well as semantics based on purely qualitative orderings, including orderings on propositions derived from orderings on worlds in the tradition of Kratzer (1991). All of these (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • A defense of imprecise credences in inference and decision making1.James M. Joyce - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):281-323.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   163 citations  
  • What is Probability?Patrick Maher - unknown
    In October 2009 I decided to stop doing philosophy. This meant, in particular, stopping work on the book that I was writing on the nature of probability. At that time, I had no intention of making my unfinished draft available to others. However, I recently noticed how many people are reading the lecture notes and articles on my web site. Since this draft book contains some important improvements on those materials, I decided to make it available to anyone who wants (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • The concept of probability in physics: an analytic version of von Mises’ interpretation.Louis Vervoort - manuscript
    In the following we will investigate whether von Mises’ frequency interpretation of probability can be modified to make it philosophically acceptable. We will reject certain elements of von Mises’ theory, but retain others. In the interpretation we propose we do not use von Mises’ often criticized ‘infinite collectives’ but we retain two essential claims of his interpretation, stating that probability can only be defined for events that can be repeated in similar conditions, and that exhibit frequency stabilization. The central idea (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Entropy - A Guide for the Perplexed.Roman Frigg & Charlotte Werndl - 2011 - In Claus Beisbart & Stephan Hartmann (eds.), Probabilities in Physics. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 115-142.
    Entropy is ubiquitous in physics, and it plays important roles in numerous other disciplines ranging from logic and statistics to biology and economics. However, a closer look reveals a complicated picture: entropy is defined differently in different contexts, and even within the same domain different notions of entropy are at work. Some of these are defined in terms of probabilities, others are not. The aim of this chapter is to arrive at an understanding of some of the most important notions (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • (1 other version)Challenges to Bayesian Confirmation Theory.John D. Norton - 2011 - In Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm Forster (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 7: Philosophy of Statistics. Elsevier B.V.. pp. 391-440.
    Proponents of Bayesian confirmation theory believe that they have the solution to a significant, recalcitrant problem in philosophy of science. It is the identification of the logic that governs evidence and its inductive bearing in science. That is the logic that lets us say that our catalog of planetary observations strongly confirms Copernicus’ heliocentric hypothesis; or that the fossil record is good evidence for the theory of evolution; or that the 3oK cosmic background radiation supports big bang cosmology. The definitive (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • (1 other version)Probability.Branden Fitelson, Alan Hajek & Ned Hall - 2005 - In Sahotra Sarkar & Jessica Pfeifer (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. New York: Routledge.
    There are two central questions concerning probability. First, what are its formal features? That is a mathematical question, to which there is a standard, widely (though not universally) agreed upon answer. This answer is reviewed in the next section. Second, what sorts of things are probabilities---what, that is, is the subject matter of probability theory? This is a philosophical question, and while the mathematical theory of probability certainly bears on it, the answer must come from elsewhere. To see why, observe (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Bayes' theorem.James Joyce - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Bayes' Theorem is a simple mathematical formula used for calculating conditional probabilities. It figures prominently in subjectivist or Bayesian approaches to epistemology, statistics, and inductive logic. Subjectivists, who maintain that rational belief is governed by the laws of probability, lean heavily on conditional probabilities in their theories of evidence and their models of empirical learning. Bayes' Theorem is central to these enterprises both because it simplifies the calculation of conditional probabilities and because it clarifies significant features of subjectivist position. Indeed, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • (1 other version)Interpretations of probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   162 citations  
  • Compendium of the foundations of classical statistical physics.Jos Uffink - 2006 - In J. Butterfield & J. Earman (eds.), Handbook of the philosophy of physics. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Roughly speaking, classical statistical physics is the branch of theoretical physics that aims to account for the thermal behaviour of macroscopic bodies in terms of a classical mechanical model of their microscopic constituents, with the help of probabilistic assumptions. In the last century and a half, a fair number of approaches have been developed to meet this aim. This study of their foundations assesses their coherence and analyzes the motivations for their basic assumptions, and the interpretations of their central concepts. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   99 citations  
  • Objectively homogeneous reference classes.Wesley C. Salmon - 1977 - Synthese 36 (4):399 - 414.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Probabilities for two properties.Patrick Maher - 2000 - Erkenntnis 52 (1):63-91.
    Let R(X, B) denote the class of probability functions that are defined on algebra X and that represent rationally permissible degrees of certainty for a person whose total relevant background evidence is B. This paper is concerned with characterizing R(X, B) for the case in whichX is an algebra of propositions involving two properties and B is empty. It proposes necessary conditions for a probability function to be in R(X, B), some of which involve the notion of statistical dependence. The (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  • The preface paradox revisited.Igor Douven - 2003 - Erkenntnis 59 (3):389 - 420.
    The Preface Paradox has led many philosophers to believe that, if it isassumed that high probability is necessary for rational acceptability, the principleaccording to which rational acceptability is closed under conjunction (CP)must be abandoned. In this paper we argue that the paradox is far less damaging to CP than is generally believed. We describe how, given certain plausibleassumptions, in a large class of cases in which CP seems to lead tocontradiction, it does not do so after all. A restricted version (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • Representation theorems and realism about degrees of belief.Lyle Zynda - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):45-69.
    The representation theorems of expected utility theory show that having certain types of preferences is both necessary and sufficient for being representable as having subjective probabilities. However, unless the expected utility framework is simply assumed, such preferences are also consistent with being representable as having degrees of belief that do not obey the laws of probability. This fact shows that being representable as having subjective probabilities is not necessarily the same as having subjective probabilities. Probabilism can be defended on the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   50 citations  
  • On the strong law of large numbers in quantum probability theory.W. Ochs - 1977 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):473 - 480.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Varieties of Bayesianism.Jonathan Weisberg - 2011
    Handbook of the History of Logic, vol. 10, eds. Dov Gabbay, Stephan Hartmann, and John Woods, forthcoming.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  • The reference class problem is your problem too.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Synthese 156 (3):563--585.
    The reference class problem arises when we want to assign a probability to a proposition (or sentence, or event) X, which may be classified in various ways, yet its probability can change depending on how it is classified. The problem is usually regarded as one specifically for the frequentist interpretation of probability and is often considered fatal to it. I argue that versions of the classical, logical, propensity and subjectivist interpretations also fall prey to their own variants of the reference (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   113 citations  
  • Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.
    – We offer a new motivation for imprecise probabilities. We argue that there are propositions to which precise probability cannot be assigned, but to which imprecise probability can be assigned. In such cases the alternative to imprecise probability is not precise probability, but no probability at all. And an imprecise probability is substantially better than no probability at all. Our argument is based on the mathematical phenomenon of non-measurable sets. Non-measurable propositions cannot receive precise probabilities, but there is a natural (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Comparativism and the Measurement of Partial Belief.Edward Elliott - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2843-2870.
    According to comparativism, degrees of belief are reducible to a system of purely ordinal comparisons of relative confidence. (For example, being more confident that P than that Q, or being equally confident that P and that Q.) In this paper, I raise several general challenges for comparativism, relating to (i) its capacity to illuminate apparently meaningful claims regarding intervals and ratios of strengths of belief, (ii) its capacity to draw enough intuitively meaningful and theoretically relevant distinctions between doxastic states, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • The normative status of logic.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Stanford Enyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • (1 other version)VI-B ayesian E xpressivism.Seth Yalcin - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):123-160.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   61 citations  
  • The Tale of Bella and Creda.Scott Sturgeon - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
    Some philosophers defend the view that epistemic agents believe by lending credence. Others defend the view that such agents lend credence by believing. It can strongly appear that the disagreement between them is notational, that nothing of substance turns on whether we are agents of one sort or the other. But that is demonstrably not so. Only one of these types of epistemic agent, at most, could manifest a human-like configuration of attitudes; and it turns out that not both types (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Stochastic microcausality in relativistic quantum mechanics.D. P. Greenwood & E. Prugovečki - 1984 - Foundations of Physics 14 (9):883-906.
    A recently formulated concept of stochastic localizability is shown to be consistent with a concept of stochastic microcausality, which avoids the conclusions of Hegerfeldt's no-go theorem as to the inconsistency of sharp localizability of quantum particles and Einstein causality. The proposed localizability on quantum space-time is shown to lead to strict asymptotic causality. For finite time evolutions, upper bounds on propagation to the exterior of stochastic light cones are derived which show that the resulting probabilities are too small to be (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Chaos, quantization, and the correspondence principle.Robert W. Batterman - 1991 - Synthese 89 (2):189 - 227.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • The scrambling theorem: A simple proof of the logical possibility of spectrum inversion.Donald D. Hoffman - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):31-45.
    The possibility of spectrum inversion has been debated since it was raised by Locke and is still discussed because of its implications for functionalist theories of conscious experience . This paper provides a mathematical formulation of the question of spectrum inversion and proves that such inversions, and indeed bijective scramblings of color in general, are logically possible. Symmetries in the structure of color space are, for purposes of the proof, irrelevant. The proof entails that conscious experiences are not identical with (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • (1 other version)Imprecise Probabilities.Seamus Bradley - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   47 citations  
  • Functional Thought Experiments.Denny Borsboom, Gideon J. Mellenbergh & Jaap Van Heerden - 2002 - Synthese 130 (3):379-387.
    The literature on thought experiments has been mainly concernedwith thought experiments that are directed at a theory, be it in aconstructive or a destructive manner. This has led somephilosophers to argue that all thought experiments can beformulated as arguments. The aim of this paper is to drawattention to a type of thought experiment that is not directed ata theory, but fulfills a specific function within a theory. Suchthought experiments are referred to as functional thoughtexperiments, and they are routinely used in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations