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  1. Do Humans Have Two Systems to Track Beliefs and Belief-Like States?Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Ian A. Apperly - 2009 - Psychological Review 116 (4):953-970.
    The lack of consensus on how to characterize humans’ capacity for belief reasoning has been brought into sharp focus by recent research. Children fail critical tests of belief reasoning before 3 to 4 years (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983), yet infants apparently pass false belief tasks at 13 or 15 months (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007). Non-human animals also fail critical tests of belief reasoning but can show very complex social behaviour (e.g., (...)
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  • Action Experience Alters 3-Month-Old Infants' Perception of Others' Actions.Jessica A. Sommerville, Amanda L. Woodward & Amy Needham - 2005 - Cognition 96 (1):1-11.
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  • Beliefs About Beliefs: Representation and Constraining Function of Wrong Beliefs in Young Children's Understanding of Deception.H. Wimmer - 1983 - Cognition 13 (1):103-128.
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  • Eighteen-Month-Old Infants Show False Belief Understanding in an Active Helping Paradigm.David Buttelmann, Malinda Carpenter & Michael Tomasello - 2009 - Cognition 112 (2):337-342.
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  • Young Children's Reasoning About Beliefs.Henry M. Wellman & Karen Bartsch - 1988 - Cognition 30 (3):239-277.
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  • From Simple Desires to Ordinary Beliefs: The Early Development of Everyday Psychology.Henry M. Wellman & Jacqueline D. Woolley - 1990 - Cognition 35 (3):245-275.
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  • Can an Agent’s False Belief Be Corrected by an Appropriate Communication? Psychological Reasoning in 18-Month-Old Infants.Hyun-joo Song, Kristine H. Onishi, Renée Baillargeon & Cynthia Fisher - 2008 - Cognition 109 (3):295-315.
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  • Understanding the Representational Mind.Josef Perner - 1991 - Cambridge: MIT Press.
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  • False-Belief Understanding in Infants.Renée Baillargeon, Rose M. Scott & Zijing He - 2010 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):110-118.
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  • How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind.Stephen A. Butterfill & Ian A. Apperly - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (5):606-637.
    What could someone represent that would enable her to track, at least within limits, others' perceptions, knowledge states and beliefs including false beliefs? An obvious possibility is that she might represent these very attitudes as such. It is sometimes tacitly or explicitly assumed that this is the only possible answer. However, we argue that several recent discoveries in developmental, cognitive, and comparative psychology indicate the need for other, less obvious possibilities. Our aim is to meet this need by describing the (...)
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  • Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
    This is a welcome reprint of a book that continues to grow in importance.
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  • Shared Cooperative Activity.Michael E. Bratman - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):327-341.
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  • Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - Cambridge University Press.
    John Searle's Speech Acts and Expression and Meaning developed a highly original and influential approach to the study of language. But behind both works lay the assumption that the philosophy of language is in the end a branch of the philosophy of the mind: speech acts are forms of human action and represent just one example of the mind's capacity to relate the human organism to the world. The present book is concerned with these biologically fundamental capacities, and, though third (...)
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  • No Norm Needed: On the Aim of Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):499–516.
    Does transparency in doxastic deliberation entail a constitutive norm of correctness governing belief, as Shah and Velleman argue? No, because this presupposes an implausibly strong relation between normative judgements and motivation from such judgements, ignores our interest in truth, and cannot explain why we pay different attention to how much justification we have for our beliefs in different contexts. An alternative account of transparency is available: transparency can be explained by the aim one necessarily adopts in deliberating about whether to (...)
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  • Pretending and Believing: Issues in the Theory of ToMM.Alan M. Leslie - 1994 - Cognition 50 (1-3):211-238.
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  • Core Mechanisms in ‘Theory of Mind’.Alan M. Leslie, Ori Friedman & Tim P. German - 2004 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (12):528-533.
    Our ability to understand the thoughts and feelings of other people does not initially develop as a theory but as a mechanism. The ‘ theory of mind ’ mechanism is part of the core architecture of the human brain, and is specialized for learning about mental states. Impaired development of this mechanism can have drastic effects on social learning, seen most strikingly in the autistic spectrum disorders. ToMM kick-starts belief–desire attribution but effective reasoning about belief contents depends on a process (...)
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  • Agency its Role in Mental Development.James Russell - 1996
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  • Mindreaders: The Cognitive Basis of "Theory of Mind".Ian Apperly - 2010 - Psychology Press.
    Introduction -- Evidence from children -- Evidence form infants and non-human animals -- Evidence from neuroimaging and neuropsychology -- Evidence from adults -- The cognitive basis of mindreading -- Elaborating and applying the theory.
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  • Weighing the Aim of Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):395-405.
    The theory of belief, according to which believing that p essentially involves having as an aim or purpose to believe that p truly, has recently been criticised on the grounds that the putative aim of belief does not interact with the wider aims of believers in the ways we should expect of genuine aims. I argue that this objection to the aim theory fails. When we consider a wider range of deliberative contexts concerning beliefs, it becomes obvious that the aim (...)
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  • The Causal Organisation of Emotional Knowledge: A Developmental Study.Nancy L. Stein & Linda J. Levine - 1989 - Cognition and Emotion 3 (4):343-378.
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