The study of mediated action focuses on how humans use cultural tools, or mediational means (terms used interchangeably), when engaging in various forms of action. The cultural tools involved may range from simple mnemonic devices, such as marks on a stone, to natural language and computers, and the kind of action involved may be socially distributed or carried out by individuals.

This article argues that Habermas and Honneth's respective critical social theories contain elements which, although largely concealed, can be unearthed, consolidated and developed for the purposes of constructing a timely kind of cognitive sociology. The proposed departure attempts to draw out and build on the strengths of both authors, however divergent and opposed their social theories might appear. Amidst all the differences between them, the common core elements in their respective language-theoretical and recognition-theoretical versions of critical theory provide the means (...) for devising a theoretical innovation that goes beyond both, yet remains within the metatheoretical parameters of critical theory encapsulated by its key concept of immanent transcendence. (shrink)

In the early 20th century, Marxist theory was enriched and rejuvenated by adopting the concept of reification, introduced by the Hungarian theorist Georg Lukács to identify and denounce the transformation of historical processes into ahistorical entities, human actions into things that seemed part of an immutable "second nature." For a variety of reasons, both theoretical and practical, the hopes placed in de-reification as a tool of revolutionary emancipation proved vain. In these original and imaginative essays, delivered as the Tanner Lectures (...) at the University of California, Berkeley in 2005, the distinguished third-generation Frankfurt School philosopher Axel Honneth attempts to rescue the concept of reification by recasting it in terms of the philosophy of recognition he has been developing over the past two decades. Three distinguished political and social theorists: Judith Butler, Raymond Geuss, and Jonathan Lear, respond with hard questions about the central anthropological premise of his argument, the assumption that prior to cognition there is a fundamental experience of intersubjective recognition that can provide a normative standard by which current social relations can be judged wanted. Honneth listens carefully to their criticism and provides a powerful defense of his position. (shrink)

Biological brains are first and foremost the control systems for biological bodies. Biological bodies move and act in rich real‐world surroundings. These apparently mundane facts are amongst the main driving forces behind a growing movement within cognitive science – a movement that seeks to reorient the scientific study of mind so as to better accommodate the roles of embodiment and environmental embedding.

This article makes five main points. Individual human consciousness is formed in the dynamic interrelation of self and other, and therefore is inherently intersubjective. The concrete encounter of self and other fundamentally involves empathy, under- stood as a unique and irreducible kind of intentionality. Empathy is the precondi- tion of the science of consciousness. Human empathy.

In einem Brief nennt Adorno die "Negative Dialektik" kurz nach ihrem Erscheinen unter seinen Schriften "das philosophische Hauptwerk, wenn ich so sagen darf“. Dieser herausgehobenen Bedeutung, die das Werk für Adorno hatte, entspricht nicht nur die lange Zeit, die er mit der Abfassung des Buchs beschäftigt war, sondern auch die lange Geschichte, die ihre zentralen Motive in seinem Denken haben. Philosophische Begriffsklärung, die Arbeit an "Begriff und Kategorien“ einer negativen Dialektik, versteht Adorno dabei als dialektischen Übergang in inhaltliches Denken – (...) und so betreibt er sie auch hier. Das hat Konsequenzen für die Form des kooperativen Kommentars, der in diesem Band versucht wird. Adornos "Negative Dialektik" zu kommentieren, kann nur in dem Bewußtsein der unüberbrückbaren Kluft gelingen, die den Kommentar von diesem Text trennt. (shrink)

In his preface to the English edition, Apel (identified with critical theory) explains that the title of his two-volume German collection connotes both a reconstruction of the process of hermeneutic transformation in recent philosophy and the author's semiotical transformation of transcendental logic. The emphasis here is on the latter with discussions of the a priori nature of language per Wittgenstein, Peirce, and Chomsky, and its implications for a rational foundation for ethics in modern science. Includes a new foreword. Name index (...) only. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR. (shrink)