- Epistemic Injustice.Rachel McKinnon - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (8):437-446.details
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Steering Clear of Bullshit? The Problem of Obscurantism.Viktor Ivanković - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (2):531-546.details
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Extracted Speech.Rachel Ann McKinney - 2016 - Social Theory and Practice 42 (2):258-284.details
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Turning up the lights on gaslighting.Kate Abramson - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):1-30.details
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Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression.Kristie Dotson - 2014 - Social Epistemology 28 (2):115-138.details
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Lying, Deceiving, and Misleading.Andreas Stokke - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (4):348-359.details
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Lies and deception: an unhappy divorce.Jennifer Lackey - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):236-248.details
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Performative Force, Convention, and Discursive Injustice.Rebecca Kukla - 2014 - Hypatia 29 (2):440-457.details
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Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Toward a Theory of Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance.Gaile Pohlhaus - 2012 - Hypatia 27 (4):715-735.details
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Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing.Kristie Dotson - 2011 - Hypatia 26 (2):236-257.details
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Bald-faced lies! Lying without the intent to deceive.Roy Sorensen - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):251-264.details
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The definition of lying.Thomas L. Carson - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):284–306.details
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To what extent is racism a magical transformation? An existential-phenomenological perspective on racism and anti-racism.Bart Van Leeuwen - 2007 - Journal of Social Philosophy 38 (2):292–310.details
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Disinformation: The use of false information. [REVIEW]James H. Fetzer - 2004 - Minds and Machines 14 (2):231-240.details
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What Is Lying.Don Fallis - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (1):29-56.details
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Affective injustice and fundamental affective goods.Francisco Gallegos - 2021 - Journal of Social Philosophy 53 (2):185-201.details
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A unified account of information, misinformation, and disinformation.Sille Obelitz Søe - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5929-5949.details
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Anticipatory Epistemic Injustice.Ji-Young Lee - 2021 - Tandf: Social Epistemology 35 (6):564–576.details
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In hate we trust: The collectivization and habitualization of hatred.Thomas Szanto - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (3):453-480.details
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Anger, Affective Injustice, and Emotion Regulation.Alfred Archer & Georgina Mills - 2019 - Philosophical Topics 47 (2):75-94.details
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Affective Intentionality and Affective Injustice: Merleau‐Ponty and Fanon on the Body Schema as a Theory of Affect.Shiloh Whitney - 2018 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 56 (4):488-515.details
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In hate we trust: The collectivization and habitualization of hatred.Thomas Szanto - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-28.details
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Collaborative Irrationality, Akrasia, and Groupthink: Social Disruptions of Emotion Regulation.Thomas Szanto - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7:1-17.details
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The Aptness of Anger.Amia Srinivasan - 2018 - Journal of Political Philosophy 26 (2):123-144.details
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Truth and Truthfulness An Essay in Genealogy.Bernard Williams - 2002 - Philosophy 78 (305):411-414.details
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Bad Faith is Necessarily Social.Matthew C. Eshleman - 2008 - Sartre Studies International 14 (2):40-47.details
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On letting it slide.Scott Kimbrough - 2006 - In Hardcastle Reisch (ed.), Bullshit and Philosophy. Open Court. pp. 3--18.details
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Lying, misleading, and what is said: an exploration in philosophy of language and in ethics.Jennifer Mather Saul - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Authenticity and others: Sartre's ethics of recognition.T. Storm Heter - 2006 - Sartre Studies International 12 (2):17-43.details
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On Bullshit.Harry Frankfurt - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):300-301.details
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Knowledge-lies.Roy Sorensen - 2010 - Analysis 70 (4):608-615.details
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On Bullshit.Harry Frankfurt - 1986 - Raritan 6 (2):81-100.details
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Bullshit and dogmatism : a discourse analytical perspective.Chris Heffer - 2021 - In Alessandra Tanesini & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives. London, UK: Routledge.details
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Is Bad Faith Necessarily Social?Ronald Santoni - 2008 - Sartre Studies International 14:23-39.details
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What lies behind misspeaking.Roy Sorensen - 2011 - American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (4):399.details
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A P.S. on B.S.: Some Remarks on Humbug and Bullshit.Michael Wreen - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (1-2):105-115.details
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Is bad faith necessarily social?Ronald E. Santoni - 2008 - Sartre Studies International 14 (2):23-39.details
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Aspects of a theory of bullshit.Jörg Meibauer - 2016 - Pragmatics Cognition 23 (1):68-91.details
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Objective falsity is essential to lying: an argument from convergent evidence.John Turri - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):2101-2109.details
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Racist Variations of Bad Faith: A Critical Study of Lewis Gordon’s Phenomenology of Racism.Bart van Leeuwen - 2008 - Social Theory and Practice 34 (1):49-69.details
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Racist Variations of Bad Faith: A Critical Study of Lewis Gordon’s Phenomenology of Racism.Bart van Leeuwen - 2008 - Social Theory and Practice 34 (1):49-69.details
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Authenticity and Others: Sartre's Ethics of Recognition.T. Storm Heter - 2006 - Sartre Studies International 12 (2):17-43.details
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Bad faith is necessarily social.Matthew C. Eshleman - 2008 - Sartre Studies International 14 (2):40-47.details
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Sartre's Political Theory.William L. Mcbride - 1996 - Studies in East European Thought 48 (2):292-296.details
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