- Stealing Harman’s Thought: knowledge saboteurs and dogmatists.Roy Sorensen - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1787-1799.details
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Can You Lie Without Intending to Deceive?Vladimir Krstić - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):642–660.details
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You don't say! Lying, asserting and insincerity.Neri Marsili - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Sheffielddetails
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Lying, risk and accuracy.Sam Fox Krauss - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):726-734.details
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Lying and Certainty.Neri Marsili - 2018 - In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford Handbooks. pp. 170-182.details
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Reply to Roy Sorensen, 'Knowledge-lies'.Julia Staffel - 2011 - Analysis 71 (2):300-302.details
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The Definition of Lying and Deception.James Edwin Mahon - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Knowledge and Evidence You Should Have Had.Matthew A. Benton - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):471-479.details
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Privacy and lack of knowledge.Don Fallis - 2013 - Episteme 10 (2):153-166.details
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Indeterminate actuality and the open future.Roberto Loss - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):248-260.details
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Beyond belief: On disinformation and manipulation.Keith Raymond Harris - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.details
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The myth of true lies.Jesper Kallestrup - 2023 - Theoria 89 (4):451-466.details
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Lying: revisiting the ‘intending to deceive’ condition.Vladimir Krstić - 2023 - Analysis.details
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Group Assertions and Group Lies.Neri Marsili - 2023 - Topoi 42 (2):369-384.details
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Bald-Faced Lies, Blushing, and Noses that Grow: An Experimental Analysis.Vladimir Krstić & Alexander Wiegmann - 2022 - Erkenntnis 89 (2):479-502.details
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Lying, Tell-Tale Signs, and Intending to Deceive.Vladimir Krstic - forthcoming - Dialectica:1-27.details
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Lying, speech acts, and commitment.Neri Marsili - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3245-3269.details
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Group Belief: Lessons from Lies and Bullshit.I.—Jennifer Lackey - 2020 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 94 (1):185-208.details
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Lying and knowing.Ben Holguín - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5351-5371.details
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Deception (Under Uncertainty) as a Kind of Manipulation.Vladimir Krstić & Chantelle Saville - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):830-835.details
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Is Classical Mathematics Appropriate for Theory of Computation?Farzad Didehvar - manuscriptdetails
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Knowledge‐lies re‐examined.Vladimir Krstić - 2017 - Ratio 31 (3):312-320.details
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Lying, Belief, and Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2018 - In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford Handbooks. pp. 120-133.details
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On the Connection between Lying, Asserting, and Intending to Cause Beliefs.Vladimir Krstic - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Alternative motivation and lies.Andrew Sneddon - 2021 - Analysis 81 (1):46-52.details
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On the nature of indifferent lies, a reply to Rutschmann and Wiegmann.Vladimir Krstić - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (5):757-771.details
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Bullshit activities.Kenny Easwaran - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.details
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Disagreement with a bald‐faced liar.Teresa Marques - 2020 - Ratio 33 (4):255-268.details
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Don’t be deceived: bald-faced lies are deceitful assertions.Jakub Rudnicki & Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-21.details
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Epistemically exploitative bullshit: A Sartrean account.Thomas Szanto - 2023 - European Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):711-730.details
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Lies and deception: an unhappy divorce.Jennifer Lackey - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):236-248.details
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¿Se atrapa antes a un mentiroso que a un cojo? Mentira, engaño, sinceridad y verdad en Los ensayos de Michel de Montaigne.Vicente Raga Rosaleny - 2021 - Ideas Y Valores 70 (177):153-171.details
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What Liars Can Tell Us about the Knowledge Norm of Practical Reasoning.Don Fallis - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):347-367.details
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Lies Matter.Chris Mills - 2019 - Law and Philosophy 38 (5):453-464.details
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The value of common knowledge.Allan Hazlett - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-18.details
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La conceptualización de la mentira en tiempos de la posverdad.Juan Antonio González de Requena Farré - 2019 - Universitas Philosophica 36 (72):97-123.details
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Lies, damned lies, and statistics: An empirical investigation of the concept of lying.Adam J. Arico & Don Fallis - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (6):790 - 816.details
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