Responds to the article by Brad Brown and Susan Perry in the August 1995 issue of `Business & Society' periodical on the measure of corporate social responsibility (CSP).

This article presents an integrative conceptual framework for linking corporate social performance, stakeholders, and quality of management, then tests this framework empirically. Results provide strong support for the hypothesis that perceived quality of management can be explained by the quality of performance with respect to specific primary stakeholders: owners, employees, customers, and (marginally) communities, but treatment of ecological environmental considera- tions is not a significant factor.

This article provides empirical results indicating that acting in a socially respon- sible and lawful manner is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for increasing shareholder wealth. It meta-analyzes 27 event studies that have mea- sured the stock market's reaction to incidences of socially irresponsible and illicit behavior. It finds that for firms engaging in socially irresponsible and illicit behavior, the effect on shareholder wealth is negative (wealth decreases), statisti- cally significant (p <.001), and so substantial in size (D = (...) -.932) that the distribution of abnormal returns is shifted nearly a full standard deviation to the left (i.e., negatively) from their expected standard normal distribution. This result gives rationally self-interested firms a self-interested reason to act in a socially responsible and law-abiding manner. It also provides support for a moral position called enlightened self-interest, which prescribes that firms should act in a socially responsible manner to promote the shareholders' interests. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to enter the conversation about stakeholder theory with the goal of clarifying certain foundational issues. I want to show, along with Boatright, that there is no stakeholder paradox, and that the principle on which such a paradox is built, the Separation Thesis, is nicely self-serving to business and ethics academics. If we give up such a thesis we find there is no stakeholder theory but that stakeholder theory becomes a genre that is quite rich. (...) It becomes one of many ways to blend together the central concepts of business with those of ethics. Rather than take each concept of business singly or the whole of “business” together and hold it to the light of ethical standards, we can use the stakeholder concept to create more fine-grained analyses that combine business and ethics; or more simply, we can tell many more, and more interesting, stories about business. (shrink)

Milton Friedman has argued that corporations have no responsibility to society beyond that of obeying the law and maximizing profits for shareholders. Individuals may have social responsibilities according to Friedman, but not corporations.When executives make contributions to address social problems in the name of the corporation, they are doing so with other people''s (shareholders'') money. The responsibility of corporate executives is a fiduciary one, to serve as an agent for the corporation''s shareholders, and to uphold shareholders'' trust, which requires executives (...) to maximize the return to their shareholders, who can then, if they choose, contribute their own money to worthy causes. (shrink)

The paper suggests replacing the shareholder/stakeholder distinction with a “Dual-Investor” model of business: stockowners provide the specific capital for business ventures, while society provides the “opportunity capital.” Thus society is an investor in every business venture. Dual-Investor theory provides a response (based purely on the ethics of investment) to Milton Friedman’s arguments that executives should maximize profit by any legal means, avoids recent criticisms by Kenneth Goodpaster and Thomas McMahon, and suggests that the dichotomy between private and public ownership overlooks (...) several important alternatives. Some consequences of the theory are detailed and a sketch of a theory of property, based on Dual-Investor theory, is appended. (shrink)

In his presentation at the 1993 Society of Business Ethics conference, Ed Freeman offered a provocative explanation for why the normative core of business and society (B&S) research is perceived as fundamentally at odds with the pervasive wisdom on business and the academic literature on management (e.g., "business ethics is an oxymoron"). He termed this explanation the separation thesis. This article explores the possibility that the separation thesis captures a pervasively held view about corporations, even among B &S researchers. To (...) support this claim, the author looks at whether three value dichotomies, which provide the conceptual underpinnings of the separation thesis, are prevalent in the literature. The article provides evidence from the literatures in ethics, corporate social responsibility/ performance, and wider management issues to support its claims, and then looks at alternative possibilities for developing inquiry to avoid the pitfalls of these value dichotomies and, therefore, the separation thesis. (shrink)