We describe a “centipede’s dilemma” that faces the sciences of human interaction. Research on human interaction has been involved in extensive theoretical debate, although the vast majority of research tends to focus on a small set of human behaviors, cognitive processes, and interactive contexts. The problem is that naturalistic human interaction must integrate all of these factors simultaneously, and grander theoretical mitigation cannot come only from focused experimental or computational agendas. We look to dynamical systems theory as a framework for (...) thinking about how these multiple behaviors, processes, and contexts can be integrated into a broader account of human interaction. By introducing and utilizing basic concepts of self-organization and synergy, we review empirical work that shows how human interaction is flexible and adaptive and structures itself incrementally during unfolding interactive tasks, such as conversation, or more focused goal-based contexts. We end on acknowledging that dynamical systems accounts are very short on concrete models, and we briefly describe ways that theoretical frameworks could be integrated, rather than endlessly disputed, to achieve some success on the centipede’s dilemma of human interaction. (shrink)

Once assessments and continuers are focussed on as distinguishable phenomena it becomes clear that they differ from each other not just in the details of their sequential placement within an extended turn, but in other significant ways as well.First, though assessments can take the form of talk with clear lexical content (for example `Oh wow' and assessment adjectives such as ‘beautiful’), they can also be done with sounds such as ‘Ah:::’ whose main function seems to be the carrying of an (...) appropriate intonation contour, as well as gesturally (cf. M. Goodwin, 1980). In this they resemble continuers, which can be performed both with talk whose lexical status is not always granted, and with appropriate gestures such as nods. In view of the way in which both continuers and brief assessments are characteristically situated within a rather specialized environment, the ongoing talk of another, it is not surprising that they share these characteristics. Indeed in so far as these features provide minimal lexical and auditory interference with the other talk already in progress, they are precisely some of the adaptations that would be expected of action able to function in such an environment. Given such structural similarity in action that is also quite brief, the clarity with which assessments can be distinguished from continuers becomes interesting. If in fact these objects are doing different work in the same environment, the salience of their distinctness from each other becomes an important feature of the structure of each. In view of the economy and clarity that brief assessments require, it is all the more remarkable that many of them, through the details of the way in which they are pronounced and their intonation contour, are able to convey quite detailed, even intricate, information about their speaker's involvement in both the assessment and the talk of the moment.Second, while ‘uh huh’ seems to be restricted to placement in the midst of extended talk by another, assessments can occur at the completion of such extended turns as well. Indeed assessments are one of the prototypical ways of bringing an extended turn such as a story to completion. Such differential placement is quite compatible with what has already been noted about the organization of these phenomena. For example, insofar as a continuer treats the talk just heard as preliminary to further talk it would be quite inappropriate as a technique for marking completion of an extended turn. On the other hand by virtue of the way in which they appreciate the details of what has just been said without marking that talk as a prelude to something else, assessments are apt structures for doing terminal work on an extended sequence.Third, ‘uh huh’ seems to be an exclusively recipient action — indeed its work as a continuer is accomplished precisely through placement relative to more extended talk by another speaker. Assessments, however, can be done by speaker as well as recipient.Fourth, though analysis in the present paper has focussed on brief assessments (the type of assessment most similar in form to continuers), assessments unlike continuers can in fact take many shapes, some of them quite elaborate with, for example, extended sentences and even sequences of turns being devoted exclusively to the activity of doing an assessment.In sum, alternative types of action are available to recipients for constructing responses in the midst of another's extended talk. Though the responses themselves are typically brief, the presence of alternatives that can be placed in a variety of sequential positions provides recipients with resources that enable them to participate in speaker's emerging talk in a differentiated fashion, something which has consequences for speaker's actions as well. (shrink)

As yet, there is no enactive account of social cognition. This paper extends the enactive concept of sense-making into the social domain. It takes as its departure point the process of interaction between individuals in a social encounter. It is a well-established finding that individuals can and generally do coordinate their movements and utterances in such situations. We argue that the interaction process can take on a form of autonomy. This allows us to reframe the problem of social cognition as (...) that of how meaning is generated and transformed in the interplay between the unfolding interaction process and the individuals engaged in it. The notion of sense-making in this realm becomes participatory sense-making. The onus of social understanding thus moves away from strictly the individual only. (shrink)

Theory of mind explanations of how we know other minds are limited in several ways. First, they construe intersubjective relations too narrowly in terms of the specialized cognitive abilities of explaining and predicting another person's mental states and behaviors. Second, they sometimes draw conclusions about secondperson interaction from experiments designed to test third-person observation of another's behavior. As a result, the larger claims that are sometimes made for theory of mind, namely, that theory of mind is our primary and pervasive (...) means for understanding other persons, go beyond both the phenomenological and the scientific evidence. I argue that the interpretation of "primary intersubjectivity" as merely precursory to theory of mind is inadequate. Rather, primary intersubjectivity, understood as a set of embodied practices and capabilities, is not only primary in a developmental sense, but is the primary way we continue to understand others in second-person interactions. (shrink)

For people to contribute to discourse, they must do more than utter the right sentence at the right time. The basic requirement is that they add to their common ground in an orderly way. To do this, we argue, they try to establish for each utterance the mutual belief that the addressees have understood what the speaker meant well enough for current purposes. This is accomplished by the collective actions of the current contributor and his or her partners, and these (...) result in units of conversation called contributions. We present a model of contributions and show how it accounts for a variety of features of everyday conversations. (shrink)

Dialogue has its origins in joint activities, which it serves to coordinate. Joint activities, in turn, usually emerge in hierarchically nested projects and subprojects. We propose that participants use dialogue to coordinate two kinds of transitions in these joint projects: vertical transitions, or entering and exiting joint projects; and horizontal transitions, or continuing within joint projects. The participants help signal these transitions with project markers, words such as uh-huh, m-hm, yeah, okay, or all right. These words have been studied mainly (...) as signals of listener feedback (back-channel signals) or turn-taking devices (acknowledgment tokens). We present evidence from several types of well-defined tasks that they are also part of a system of contrasts specialized for navigating joint projects. Uh-huh, m-hm and yeah are used for horizontal transitions, and okay and all right for vertical transitions. (shrink)

Our target article proposed that language production and comprehension are interwoven, with speakers making predictions of their own utterances and comprehenders making predictions of other people's utterances at different linguistic levels. Here, we respond to comments about such issues as cognitive architecture and its neural basis, learning and development, monitoring, the nature of forward models, communicative intentions, and dialogue.

People coordinate body postures and gaze patterns during conversation. We review literature showing that (1) action embodies cognition, (2) postural coordination emerges spontaneously when two people converse, (3) gaze patterns influence postural coordination, (4) gaze coordination is a function of common ground knowledge and visual information that conversants believe they share, and (5) gaze coordination is causally related to mutual understanding. We then consider how coordination, generally, can be understood as temporarily coupled neuromuscular components that function as a collective unit (...) known as a coordinative structure in the motor control literature. We speculate that the coordination of gaze and body sway found in conversation may be understood as a cross‐person coordinative structure that embodies the goals of the joint action system. (shrink)