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  1. The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception: Classic Edition.James J. Gibson - 1979 - Houghton Mifflin.
    This is a book about how we see: the environment around us (its surfaces, their layout, and their colors and textures); where we are in the environment; whether or not we are moving and, if we are, where we are going; what things are good for; how to do things (to thread a needle or drive an automobile); or why things look as they do.The basic assumption is that vision depends on the eye which is connected to the brain. The (...)
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  • The Intentional Stance.Daniel Clement Dennett - 1981 - MIT Press.
    Through the use of such "folk" concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, Daniel Dennett asserts in this first full scale presentation of...
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  • Computation and Cognition: Toward a Foundation for Cognitive Science.Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1984 - Cambridge: MIT Press.
    This systematic investigation of computation and mental phenomena by a noted psychologist and computer scientist argues that cognition is a form of computation, that the semantic contents of mental states are encoded in the same general way as computer representations are encoded. It is a rich and sustained investigation of the assumptions underlying the directions cognitive science research is taking. 1 The Explanatory Vocabulary of Cognition 2 The Explanatory Role of Representations 3 The Relevance of Computation 4 The Psychological Reality (...)
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  • (1 other version)Minds, brains, and programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
    What psychological and philosophical significance should we attach to recent efforts at computer simulations of human cognitive capacities? In answering this question, I find it useful to distinguish what I will call "strong" AI from "weak" or "cautious" AI. According to weak AI, the principal value of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise fashion. (...)
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  • Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content.Daniel D. Hutto & Erik Myin - 2012 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
    In this book, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin promote the cause of a radically enactive, embodied approach to cognition that holds that some kinds of minds -- basic minds -- are neither best explained by processes involving the manipulation of ...
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  • The Rediscovery of the Mind.John R. Searle - 1992 - MIT Press. Edited by Ned Block & Hilary Putnam.
    The title of The Rediscovery of the Mind suggests the question "When was the mind lost?" Since most people may not be aware that it ever was lost, we must also then ask "Who lost it?" It was lost, of course, only by philosophers, by certain philosophers. This passed unnoticed by society at large. The "rediscovery" is also likely to pass unnoticed. But has the mind been rediscovered by the same philosophers who "lost" it? Probably not. John Searle is an (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Facing up to the problem of consciousness.D. J. Chalmers - 1996 - Toward a Science of Consciousness:5-28.
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  • From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds.Daniel Dennett - unknown
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  • (1 other version)Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.Paul M. Churchland - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):67-90.
    Eliminative materialism is the thesis that our common-sense conception of psychological phenomena constitutes a radically false theory, a theory so fundamentally defective that both the principles and the ontology of that theory will eventually be displaced, rather than smoothly reduced, by completed neuroscience. Our mutual understanding and even our introspection may then be reconstituted within the conceptual framework of completed neuroscience, a theory we may expect to be more powerful by far than the common-sense psychology it displaces, and more substantially (...)
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  • Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content.Daniel D. Hutto & Erik Myin - 2017 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press. Edited by Erik Myin.
    An extended argument that cognitive phenomena—perceiving, imagining, remembering—can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. -/- Evolving Enactivism argues that cognitive phenomena—perceiving, imagining, remembering—can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Building on their earlier book Radicalizing Enactivism, which proposes that there can be forms of cognition without content, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin demonstrate the unique explanatory advantages of recognizing that only some forms (...)
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  • The Language of Thought.J. A. Fodor - 1978 - Critica 10 (28):140-143.
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  • Brainstorms.Daniel Dennett - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 47 (2):326-327.
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  • Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False.Thomas Nagel - 2012 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.
    The modern materialist approach to life has conspicuously failed to explain such central mind-related features of our world as consciousness, intentionality, meaning, and value. This failure to account for something so integral to nature as mind, argues philosopher Thomas Nagel, is a major problem, threatening to unravel the entire naturalistic world picture, extending to biology, evolutionary theory, and cosmology. Since minds are features of biological systems that have developed through evolution, the standard materialist version of evolutionary biology is fundamentally incomplete. (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Inquiry.Robert Stalnaker - 1984 - Synthese 79 (1):171-189.
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  • Mental representation.Hartry Field - 1978 - Erkenntnis 13 (July):9-61.
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  • Life, mind, agency: Why Markov blankets fail the test of evolution.Walter Veit & Heather Browning - 2022 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 45:e214.
    There has been much criticism of the idea that Friston's free-energy principle can unite the life and mind sciences. Here, we argue that perhaps the greatest problem for the totalizing ambitions of its proponents is a failure to recognize the importance of evolutionary dynamics and to provide a convincing adaptive story relating free-energy minimization to organismal fitness.
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  • The Natural Origins of Content.Daniel D. Hutto & Glenda Satne - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):521-536.
    We review the current state of play in the game of naturalizing content and analyse reasons why each of the main proposals, when taken in isolation, is unsatisfactory. Our diagnosis is that if there is to be progress two fundamental changes are necessary. First, the point of the game needs to be reconceived in terms of explaining the natural origins of content. Second, the pivotal assumption that intentionality is always and everywhere contentful must be abandoned. Reviving and updating Haugeland’s baseball (...)
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  • (1 other version)Some reflections on language games.Wilfrid Sellars - 1954 - Philosophy of Science 21 (3):204-228.
    1. It seems plausible to say that a language is a system of expressions the use of which is subject to certain rules. It would seem, thus, that learning to use a language is learning to obey the rules for the use of its expressions. However, taken as it stands, this thesis is subject to an obvious and devastating refutation. After formulating this refutation, I shall turn to the constructive task of attempting to restate the thesis in a way which (...)
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  • Agential thinking.Walter Veit - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5):13393-13419.
    In his 2009 monograph, Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection, Peter Godfrey-Smith accuses biologists of demonstrating ‘Darwinian Paranoia’ when they engage in what he dubs ‘agential thinking’. But as Daniel Dennett points out, he offers neither an illuminating set of examples nor an extended argument for this assertion, deeming it to be a brilliant propaganda stroke against what is actually a useful way of thinking. Compared to the dangers of teleological thinking in biology, the dangers of agential thinking have unfortunately rarely (...)
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  • Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 (2):175-182.
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  • Predictive Processing and the Representation Wars.Daniel Williams - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (1):141-172.
    Clark has recently suggested that predictive processing advances a theory of neural function with the resources to put an ecumenical end to the “representation wars” of recent cognitive science. In this paper I defend and develop this suggestion. First, I broaden the representation wars to include three foundational challenges to representational cognitive science. Second, I articulate three features of predictive processing’s account of internal representation that distinguish it from more orthodox representationalist frameworks. Specifically, I argue that it posits a resemblance-based (...)
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  • On computation and cognition: Toward a foundation of cognitive science.Zenon Pylyshyn - 1989 - Artificial Intelligence 38 (2):248-251.
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  • The intentionality all-stars.John Haugeland - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:383-427.
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  • (3 other versions)Beyond Freedom and Dignity.B. F. Skinner - 1974 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 7 (1):58-69.
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  • Freedom and Constraint by Norms.Robert Brandom - 1979 - American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (3):187 - 196.
    In this paper I will examine one way of developing Kant's suggestion that one is free just insofar as he acts according to the dictates of norms or principles. and of his distinction between the Realm of Nature, governed by causes, and the Realm of Freedom, governed by norms and principles. Kant's transcendental machinery—the distinction between Understanding and Reason, the free noumenal self expressed somehow as a causally constrained phenomenal self, and so on—can no longer secure this distinction for us. (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Asserting.Robert Brandom - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (11):766-767.
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  • Mental Representation, Naturalism, and Teleosemantics.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2006 - In Graham Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics: New Philo-sophical Essays. New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    The "teleosemantic" program is part of the attempt to give a naturalistic explanation of the semantic properties of mental representations. The aim is to show how the internal states of a wholly physical agent could, as a matter of objective fact, represent the world beyond them. The most popular approach to solving this problem has been to use concepts of physical correlation with some kinship to those employed in information theory (Dretske 1981, 1988; Fodor 1987, 1990). Teleosemantics, which tries to (...)
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  • (1 other version)Language as Thought and as Communication.Wilfrid Sellars - 2011 - In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (eds.), The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton University Press. pp. 265-285.
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  • Intentional Systems Theory.Daniel Dennett - 2007 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Are cartesian sensations representational?Alison Simmons - 1999 - Noûs 33 (3):347-369.
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  • Mental representation, naturalism, and teleosemantics.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2006 - In Graham Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics: New Philo-sophical Essays. New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    The "teleosemantic" program is part of the attempt to give a naturalistic explanation of the semantic properties of mental representations. The aim is to show how the internal states of a wholly physical agent could, as a matter of objective fact, represent the world beyond them. The most popular approach to solving this problem has been to use concepts of physical correlation with some kinship to those employed in information theory (Dretske 1981, 1988; Fodor 1987, 1990). Teleosemantics, which tries to (...)
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  • Neural representations not needed - no more pleas, please.Daniel D. Hutto & Erik Myin - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):241-256.
    Colombo (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2012) argues that we have compelling reasons to posit neural representations because doing so yields unique explanatory purchase in central cases of social norm compliance. We aim to show that there is no positive substance to Colombo’s plea—nothing that ought to move us to endorse representationalism in this domain, on any level. We point out that exposing the vices of the phenomenological arguments against representationalism does not, on its own, advance the case for representationalism (...)
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  • Descartes and the Puzzle of Sensory Representation.Raffaella De Rosa - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Raffaella De Rosa discusses the theory of sensory perception, especially color perception, offered by Ren Descartes. She offers a detailed overview of the recent literature on the topic and provides a new reading of Descartes' theory; she also raises questions of great interest in the contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science.
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  • The Genealogy of Content or the Future of an Illusion.Alex Rosenberg - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):537-547.
    Eliminativism about intentional content argues for its conclusion from the partial correctness of all three of the theses Hutto and Satne seek to combine: neo-Cartesianism is correct to this extent: if there is intentional content it must originally be mental. Neo-Behaviorism is correct to this extent: attribution of intentional content is basically a heuristic device for predicting the behavior of higher vertebrates. Neo-Pragmatism is right to this extent: the illusion of intentionality in language is the source of the illusion of (...)
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  • How Jerry Fodor slid down the slippery slope to Anti-Darwinism, and how we can avoid the same fate.Alex Rosenberg - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (1):1-17.
    There is only one physically possible process that builds and operates purposive systems in nature: natural selection. What it does is build and operate systems that look to us purposive, goal directed, teleological. There really are not any purposes in nature and no purposive processes ether. It is just one vast network of linked causal chains. Darwinian natural selection is the only process that could produce the appearance of purpose. That is why natural selection must have built and must continually (...)
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  • The Apparent (Ur-)Intentionality of Living Beings and the Game of Content.Katerina Abramova & Mario Villalobos - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):651-668.
    Hutto and Satne, Philosophia propose to redefine the problem of naturalizing semantic content as searching for the origin of content instead of attempting to reduce it to some natural phenomenon. The search is to proceed within the framework of Relaxed Naturalism and under the banner of teleosemiotics which places Ur-intentionality at the source of content. We support the proposed redefinition of the problem but object to the proposed solution. In particular, we call for adherence to Strict Naturalism and replace teleosemiotics (...)
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  • Mental representations: What philosophy leaves out and neuroscience puts in.Anne Jaap Jacobson - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):189-204.
    This paper investigates how "representation" is actually used in some areas in cognitive neuroscience. It is argued that recent philosophy has largely ignored an important kind of representation that differs in interesting ways from the representations that are standardly recognized in philosophy of mind. This overlooked kind of representation does not represent by having intentional contents; rather members of the kind represent by displaying or instantiating features. The investigation is not simply an ethnographic study of the discourse of neuroscientists. If (...)
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  • Introduction: Searching for the Natural Origins of Content: Challenging Research Project or Benighted Quest?Daniel D. Hutto & Glenda Satne - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):505-519.
    This paper introduces this special issue which is focused on its target paper - The Natural Origins of Content. The target paper has had a robust and considered set of fifteen replies; a literal A to Z of papers. This extended introduction explains the background thinking and challenges that motivated the target article's proposed research programme. It also provides a sneak peak preview and navigational aid to the special issue’s contents. Brief highlights of each commentary are provided and they are (...)
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  • Three Concerns about the Origins of Content.Anne Jaap Jacobson - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):625-638.
    In this paper I will present three reservations about the claims made by Hutto and Satnet. First of all, though TNOC is presented as drawing on teleological theories of mental content for a conception of Ur-Intentionaltiy, what is separated out after objectionable claims are removed from teleological accounts may not retain enough to give us directed intelligence. This problem raises a question about what we need in a naturalistic basis for an account of the mental. Secondly, I think that the (...)
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  • A Dilemma or a Challenge? Assessing the All-star Team in a Wider Context.Nikolai Alksnis - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):669-685.
    In their update to Intentionality All-Stars, Hutto and Satne claim that there is currently no satisfactory account for a naturalised conception of content. From this the pair suggest that we need to consider whether content is present in all aspects of intelligence, that is, whether it is content all the way down. Yet if we do not have an acceptable theory of content such a question seems out of place. It seems more appropriate to question whether content itself is the (...)
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  • What should a theory of vision look like?Anne Jaap Jacobson - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):585 – 599.
    This paper argues for two major revisions in the way philosophers standardly think of vision science and vision theories more generally. The first concerns mental representations and the second supervenience. The central result is that the way is cleared for an externalist theory of perception. The framework for such a theory has what are called Aristotelian representations as elements in processes the well-functioning of which is the principal object of a theory of vision.
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  • (2 other versions)Empathy, Primitive Reactions and the Modularity of Emotion.Anne J. Jacobson - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (sup1):95-113.
    Are emotion-producing processes modular? Jerry Fodor, in his classic introduction of the notion of modularity, holds that its most important feature is cognitive impenetrability or information encapsulation. If a process possesses this feature, then, as standardly understood, “what we want or believe makes no difference to how [it] works”.In this paper, we will start with the issue of the cognitive impenetrability of emotion-producing processes. It turns out that, while there is abundant evidence of emotion-producing processes that are not cognitively impenetrable, (...)
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  • (1 other version)Science friction : phenomenology, naturalism and cognitive science.Michael Wheeler - 2013 - In Havi Carel & Darian Meacham (eds.), Phenomenology and Naturalism: Examining the Relationship Between Human Experience and Nature. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
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  • Consciousness Engineered.Michael Graziano - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12):98-115.
    The attention schema theory offers one possible account for how we claim to have consciousness. The theory begins with attention, a mechanistic method of handling data in which some signals are enhanced at the expense of other signals and are more deeply processed. In the theory, the brain does more than just use attention. It also constructs an internal model, or representation, of attention. That internal model contains incomplete, schematic information about what attention is, what the consequences of attention are, (...)
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  • Keeping the world in mind: mental representations and the sciences of the mind.Anne Jaap Jacobson - 2013 - New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Drawing on a wide range of resources, including the history of philosophy, her role as director of a cognitive neuroscience group, and her Wittgensteinian training at Oxford, Jacobson provides fresh views on representation, concepts, perception, action, emotion and belief.
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  • Empathy and Instinct: Cognitive Neuroscience and Folk Psychology.Anne Jaap Jacobson - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (5):467-482.
    Might we have an instinctive tendency to perform helpful actions? This paper explores a model under development in cognitive neuroscience that enables us to understand what instinctive, helpful actions might look like. The account that emerges puts some pressure on key concepts in the philosophical understanding of folk psychology. In developing the contrast, a notion of embodied beliefs is introduced; it arguably fits folk conceptions better than philosophical ones. One upshot is that Humean insights into the role of empathy and (...)
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  • Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism.Bana Bashour (ed.) - 2014
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  • 3 Naturalism and the Linguistic Turn.Paul Horwich - 2013 - In Bana Bashour Hans Muller (ed.), Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and Its Implications. Routledge. pp. 13--37.
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