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Brainstorms

Philosophy of Science 47 (2):326-327 (1980)

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  1. On Evolution of God-Seeking Mind: An Inquiry Into Why Natural Selection Would Favor Imagination and Distortion of Sensory Experience.Conrad Montell - forthcoming - Philosophical Explorations.
    The earliest known products of human imagination appear to express a primordial concern and struggle with thoughts of dying and of death and mortality. I argue that the structures and processes of imagination evolved in that struggle, in response to debilitating anxieties and fearful states that would accompany an incipient awareness of mortality. Imagination evolved to find that which would make the nascent apprehension of death more bearable, to engage in a search for alternative perceptions of death: a search that (...)
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  • Intentionality, Mind and Folk Psychology.Winand H. Dittrich & Stephen E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.
    The comment addresses central issues of a "theory theory" approach as exemplified in Gopnik' and Goldman's BBS-articles. Gopnik, on the one hand, tries to demonstrate that empirical evidence from developmental psychology supports the view of a "theory theory" in which common sense beliefs are constructed to explain ourselves and others. Focusing the informational processing routes possibly involved we would like to argue that his main thesis (e.g. idea of intentionality as a cognitive construct) lacks support at least for two reasons: (...)
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  • Why We Can Still Believe the Error Theory.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4):523-536.
    The error theory is a metaethical theory that maintains that normative judgments are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, and that these properties do not exist. In a recent paper, Bart Streumer argues that it is impossible to fully believe the error theory. Surprisingly, he claims that this is not a problem for the error theorist: even if we can’t fully believe the error theory, the good news is that we can still come close to believing the error theory. In this (...)
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  • Intentionality: Some Lessons From the History of the Problem From Brentano to the Present.Dermot Moran - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):317-358.
    Intentionality (?directedness?, ?aboutness?) is both a central topic in contemporary philosophy of mind, phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, and one of the themes with which both analytic and Continental philosophers have separately engaged starting from Brentano and Edmund Husserl?s ground-breaking Logical Investigations (1901) through Roderick M. Chisholm, Daniel C. Dennett?s The Intentional Stance, John Searle?s Intentionality, to the recent work of Tim Crane, Robert Brandom, Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, among many others. In this paper, I shall review recent discussions (...)
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  • Epistemic Injustice in Healthcare: A Philosophical Analysis.Ian James Kidd & Havi Carel - 2014 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 17 (4):529-540.
    In this paper we argue that ill persons are particularly vulnerable to epistemic injustice in the sense articulated by Fricker. Ill persons are vulnerable to testimonial injustice through the presumptive attribution of characteristics like cognitive unreliability and emotional instability that downgrade the credibility of their testimonies. Ill persons are also vulnerable to hermeneutical injustice because many aspects of the experience of illness are difficult to understand and communicate and this often owes to gaps in collective hermeneutical resources. We then argue (...)
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  • Deflationary Realism: Representation and Idealisation in Cognitive Science.Dimitri Coelho Mollo - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    Debate on the nature of representation in cognitive systems tends to oscillate between robustly realist views and various anti-realist options. I defend an alternative view, deflationary realism, which sees cognitive representation as an offshoot of the extended application to cognitive systems of an explanatory model whose primary domain is public representation use. This extended application, justified by a common explanatory target, embodies idealisations, partial mismatches between model and reality. By seeing representation as part of an idealised model, deflationary realism avoids (...)
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  • Believing, Holding True, and Accepting.Pascal Engel - 1998 - Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):140 – 151.
    Belief is not a unified phenomenon. In this paper I argue, as a number of other riters argue, that one should distinguish a variety of belief-like attitudes: believing proper - a dispositional state which can have degrees - holding true - which can occur without understanding what one believes - and accepting - a practical and contextual attitude that has a role in deliberation and in practical reasoning. Acceptance itself is not a unified attitude. I explore the various relationships and (...)
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  • Are Theories of Imagery Theories of Imagination? An Active Perception Approach to Conscious Mental Content.Nigel J. T. Thomas - 1999 - Cognitive Science 23 (2):207-245.
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  • Parallel Computation and the Mind-Body Problem.Paul Thagard - 1986 - Cognitive Science 10 (3):301-18.
    states are to be understood in terms of their functional relationships to other mental states, not in terms of their material instantiation in any particular kind of hardware. But the argument that material instantiation is irrelevant to functional..
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  • Supervenience and Neuroscience.Pete Mandik - 2011 - Synthese 180 (3):443 - 463.
    The philosophical technical term "supervenience" is frequently used in the philosophy of mind as a concise way of characterizing the core idea of physicalism in a manner that is neutral with respect to debates between reductive physicalists and nonreductive physicalists. I argue against this alleged neutrality and side with reductive physicalists. I am especially interested here in debates between psychoneural reductionists and nonreductive functionalist physicalists. Central to my arguments will be considerations concerning how best to articulate the spirit of the (...)
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  • Psycho-Practice, Psycho-Theory and the Contrastive Case of Autism: How Practices of Mind Become Second-Nature.Victoria McGeer - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):109-132.
    In philosophy, the last thirty years or so has seen a split between 'simulation theorists' and 'theory-theorists', with a number of variations on each side. In general, simulation theorists favour the idea that our knowledge of others is based on using ourselves as a working model of what complex psychological creatures are like. Theory-theorists claim that our knowledge of complex psychological creatures, including ourselves, is theoretical in character and so more like our knowledge of the world in general. The body (...)
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  • A Deductive Argument for the Representational Theory of Thinking.William G. Lycan - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (3):404-420.
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  • A Pragmatic Theory of Truth and Ontology.Stewart Edward Granger - unknown
    At the heart of my pragmatic theory of truth and ontology is a view of the relation between language and reality which I term internal justification: a way of explaining how sentences may have truth-values which we cannot discover without invoking the need for the mystery of a correspondence relation. The epistemology upon which the theory depend~ is fallibilist and holistic ; places heavy reliance on modal idioms ; and leads to the conclusion that current versions of realism and anti-realism (...)
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  • The Meaning of Life, Equality and Eternity.Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu - 2019 - Journal of Ethics 23 (2):223-238.
    We present an analysis of a notion of the meaning of life, according to which our lives have meaning if we spend them intentionally producing what has value for ourselves or others. In this sense our lives can have meaning even if a science-inspired view of the world is correct, and they are only transient phenomena in a vast universe. Our lives are more or less meaningful in this sense due to the difference in value for ourselves and others we (...)
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  • Chronic Sensory Pain.Patricia Kitcher - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):63-64.
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  • The Mind as Neural Software? Understanding Functionalism, Computationalism, and Computational Functionalism.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):269-311.
    Defending or attacking either functionalism or computationalism requires clarity on what they amount to and what evidence counts for or against them. My goalhere is not to evaluatc their plausibility. My goal is to formulate them and their relationship clearly enough that we can determine which type of evidence is relevant to them. I aim to dispel some sources of confusion that surround functionalism and computationalism. recruit recent philosophical work on mechanisms and computation to shed light on them, and clarify (...)
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  • Rules and Representations.Noam Chomsky - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):1-15.
    The book from which these sections are excerpted is concerned with the prospects for assimilating the study of human intelligence and its products to the natural sciences through the investigation of cognitive structures, understood as systems of rules and representations that can be regarded as “mental organs.” These mental structui′es serve as the vehicles for the exercise of various capacities. They develop in the mind on the basis of an innate endowment that permits the growth of rich and highly articulated (...)
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  • Contingencies and Rules.B. F. Skinner - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):607-613.
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  • Negation in Skinner's System.N. E. Wetherick - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):606-607.
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  • The Egg Revealed.William S. Verplanck - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):605-606.
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  • Rule-Governed Behavior in Computational Psychology.Edward P. Stabler - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):604-605.
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  • Operant Analysis of Problem Solving: Answers to Questions You Probably Don't Want to Ask.Robert J. Sternberg - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):605-605.
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  • New Wine in Old Glasses?Joseph M. Scandura - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):602-603.
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  • Response Classes, Operants, and Rules in Problem Solving.Jan G. Rein - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):602-602.
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  • Questions Raised by the Reinforcement Paradigm.Anatol Rapoport - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):601-602.
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  • Problem Solving as a Cognitive Process.Manfred Kochen - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):599-600.
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  • Is There Such a Thing as a Problem Situation?Kjell Raaheim - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):600-601.
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  • Can Skinner Define a Problem?Geir Kaufmann - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):599-599.
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  • Contingencies, Rules, and the “Problem” of Novel Behavior.Pere Julià - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):598-599.
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  • A Case Study of How a Paper Containing Good Ideas, Presented by a Distinguished Scientist, to an Appropriate Audience, Had Almost No Influence at All.Earl Hunt - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):597-598.
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  • Psychology as Moral Rhetoric.Rom Harré - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):595-596.
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  • On Choosing the “Right” Stimulus and Rule.Robin M. Hogarth - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):596-596.
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  • The Microscopic Analysis of Behavior: Toward a Synthesis of Instrumental, Perceptual, and Cognitive Ideas.Stephen Grossberg - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):594-595.
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  • Learning From Instruction.Jerome A. Feldman - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):593-593.
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  • Can We Analyze Skinner's Problem-Solving Behavior in Operant Terms?P. C. Dodwell - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):592-593.
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  • On the Depth and Fit of Behaviorist Explanation.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):591-592.
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  • An Operant Analysis of Problem Solving.B. F. Skinner - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):583-591.
    Behavior that solves a problem is distinguished by the fact that it changes another part of the solver's behavior and is strengthened when it does so. Problem solving typically involves the construction of discriminative stimuli. Verbal responses produce especially useful stimuli, because they affect other people. As a culture formulates maxims, laws, grammar, and science, its members behave more effectively without direct or prolonged contact with the contingencies thus formulated. The culture solves problems for its members, and does so by (...)
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  • Levels of Modeling of Mechanisms of Visually Guided Behavior.Michael A. Arbib - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):407-436.
    Intermediate constructs are required as bridges between complex behaviors and realistic models of neural circuitry. For cognitive scientists in general, schemas are the appropriate functional units; brain theorists can work with neural layers as units intermediate between structures subserving schemas and small neural circuits.After an account of different levels of analysis, we describe visuomotor coordination in terms of perceptual schemas and motor schemas. The interest of schemas to cognitive science in general is illustrated with the example of perceptual schemas in (...)
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  • Reintroducing Group Selection to the Human Behavioral Sciences.David Sloan Wilson & Elliott Sober - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):585-608.
    In both biology and the human sciences, social groups are sometimes treated as adaptive units whose organization cannot be reduced to individual interactions. This group-level view is opposed by a more individualistic one that treats social organization as a byproduct of self-interest. According to biologists, group-level adaptations can evolve only by a process of natural selection at the group level. Most biologists rejected group selection as an important evolutionary force during the 1960s and 1970s but a positive literature began to (...)
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  • How Many Concepts of Consciousness?Ned Block - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):272-287.
    With some help from the commentators, a few adjustments to the characterizations of A-consciousness and P-consciousness can avoid some trivial cases of one without the other. But it still seems that the case for the existence of P without A is stronger than that for A without P. If indeed there can be P without A, but not A without P, this would be a remarkable result that would need explanation.
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  • Feeling of Knowing and Phenomenal Consciousness.Tiziana Zalla & Adriano P. Palma - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):271-272.
    In Feeling of Knowing cases, subjects have a form of consciousness about the presence of a content without having access to it. If this phenomenon can be correctly interpreted as having to do with consciousness, then there would be a P-conscious mental experience which is dissociated from access.
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  • More on Prosopagnosia.Andrew W. Young - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):271-271.
    Some cases of prosopagnosia involve a highly circumscribed loss of A-consciousness. When seen in this way they offer further support for the arguments made in Block's target article.
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  • Should We Continue to Study Consciousness?Richard M. Warren - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):270-271.
    Block has attempted to reduce the confusion and controversy concerning the term “consciousness” by suggesting that there are two forms or types of consciousness, each of which has several characteristics or properties. This suggestion appears to further becloud the topic, however. Perhaps consciousness cannot be defined adequately and should not be considered as a topic that can be studied scientifically.
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  • Consciousness is Not a Natural Kind.J. van Brakel - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):269-270.
    Blocks distinction between “phenomenal feel” consciousness and “thought/cognition” consciousness is a cultural construction. Consciousness is not a natural kind. Some crosscultural data are presented to support this.
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  • Blindsight, Orgasm, and Representational Overlap.Michael Tye - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):268-269.
    It is argued that there is no fallacy in the reasoning in the example of the thirsty blindsight subject, on one reconstruction of that reasoning. Neither the case of orgasm nor the case of a visual versus an auditory experience as of something overheard shows that phenomenal content is not representational.
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  • What is an Agent That It Experiences P-Consciousness? And What is P-Consciousness That It Moves an Agent?Roger N. Shepard - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):267-268.
    If phenomenal consciousness is distinct from the computationally based access-consciousness that controls overt behavior, how can I tell which things enjoy phenomenal consciousness? And if phenomenal consciousness 'plays no role in controlling overt behavior, how do human bodies come to write target articles arguing for the existence of phenomenal consciousness?
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  • Block's Philosophical Anosognosia.G. Rey - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):266-267.
    Block's P-/A-consciousness distinction rules out P's involving a specific kind of cognitive access and commits him to a “strong” Pconsciousness. This not only confounds plausible research in the area but betrays an anosognosia about Wittgenstein's diagnosis about our philosophical “introspection” of mysterious inner processes.
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  • Conscious and Nonconscious Control of Action.Antti Revonsuo - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):265-266.
    I criticize Block's examples of P-consciousness and A-consciousness for being flawed and the notion of A-consciousness for not being a notion of consciousness at all. I argue that an empirically important distinction can be made between behavior that is supported by an underlying conscious experience and behavior that is brought about by nonconscious action-control mechanisms. This distinction is different from that made by Block.
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  • How Access-Consciousness Might Be a Kind of Consiousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):264-265.
    In response to the objection that his “access-consciousness” is not really consciousness but a matter of the availability of certain information for certain kinds of processing, Block will probably have to argue that consciousness in a more basic, familiar, traditional sense is an essential component of any instance of access-consciousness and thus justifies the name.
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