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Brainstorms

Philosophy of Science 47 (2):326-327 (1978)

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  1. Transitivity and Transparency.Joseph Gottlieb - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (4):353-379.
    Two popular theses central to recent theorizing about consciousness are the transitivity principle and the transparency of experience. According to the former, conscious mental states are mental states we are aware of in some way. According to the latter, there is some awareness-relation that we seemingly cannot bear to our experiences. I argue that, within certain reasonable constraints, there is no precisification of these theses that renders them compatible.
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  • Epistemic Injustice in Healthcare: A Philosophical Analysis.Ian James Kidd & Havi Carel - 2014 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 17 (4):529-540.
    In this paper we argue that ill persons are particularly vulnerable to epistemic injustice in the sense articulated by Fricker. Ill persons are vulnerable to testimonial injustice through the presumptive attribution of characteristics like cognitive unreliability and emotional instability that downgrade the credibility of their testimonies. Ill persons are also vulnerable to hermeneutical injustice because many aspects of the experience of illness are difficult to understand and communicate and this often owes to gaps in collective hermeneutical resources. We then argue (...)
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  • A Situated Grandmother? Some Remarks on Proposals by Barwise and Perry.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - Mind and Language 2 (1):64-81.
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  • Homunkulismus in den Kognitionswissenschaften.Geert Keil - 2003 - In Wolfgang R. Köhler & Hans-Dieter Mutschler (eds.), Ist der Geist berechenbar? Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. pp. 77-112.
    1. Was ist ein Homunkulus-Fehlschluß? 2. Analyse des Mentalen und Naturalisierung der Intentionalität 3. Homunkulismus in Theorien der visuellen Wahrnehmung 4. Homunkulismus und Repräsentationalismus 5. Der homunkulare Funktionalismus 6. Philosophische Sinnkritik und empirische Wissenschaft Literatur .
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  • (4 other versions)Rules and representations.Noam Chomsky - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):1-15.
    The book from which these sections are excerpted is concerned with the prospects for assimilating the study of human intelligence and its products to the natural sciences through the investigation of cognitive structures, understood as systems of rules and representations that can be regarded as “mental organs.” These mental structui′es serve as the vehicles for the exercise of various capacities. They develop in the mind on the basis of an innate endowment that permits the growth of rich and highly articulated (...)
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  • Historical Moral Responsibility: Is The Infinite Regress Problem Fatal?Eric Christian Barnes - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (4):533-554.
    Some compatibilists have responded to the manipulation argument for incompatibilism by proposing an historical theory of moral responsibility which, according to one version, requires that agents be morally responsible for having their pro-attitudes if they are to be morally responsible for acting on them. This proposal, however, leads obviously to an infinite regress problem. I consider a proposal by Haji and Cuypers that addresses this problem and argue that it is unsatisfactory. I then go on to propose a new solution (...)
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  • The Natural Origins of Content.Daniel D. Hutto & Glenda Satne - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):521-536.
    We review the current state of play in the game of naturalizing content and analyse reasons why each of the main proposals, when taken in isolation, is unsatisfactory. Our diagnosis is that if there is to be progress two fundamental changes are necessary. First, the point of the game needs to be reconceived in terms of explaining the natural origins of content. Second, the pivotal assumption that intentionality is always and everywhere contentful must be abandoned. Reviving and updating Haugeland’s baseball (...)
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  • (1 other version)Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings.David John Chalmers (ed.) - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.
    What is the mind? Is consciousness a process in the brain? How do our minds represent the world? Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings is a grand tour of writings on these and other perplexing questions about the nature of the mind. The most comprehensive collection of its kind, the book includes sixty-three selections that range from the classical contributions of Descartes to the leading edge of contemporary debates. Extensive sections cover foundational issues, the nature of consciousness, and the (...)
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  • Free Will: The Scandal in Philosophy.Bob Doyle - 2011 - Cambridge, MA, USA: I-Phi Press.
    A sourcebook/textbook on the problem of free will and determinism. Contains a history of the free will problem, a taxonomy of current free will positions, the standard argument against free will, the physics, biology, and neuroscience of free will, the most plausible and practical solution of the problem, and reviews of the work of the leading determinist Ted Honderich, the leading libertarian Robert Kane, the well-known compatibilist Daniel Dennett, and the determinism-agnostic Alfred Mele.
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  • Dennett’s Strategy for Naturalizing Intentionality: an Innovative Play at Second Base.Tadeusz Wieslaw Zawidzki - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):593-609.
    I briefly review the three basic strategies for naturalizing intentionality discussed by Haugeland 4:383–427, 1990, and Hutto and Satne, recounting their deficits. Then, I focus on Dennett’s version of what Haugeland calls the “second-base … neo-behaviorist” strategy. After briefly explaining Dennett’s proposal, I defend it against four common objections: circularity, relativity, under-specified rationality, and failure to track robustly natural facts. I conclude by recounting the advantages of Dennettian neo-behaviorism over the neo-Cartesian and neo-pragmatist alternatives, as well as Hutto and Satne’s (...)
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  • Against Motivational Efficacy of Beliefs.Seungbae Park - 2015 - Santalka: Filosofija, Komunikacija 23 (1):86-95.
    Bromwich (2010) argues that a belief is motivationally efficacious in that, other things being equal, it disposes an agent to answer a question in accordance with that belief. I reply that what we are disposed to do is largely determined by our genes, whereas what we believe is largely determined by stimuli from the environment. We have a standing and default disposition to answer questions honestly, ceteris paribus, even before we are exposed to environmental stimuli. Since this standing and default (...)
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  • The cognitive neuroscience revolution.Worth Boone & Gualtiero Piccinini - 2016 - Synthese 193 (5):1509-1534.
    We outline a framework of multilevel neurocognitive mechanisms that incorporates representation and computation. We argue that paradigmatic explanations in cognitive neuroscience fit this framework and thus that cognitive neuroscience constitutes a revolutionary break from traditional cognitive science. Whereas traditional cognitive scientific explanations were supposed to be distinct and autonomous from mechanistic explanations, neurocognitive explanations aim to be mechanistic through and through. Neurocognitive explanations aim to integrate computational and representational functions and structures across multiple levels of organization in order to explain (...)
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  • On the relationship between speech acts and psychological states.Seungbae Park - 2014 - Pragmatics and Cognition 22 (3):340-351.
    This paper defends a theory of speech act that I call concurrentism. It consists of the following three theses. 1. We believe, ceteris paribus, that other people’s speech acts concur with their beliefs. 2. Our speech acts, ceteris paribus, concur with our beliefs. 3. When our speech acts deviate from our beliefs, we do not, ceteris paribus, declare the deviations to other people. Concurrentism sheds light on what the hearer believes when he hears an indicative sentence, what the speaker believes (...)
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  • Concrete consciousness: A Sartrean critique of functionalist accounts of mind.Joel W. Krueger - 2006 - Sartre Studies International 12 (2):44-60.
    In this essay, I argue that Sartre's notion of pre-reflective consciousness can be summoned to offer a general challenge to contemporary functionalist accounts of mind, broadly construed. In virtue of the challenge Sartre offers these contemporary functionalist accounts and the richness of his phenomenological analysis, I conclude that his voice needs to be included in ongoing debates over the nature of consciousness. First, I look at some of the basic claims motivating functionalist accounts of mind. Next, I look at Sartre's (...)
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  • Methodological problems in evolutionary biology VI. The force of evolutionary epistemology.Wim J. van der Steen - 1986 - Acta Biotheoretica 35 (3):193-204.
    Evolutionary epistemology takes various forms. As a philosophical discipline, it may use analogies by borrowing concepts from evolutionary biology to establish new foundations. This is not a very successful enterprise because the analogies involved are so weak that they hardly have explanatory force. It may also veil itself with the garbs of biology. Proponents of this strategy have only produced irrelevant theories by transforming epistemology's concepts beyond recognition. Sensible theories about “knowledge and biology” should presuppose that various long-standing problems concerning (...)
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  • (1 other version)A philosophical investigation into coercive psychiatric practices_Vol 2.Gerry Roche - 2012 - Dissertation, University of Limerick
    This dissertation seeks to examine the validity of the justification commonly offered for a coercive (1) psychiatric intervention, namely that the intervention was in the ‘best interests’ of the subject and/or that the subject posed a danger to others. As a first step,it was decided to analyse justifications based on ‘best interests’ [the ‘Stage 1’ argument] separately from those based on dangerousness [the ‘Stage 2’ argument]. Justifications based on both were the focus of the ‘Stage 3’ argument. Legal and philosophical (...)
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  • Folk Psychology.Adam Morton - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
    I survey the previous 20 years work on the nature of folk psychology, with particular emphasis on the original debate between theory theorists and simulation theorists, and the positions that have emerged from this debate.
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  • Kant’s Emergence and Sellarsian Cognitive Science.Richard McDonough - 2014 - Open Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):44-53.
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  • Sculpting the space of actions. Explaining human action by integrating intentions and mechanisms.Machiel Keestra - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Amsterdam
    How can we explain the intentional nature of an expert’s actions, performed without immediate and conscious control, relying instead on automatic cognitive processes? How can we account for the differences and similarities with a novice’s performance of the same actions? Can a naturalist explanation of intentional expert action be in line with a philosophical concept of intentional action? Answering these and related questions in a positive sense, this dissertation develops a three-step argument. Part I considers different methods of explanations in (...)
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  • Hydrocephalus and “misapplied competence”: Awkward evidence for or against?N. F. Dixon - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):675-676.
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  • Dream processing.David Foulkes - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):678-678.
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  • What is the relation between language and consciousness?Jeffrey A. Gray - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):679-679.
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  • Consciousness and content in learning: Missing or misconceived?Richard A. Carlson - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):673-674.
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  • When functions are causes.Jonathan Schull - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):622-624.
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  • Consciousness and accessibility.Ned Block - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):596-598.
    This is my first publication of the distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness, though not using quite those terms. It ends with this: "The upshot is this: If Searle is using the access sense of "consciousness," his argument doesn't get to first base. If, as is more likely, he intends the what-it-is-like sense, his argument depends on assumptions about issues that the cognitivist is bound to regard as deeply unsettled empirical questions." Searle replies: "He refers to what he calls (...)
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  • Mental Imagery and mystification.John Hell - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (4):554-555.
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  • Imagining the purpose of imagery.Robert P. Abelson - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (4):548-549.
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  • When does the intentional stance work?Daniel C. Dennett - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):763-766.
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  • Information is in the eye of the beholder.Rhea T. Eskew - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1):144-144.
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  • Representational development and theory-of-mind computations.David C. Plaut & Annette Karmiloff-Smith - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):70-71.
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  • Cognition is not computation, for the reasons that computers don't solve the mind-body problems.Walter B. Weimer - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):152-153.
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  • The milk of human intentionality.Daniel Dennett - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):428-430.
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  • Brains + programs = minds.Bruce Bridgeman - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):427-428.
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  • Rules and causation.John R. Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):37-38.
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  • Representation and psychological reality.Elliott Sober - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):38-39.
    In this brief space I want to describe how Chomsky's analysis of "psychological reality" departs from what I think is a fairly standard construal of the idea. This familiar formulation arises from distinguishing between someone's following a rule and someone's acting in conformity with a rule. The former idea, but not the latter, involves the idea that the person has some mental representation of the rule that plays a certain causal role in determining behavior. Although there may be many grammatical (...)
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  • Difficulties with a direct theory of perception.Irvin Rock - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):398-399.
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  • Some remarks on the notion of competence.József Andor - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):15-16.
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  • The language faculty and the interpretation of linguistics.Robert Cummins & Robert M. Harnish - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):18-19.
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  • On the nature of information in behalf of direct perception.Rebecca K. Jones & Anne D. Pick - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):388-389.
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  • Intrinsic intentionality.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):450-457.
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  • Decentralized minds.Marvin Minsky - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):439-440.
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  • The chess room: further demythologizing of strong AI.Roland Puccetti - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):441-442.
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  • Qualia for propositional attitudes?Frank Jackson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):52-52.
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  • Goldman has not defeated folk functionalism.James H. Fetzer - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):42-43.
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  • Simulation?Joseph Agassi - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (4):535-536.
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  • Testing the components of a computer model.Brendan A. Maher - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (4):543-543.
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  • Nonhuman intentional systems.H. S. Terrace - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):378-379.
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  • Belief accripton, parsimony, and rationality.John Hell - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):365-366.
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  • Thinking about animal thoughts.Donald R. Griffin - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):364-364.
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  • Common sense, functional theories and knowledge of the mind.Max Velmans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):85-86.
    A commentary on a target article by Alison Gopnik (1993) How we know our minds: the illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality. Focusing on evidence of how children acquire a theory of mind, this commentary argues that there are internal inconsistencies in theories that both argue for the functional role of conscious experiences and the irreducibility of those experiences to third-person viewable information processing.
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