Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. (6 other versions)The right and the good.W. Ross - 1932 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 39 (2):11-12.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   393 citations  
  • The Logic of Questions and Answers by N. D. Belnap and T. B. Steel. [REVIEW]Martin Bell - 1979 - Mind 88 (350):297-299.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • (6 other versions)The Right and the Good.W. D. Ross - 1930 - Mind 40 (159):341-354.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   347 citations  
  • (1 other version)Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:321-332.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1052 citations  
  • Reasons Why.Bradford Skow - 2016 - Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press UK.
    This book first argues that what philosophers are really after, or at least should be after, when they seek a theory of explanation, is a theory of answers to why-questions. The book's main thesis, then, is a theory of reasons why. Every reason why some event happened is either a cause, or a ground, of that event. Challenging this thesis are many examples philosophers have thought they have found of "non-causal explanations." Reasons Why uses two ideas to show that these (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   69 citations  
  • I Ought, Therefore I Can.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):167-216.
    I defend the following version of the ought-implies-can principle: (OIC) by virtue of conceptual necessity, an agent at a given time has an (objective, pro tanto) obligation to do only what the agent at that time has the ability and opportunity to do. In short, obligations correspond to ability plus opportunity. My argument has three premises: (1) obligations correspond to reasons for action; (2) reasons for action correspond to potential actions; (3) potential actions correspond to ability plus opportunity. In the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   140 citations  
  • Rationality Through Reasoning.John Broome (ed.) - 2013 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Rationality Through Reasoning answers the question of how people are motivated to do what they believe they ought to do, built on a comprehensive account of normativity, rationality and reasoning that differs significantly from much existing philosophical thinking. Develops an original account of normativity, rationality and reasoning significantly different from the majority of existing philosophical thought Includes an account of theoretical and practical reasoning that explains how reasoning is something we ourselves do, rather than something that happens in us Gives (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   446 citations  
  • (6 other versions)The Right and the Good. By R. Robinson. [REVIEW]W. D. Ross - 1930 - International Journal of Ethics 41:343.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   429 citations  
  • Engaging Reason.Joseph Raz - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):745-748.
    Joseph Raz presents a penetrating exploration of the interdependence of value, reason, and the will. These essays illuminate a wide range of questions concerning fundamental aspects of human thought and action. Engaging Reason is a summation of many years of original, compelling, and influential work by a major contemporary philosopher.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   249 citations  
  • Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism.Erik Joseph Wielenberg - 2014 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Erik J. Wielenberg draws on recent work in analytic philosophy and empirical moral psychology to defend non-theistic robust normative realism, according to which there are objective ethical features of the universe that do not depend on God for their existence. He goes on to develop an empirically-grounded account of human moral knowledge.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   52 citations  
  • The truth in particularism.Joseph Raz - 2000 - In Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral particularism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 48--78.
    Particularism's model of explanation is challenged on the ground that a sensible intelligibility principle requires that there must be an explanation for the difference between a good and a bad action. Raz is concerned with what it is to be guided by reason, as well as with the results of the fact that reason can often undermine particular outcomes. What determines the moral status of an action must extend beyond what the agent's reason for acting is. It is argued that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   47 citations  
  • Advertisement for a sketch of an outline of a proto-theory of causation.Stephen Yablo - 2004 - In John Collins, Ned Hall & Laurie Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals. MIT Press. pp. 119-137.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  • Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action.Maria Alvarez - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Understanding human beings and their distinctive rational and volitional capacities requires a clear account of such things as reasons, desires, emotions, and motives, and how they combine to produce and explain human behaviour. Maria Alvarez presents a fresh and incisive study of these concepts, centred on reasons and their role in human agency.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   201 citations  
  • The logic of questions and answers.Nuel D. Belnap & Thomas B. Steel (eds.) - 1976 - New Haven/London: Yale University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   95 citations  
  • Ethics without principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    In this much-anticipated book, Jonathan Dancy offers the only available full-scale treatment of particularism in ethics, a view with which he has been associated for twenty years. Dancy now presents particularism as the view that the possibility of moral thought and judgement does not in any way depend on an adequate supply of principles. He grounds this claim on a form of reasons-holism, holding that what is a reason in one case need not be any reason in another, and maintaining (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   675 citations  
  • (1 other version)Intention.Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    This is a welcome reprint of a book that continues to grow in importance.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   883 citations  
  • (1 other version)A Theory of Hedged Moral Principles.Pekka Väyrynen - 2009 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 91-132.
    This paper offers a general model of substantive moral principles as a kind of hedged moral principles that can (but don't have to) tolerate exceptions. I argue that the kind of principles I defend provide an account of what would make an exception to them permissible. I also argue that these principles are nonetheless robustly explanatory with respect to a variety of moral facts; that they make sense of error, uncertainty, and disagreement concerning moral principles and their implications; and that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Non-naturalism and Normative Necessities.Stephanie Leary - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12.
    This chapter argues that the best way for a non-naturalist to explain why the normative supervenes on the natural is to claim that, while there are some sui generis normative properties whose essences cannot be fully specified in non-normative terms and do not specify any non-normative sufficient conditions for their instantiation, there are certain hybrid normative properties whose essences specify both naturalistic sufficient conditions for their own instantiation and sufficient conditions for the instantiation of certain sui generis normative properties. This (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  • The grounding argument against non-reductive moral realism.Ralf M. Bader - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  • Not All Partial Grounds Partly Ground: Some Useful Distinctions in the Theory of Grounding.Shlomit Wygoda Cohen - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1):75-92.
    The aim of this paper is to argue for some useful distinctions in the theory of grounding. I do so by first introducing the notion of grounding, discussing some of its features, and arguing that grounds must play some role in bringing about what they ground (sec.1). I then argue that there are various distinct roles a fact may play in bringing about another, and more particularly that we should distinguish between three such roles; enablers, partial grounds, and facts that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Normative Reasons as Reasons Why We Ought.Jacob M. Nebel - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):459-484.
    I defend the view that a reason for someone to do something is just a reason why she ought to do it. This simple view has been thought incompatible with the existence of reasons to do things that we may refrain from doing or even ought not to do. For it is widely assumed that there are reasons why we ought to do something only if we ought to do it. I present several counterexamples to this principle and reject some (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • (1 other version)A Theory of Hedged Moral Principles.Pekka Väyrynen - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:91-132.
    This paper offers a general model of substantive moral principles as a kind of hedged moral principles that can (but don't have to) tolerate exceptions. I argue that the kind of principles I defend provide an account of what would make an exception to them permissible. I also argue that these principles are nonetheless robustly explanatory with respect to a variety of moral facts; that they make sense of error, uncertainty, and disagreement concerning moral principles and their implications; and that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  • Intention.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (1):110.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   261 citations  
  • Reasons and Impossibility.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):351-384.
    Many philosophers claim that it cannot be the case that a person ought to perform an action if this person cannot perform this action. However, most of these philosophers do not give arguments for the truth of this claim. In this paper, I argue that it is plausible to interpret this claim in such a way that it is entailed by the claim that there cannot be a reason for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   77 citations  
  • Explaining Right and Wrong: A New Moral Pluralism and its Implications.Benjamin Sachs - 2017 - London: Routledge.
    How should we choose between competing explanatory stories? -- Against monism -- Against Rossian pluralism -- Non-Rossian pluralism -- The question of scope, part I: distributive moral concerns -- The question of scope, part II: non-distributive moral concerns -- Doing harm and failing to rescue -- The distribution of health care resources.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • (6 other versions)The Right and the Good.W. D. Ross - 1932 - The Monist 42:157.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   311 citations  
  • Questions.Jeroen Groenendijk & Martin Stokhof - 1997 - In J. F. A. K. Van Benthem, Johan van Benthem & Alice G. B. Ter Meulen (eds.), Handbook of Logic and Language. Elsevier. pp. 1059–1131.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   121 citations  
  • (1 other version)The Right and the Good.Some Problems in Ethics.W. D. Ross & H. W. B. Joseph - 1933 - Journal of Philosophy 30 (19):517-527.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   360 citations  
  • (6 other versions)The Right and the Good.W. D. Ross - 1930 - Philosophy 6 (22):236-240.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   442 citations  
  • (6 other versions)The Right and the Good.W. D. Ross - 1930 - International Journal of Ethics 41 (3):343-351.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   354 citations  
  • Nuel D. Belnap, Jr. and Thomas B. Steel, Jr.: The Logic of Questions and Answers. [REVIEW]Charles F. Kielkopf - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (3):490-491.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • (1 other version)Four Decades of Scientific Explanation.Wesley C. Salmon & Anne Fagot-Largeault - 1989 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 16 (2):355.
    As Aristotle stated, scientific explanation is based on deductive argument--yet, Wesley C. Salmon points out, not all deductive arguments are qualified explanations. The validity of the explanation must itself be examined. _Four Decades of Scientific Explanation_ provides a comprehensive account of the developments in scientific explanation that transpired in the last four decades of the twentieth century. It continues to stand as the most comprehensive treatment of the writings on the subject during these years. Building on the historic 1948 essay (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   514 citations