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  1. Skill.Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):713-726.
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  • Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action.John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.) - 2011 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA.
    Knowledge how to do things is a pervasive and central element of everyday life. Yet it raises many difficult questions that must be answered by philosophers and cognitive scientists aspiring to understand human cognition and agency. What is the connection between knowing how and knowing that? Is knowledge how simply a type of ability or disposition to act? Is there an irreducibly practical form of knowledge? What is the role of the intellect in intelligent action? This volume contains fifteen state (...)
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  • They’ve lost control: reflections on skill.Ellen Fridland - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2729-2750.
    In this paper, I submit that it is the controlled part of skilled action, that is, that part of an action that accounts for the exact, nuanced ways in which a skilled performer modifies, adjusts and guides her performance for which an adequate, philosophical theory of skill must account. I will argue that neither Jason Stanley nor Hubert Dreyfus have an adequate account of control. Further, and perhaps surprisingly, I will argue that both Stanley and Dreyfus relinquish an account of (...)
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  • Ryle's Knowing how and knowing how to act.Jennifer Hornsby - 2011 - In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 80.
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  • The Structure of Practical Expertise.Cheng-Hung Tsai - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):539-554.
    Anti-intellectualists in epistemology argue for the thesis that knowing-how is not a species of knowing-that, and most of them tend to avoid any use of the notion “knowing-that” in their explanation of intelligent action on pain of inconsistency. Intellectualists tend to disprove anti-intellectualism by showing that the residues of knowing-that remain in the anti-intellectualist explanation of intelligent action. Outside the field of epistemology, some philosophers who try to highlight the nature of their explanation of intelligent action in certain fields, such (...)
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  • Replies to Dickie, Schroeder and Stalnaker. [REVIEW]Jason Stanley - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):762-778.
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  • Knowing How and Knowing That: The Presidential Address.Gilbert Ryle - 1946 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 46:1 - 16.
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  • Knowing How Without Knowing That.Yuri Cath - 2011 - In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 113.
    In this paper I develop three different arguments against the thesis that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. Knowledge-that is widely thought to be subject to an anti-luck condition, a justified or warranted belief condition, and a belief condition, respectively. The arguments I give suggest that if either of these standard assumptions is correct then knowledge-how is not a kind of knowledge-that. In closing I identify a possible alternative to the standard Rylean and intellectualist accounts of knowledge-how. This alternative view (...)
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  • Counter-Closure.Federico Luzzi - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):673-683.
    The focus of this paper is the prima facie plausible view, expressed by the principle of Counter-Closure, that knowledge-yielding competent deductive inference must issue from known premises. I construct a case that arguably falsifies this principle and consider five available lines of response that might help retain Counter-Closure. I argue that three are problematic. Of the two remaining lines of response, the first relies on non-universal intuitions and forces one to view the case I construct as exhibiting a justified, true (...)
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  • Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation.Michael Strevens - 2008 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    Approaches to explanation -- Causal and explanatory relevance -- The kairetic account of /D making -- The kairetic account of explanation -- Extending the kairetic account -- Event explanation and causal claims -- Regularity explanation -- Abstraction in regularity explanation -- Approaches to probabilistic explanation -- Kairetic explanation of frequencies -- Kairetic explanation of single outcomes -- Looking outward -- Looking inward.
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  • Doxastic compatibilism and the ethics of belief.Sharon Ryan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):47-79.
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  • Responsibility for attitudes: Activity and passivity in mental life.Angela M. Smith - 2005 - Ethics 115 (2):236-271.
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  • (1 other version)What the tortoise said to Achilles.Lewis Carroll - 1895 - Mind 4 (14):278-280.
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  • The deontological conception of epistemic justification.William P. Alston - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:257-299.
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  • Involuntary sins.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):3-31.
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  • Knowledge, Perception, and Memory.Don Locke - 1976 - Philosophical Quarterly 26 (104):279-280.
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  • (1 other version)What The Tortoise Said To Achilles.Lewis Carroll - 1895 - Mind 104 (416):691-693.
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  • Regarding a Regress.Yuri Cath - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):358-388.
    Is there a successful regress argument against intellectualism? In this article I defend the negative answer. I begin by defending Stanley and Williamson's (2001) critique of the contemplation regress against Noë (2005). I then identify a new argument – the employment regress – that is designed to succeed where the contemplation regress fails, and which I take to be the most basic and plausible form of a regress argument against intellectualism. However, I argue that the employment regress still fails. Drawing (...)
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  • Ryle’s regress defended.Jeremy Fantl - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):121-130.
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  • Doxastic freedom.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):375-392.
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  • God exists!Robert K. Meyer - 1987 - Noûs 21 (3):345-361.
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  • Know How.Jason Stanley - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Chapter 1: Ryle on Knowing How Chapter 2: Knowledge-wh Chapter 3: PRO and the Representation of First-Person Thought Chapter 4: Ways of Thinking Chapter 5: Knowledge How Chapter 6: Ascribing Knowledge How Chapter 7: The Cognitive Science of Practical Knowledge Chapter 8: Knowledge Justified Preface A fact, as I shall use the term, is a true proposition. A proposition is the sort of thing that is capable of being believed or asserted. A proposition is also something that is characteristically the (...)
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  • Knowledge from falsehood.Ted A. Warfield - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):405–416.
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  • Intellectualism and the Objects of Knowledge. [REVIEW]Robert Stalnaker - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):754-761.
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  • Nonpropositional Intellectualism.John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett - 2011 - In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 161-195.
    Knowledge how to do things, or know-how, is intimately related to action. Yet know-how is also a genuine cognitive achievement. An adequate account must handle these points. Negatively, we advance arguments against theories that focus narrowly on abilities or propositional knowledge. Positively, we develop an alternative approach. The central idea is that know-how involves grasping a conception of a method for acting (or set of such methods)—where a method for phi-ing is a sequence of act-types the execution of which is (...)
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  • Skill Before Knowledge. [REVIEW]Imogen Dickie - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):737-745.
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  • Idealizations and Contextualism in Physics.Kevin Davey - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (1):16-38.
    Describing a physical system in idealized terms involves making claims about the system that we know to be literally false. Because of this, it is not clear how calculations involving idealizations can generate justified belief and explain facts about the world. I argue that this puzzling aspect of idealizations cannot be explained away by talking about approximations, as is often supposed. I develop a different account of how justified beliefs and explanations can be generated from idealized descriptions of physical systems. (...)
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  • Knowing how to and knowing that.David Wiggins - 2009 - In Hans-Johann Glock & John Hyman (eds.), Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy: Essays for P. M. S. Hacker. New York: Oxford University Press.
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