Public accounting firms can build integrity within their organizations through early detection of fraud. One way to reduce and detect fraud is to encourage whistleblowing as a prosocial behavior. We explore the impact of mentoring on intention to report fraud. A survey with 120 responses from the US public accountants suggests that quality mentoring relationships, a common feature in the profession, and caring ethical climate positively relate to internal reporting of fraud. Two intermediate variables, trust and affective commitment, mediate these (...) effects. Mentor-relationship quality also increases perceptions of caring ethical climate. The study contributes to two bodies of research by finding extended benefits from mentoring, beyond those typically discussed in academic literature; and identifying a previously unexplored firm intervention capable of positively influencing prosocial behavior and combating fraud. (shrink)

IN THIS PAPER I CONSIDER THE VALUE OF FRIENDSHIP FROM AN ARISTOTELIAN POINT OF VIEW. THE ISSUE IS OF CURRENT INTEREST GIVEN RECENT CHALLENGES TO IMPARTIALIST ETHICS TO TAKE MORE SERIOUSLY THE COMMITMENTS AND ATTACHMENTS OF A PERSON. HOWEVER, I ENTER THAT DEBATE IN ONLY A RESTRICTED WAY BY STRENGTHENING THE CHALLENGE ARTICULATED IN ARISTOTLE'S SYSTEMATIC DEFENSE OF FRIENDSHIP AND THE SHARED LIFE. AFTER SOME INTRODUCTORY REMARKS, I BEGIN BY CONSIDERING ARISTOTLE'S NOTION THAT GOOD LIVING OR HAPPINESS ("EUDAIMONIA") FOR AN (...) INDIVIDUAL NECESSARILY INCLUDES THE HAPPINESS OF OTHERS. SHARED HAPPINESS ENTAILS THE RATIONAL CAPACITY FOR JOINTLY PROMOTING COMMON ENDS AS WELL AS THE CAPACITY TO IDENTIFY WITH AND COORDINATE SEPARATE ENDS. THIS EXTENDED NOTION OF HAPPINESS PRESUPPOSES THE EXTENSION OF SELF THROUGH ATTACHMENTS, AND I NEXT CONSIDER CERTAIN MINIMAL CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR ATTACHMENT. FINALLY, I DISCUSS HOW ARISTOTLE'S NOTION OF A FRIEND AS "ANOTHER SELF" IS COMPATIBLE BOTH WITH A CONCEPTION OF THE SEPARATENESS OF THE INDIVIDUALS AND OF THE DISTINCTIVE WAYS IN WHICH EACH INDIVIDUAL REALIZES VIRTUE WITHIN A SHARED LIFE. (shrink)

Quite frequently, business periodicals feature articles on the importance of building and maintaining a "network" of businessfriends. Typically, these articles offer practical suggestions for "networking." This article is a philosophical investigation of businessfriends, and business friendships. Relying upon Aristotle's classic analysis, I argue that business friendships are instances of"incomplete friendships for utility." Viewed in this way, much is revealed about what business friendships are; even more is revealedabout what business friendships are not. It is perfectly natural to say that business (...) friends use one another; this raises the issue of whether business friendships violate the Kantian "categorical imperative." I argue that they need not, and that-so long as they are truly"friendships"-they do not. What this discussion makes clear, however, is that business friendships are in continuous peril of eroding intorelationships that cannot survive moral scrutiny. I conclude with a few practical suggestions-and philosophical cautions. (shrink)

Mentoring is a natural setting for senior employees to render ethics advice and consultation to junior employees. Two studies examined the question of whether those who mentor are more practically wise than those who do not. Although four different measures of practical wisdom were used, no differences were detected. However, mentors were shown to be more politically skilled than non-mentors.

There is still a relative paucity of discussion of the views on friendship that Aristotle presents in the Nicomachean Ethics ,1 although some recent work may indicate a new trend. One suspects that this paucity reflects a belief that those views are not very interesting; if true, this witnesses to an unfortunate underestimation of Aristotle's account. This account is in fact quite surprising, for -- I shall argue -- Aristotle believes that one makes one's friends in the most literal sense (...) of the verb. (shrink)

While the loss of the second book of the Poetics has deprived us of Aristotle’s most extensive account of laughter and comedy, his discussion of eutrapelia (wittiness) as a virtue in his ethical works and in the Rhetoric points toward the importance of humor for his ethical and political thought. This article offers a reconstruction of Aristotle’s account of wittiness and attempts to explain how the virtue of wittiness would animate the everyday interactions of ordinary citizens. Placing Aristotle’s account of (...) wittiness in dialogue with recent work within the ethical turn in contemporary political theory can help articulate what a late-modern ethos of democratic laughter might look like. (shrink)

This book provides a reconstruction of Aristotelian character education, shedding new light on what moral character really is, and how it can be highlighted, measured, nurtured and taught in current schooling. Arguing that many recent approaches to character education understand character in exclusively amoral, instrumentalist terms, Kristjánsson proposes a coherent, plausible and up-to-date concept, retaining the overall structure of Aristotelian character education. After discussing and debunking popular myths about Aristotelian character education, subsequent chapters focus on the practical ramifications and methodologies (...) of character education. These include measuring virtue and morality, asking whether Aristotelian character education can salvage the effects of bad upbringing, and considering implications for teacher training and classroom practice. The book rejuvenates time-honoured principles of the development of virtues in young people, at a time when 'character' features prominently in educational agendas and parental concerns over school education systems. Offering an interdisciplinary perspective which draws from the disciplines of education, psychology, philosophy and sociology, this book will appeal to researchers, academics and students wanting a greater insight into character education. (shrink)

In a formidable display of boundary-breaking scholarship, Kristján Kristjánsson analyzes and dispels misconceptions about Aristotle's views on morality, emotions and education that abound in the current literature - including claims of the emotional intelligence theorists that they have revitalized Aristotle's message for the present day. This is an arresting book that deepens the contemporary discourse on emotion cultivation and one that will excite any student of moral education, whether academic or practitioner.

This paper seeks to examine the plausibility of the concept of ‘Civic Friendship’ as a philosophical model for a conceptualisation of ‘belonging’. Such a concept, would hold enormous interest for educators in enabling the identification of particular virtues, attitudes and values that would need to be taught and nurtured to enable the civic relationship to be passed on from generation to generation. I consider both of the standard arguments for civic friendship: that it can be understood within the Aristotelian typology (...) as either a form of utility friendship or as a form of virtue friendship. I argue that civic friendship may not be the most appropriate model and that attempts to resolve the problems through looking on it as a political metaphor leave it unable to fulfil the function for which it was originally designed in Ancient Greece. Finally, I emphasize the need to carefully consider which particular metaphors we choose for civic relationships and how we subsequently use them. (shrink)

How can the Aristotelian account of friendship contribute to an understanding of the notion of politike philia? The aim of this paper is to sketch out a general description of political friendship in the light of Aristotle's well-known distinction between friendships of utility, friendships of pleasure and friendships between virtuous people drawn in Book VIII of the Nicomachean Ethics. I shall define the boundaries of political friendship through the analysis of resemblances to and differences from both friendship according ethical excellence (...) and friendship grounded in mere utility. Political friendship seems to be a kind of advantage-friendship sui generis, where the search for utility does not prevent people from displaying other-regarding qualities like cooperation, trust and loyalty, that are typical of friendship according to ethical excellence. I will also show that activity according to justice replaces the form of mutual and intimate love that should subsist in a friendship based on ethical virtue. (shrink)

We propose a revised set of moral dilemmas for studies on moral judgment. We selected a total of 46 moral dilemmas available in the literature and fine-tuned them in terms of four conceptual factors (Personal Force, Benefit Recipient, Evitability and Intention) and methodological aspects of the dilemma formulation (word count, expression style, question formats) that have been shown to influence moral judgment. Second, we obtained normative codings of arousal and valence for each dilemma showing that emotional arousal in response to (...) moral dilemmas depends crucially on the factors Personal Force, Benefit Recipient, and Intentionality. Third, we validated the dilemma set confirming that people's moral judgment is sensitive to all four conceptual factors, and to their interactions. Results are discussed in the context of this field of research, outlining also the relevance of our RT effects for the Dual Process account of moral judgment. Finally, we suggest tentative theoretical avenues for future testing, particularly stressing the importance of the factor Intentionality in moral judgment. Additionally, due to the importance of cross-cultural studies in the quest for universals in human moral cognition, we provide the new set dilemmas in six languages (English, French, German, Spanish, Catalan and Danish). The norming values provided here refer to the Spanish dilemma set. (shrink)

The essay sheds light on Aristotle's understanding of friendship and its relation to political life. The author challenges the usual view that Aristotle postulates three distinct kinds of friendship. Instead the author argues that Aristotle understood there to be only one kind of friendship, and that other "friendships" were to Aristotle "unfinished" and thus not friendship at all. Aristotle shows that the relation between friendship and politics is grounded in friendship's possibility for human beings, and not as something cherished for (...) its actuality. By looking at proper friendship as possibility and not actuality, we could only ever interpret the infamous statement attributed to Aristotle—"my friends, there are no friends"—not as illuminating of what friendship is but rather as a nostalgic diagnosis of the decay of the possibility of friendship, and hence of politics. By extension, and more poignantly, interpreting Aristotle's work on friendship in this light, we stand ready to reinterpret the mobilization of Aristotelian friendship for contemporary understandings of democratic practice. (shrink)

Among the tasks of modern political philosophy is to develop a favored conception of the relations among modern citizens, among people who can know little or nothing of one another individually and yet are deeply reciprocally dependent. One might think of this as developing a favored conception of civic friendship. In this essay I sketch two candidate conceptions. The first derives from the Kantian tradition, the second from the 1844 Marx. I present the two conceptions and then describe similarities and (...) differences. My approach is both taxonomic and programmatic. My taxonomic goal is to provide an initial sketch of the conceptual territory. My programmatic goal is to provide reasons to think that the conception derived from Marx is both appealing and feasible. (shrink)

An English language translation accompanies the original Greek text of Aristotle's book about the nature of the state, constitutions, revolutions, democracy, and oligarchy.

Book synopsis: With the emergence of democracy in the city-state of Athens in the years around 460 BC, public speaking became an essential skill for politicians in the Assemblies and Councils - and even for ordinary citizens in the courts of law. In response, the technique of rhetoric rapidly developed, bringing virtuoso performances and a host of practical manuals for the layman. While many of these were little more than collections of debaters' tricks, the Art of Rhetoric held a far (...) deeper purpose. Here Aristotle establishes the methods of informal reasoning, provides the first aesthetic evaluation of prose style and offers detailed observations on character and the emotions. Hugely influential upon later Western culture, the Art of Rhetoric is a fascinating consideration of the force of persuasion and sophistry, and a compelling guide to the principles behind oratorical skill. (shrink)

Julia Annas offers a new account of virtue and happiness as central ethical ideas. She argues that exercising a virtue involves practical reasoning of the kind we find in someone exercising an everyday practical skill, such as farming, building, or playing the piano. This helps us to see virtue as part of an agent's happiness or flourishing.

IN THE FIRST SEVERAL PARAGRAPHS of Nicomachean Ethics 9.8, Aristotle asks "whether a man should love himself most", and asserts that "men say that one ought to love best one's best friend". Yet earlier Aristotle describes loving as more essential to friendship than being loved; furthermore, he emphasizes that a man wishes well to his friend for his friend's sake, not as a means to his own happiness. Note also Aristotle's continued emphasis upon man as a political animal. In the (...) Politics as well as the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle describes the biological, even instinctive tendency of humans to seek each other's company. He considers it absurd for a man even to imagine living alone, since "without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods". It is only the human animal, however, who is even capable of that genuine friendship which, although rare, Aristotle considers "not only necessary but also noble; for... we think it is the same people that are good men and are friends" ; these friends are "alike in their excellence", one loving another "as being the man he is". (shrink)

In this paper I will discuss Aristotle's phenomenology of giving. I try to point out the relations between virtues such as liberality, magnificence and magnanimity. These virtues deal with different domains, i.e. with the right flow of money, with expenditure and finally with political and spiritual greatness. I argue, however, that they share a common structure, the friendship with oneself. Aristotle's concept of friendship with oneself means a personal integration, an achieved harmony of individual faculties, which represents the core of (...) the different virtues. It can be recognized in its most accomplished form in the case of magnanimity, a secondlevel virtue that is not primarily about economic goods and deals rather with self-knowledge and self-realization. Friendship with oneself is actually the result of a long process of maturation, made possible by practice, imitation of good models, teachings and personal reflection. During this process the natural individuality, with its attachments and cravings, is regenerated and adjusted to higher goals: the ethical and political life. Accordingly, I try to make clear that both the liberal and the magnificent man have gone through this long and challenging path. Both the liberal and the magnificent citizen can give to others in the right way as they do not rob themselves of the good they deserve. The consequence of Aristotle's theory of virtuous giving is intriguing: one can give to other people in a virtuous way only if one is friend of himself and recognizes himself the right to the goods he is truly worth of. (shrink)

Aristotle's emphasis on sameness of character in his description of the virtuous friend as "another self" figures centrally in all his arguments for the necessity of friendship to self-knowledge. Although the attribution of the Magna Moralia to Aristotle is disputed, the comparison of the friend to a mirror in this work has encouraged many commentators to view the friend as a mirror that provides the clearest and most immediate image of one's own virtue. I will offer my own reading of (...) Aristotle's theory of friendship, suggesting that the friend constitutes "another self" not as a mirror image but rather as a partner in moral perception. (shrink)

Aristotle's well-known divisions of friendship, those based on utility, pleasure and virtue, are based on the kind of good each provides. It is fairly easy to see what is contributed by utility- and pleasure-friendships, but virtue-friendship presents a special difficulty. Aristotle writes that virtue-friendship occurs between good (virtuous) persons, each of whom is happy because of that goodness. Aristotle also asserts, however, that the good (happy) person, especially the philosopher, is largely self-sufficient, needing little in the way of external goods (...) for his happiness. Such a person is virtuous not only in the moral sense but intellectually, having developed the capacities of the mind to make effective moral decisions and, in the case of the philosopher, to contemplate the most divine of subjects. If that is the case, it is not difficult to see why such a person would not need many utility- or pleasure-friends, but why would he need virtue-friends? What does virtue-friendship contribute to the happiness of one who is already happy? Possible answers to those questions have been provided by a number of commentators, whose views will be considered below. I believe their answers can be classified into three general types of argument: the �opportunity argument�, the �reassurance argument� and the �pleasure argument�. Although all of these have their merits, each has pitfalls. There is another possible answer, an �essentialist argument�, which more accurately describes Aristotle's view. I will argue that virtue-friends come to understand each other's true selves, and each, through the awareness and contemplation of the other, becomes a better human being and, consequently, happier. (shrink)